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ABSTRACT
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Canada and Japan contrast significantly in many respects.
Geographically» Canada occupies the northern part of North Anerica— vast
in land area and rich in natural resources.

Japan, on the other hand, forms

a small chain of islands off the Asian continent.

Its resources are found

in a large population and a rapidly growing industrial strength substanti
ated by its high GNP.
Socio-culturally, Canada’s heritage is mainly a mixture of French
and English.

Presently, it is greatly influenced by the Anerican culture.

Japan contrasts with a culture all its own, which has so far withstood
attacks of Americanization.
Important differences can also be found in the foreign and defence
policy-making processes of the two countries.

The comparative study of

the functions of their decision-makers shows great contrast in the senior
officialdom, the Prime Ministership, the Cabinet, as well as the opposition
of both countries, in spite of the fact they share a similar Parliamentary
system.
Although there are these differences, Canada and Japan share in
military relations with the U.S.— Canada in NATO and NORAD, and Japan in
the Security Treaty.

Careful comparative examination, however, reveals

some striking differences.

Most significant is the divergence in the

development of their military dependence on the U.S. in the postwar period.
Canada’s defence has become greatly integrated with the U.S., whereas
Japan has shown a tendency towards gradual reduction of its dependence.
To a certain extent, this divergence in their military dependence
can be related to their differences in the policy-making process.

This

divergence can be related more to the differences existing in geographical
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and socio-cultural aspects of the two countries.

In Canada*s case,

heavier military dependence on the U.S. is explained by its convergence
with the U.S. in geography, society and culture.

Japan*s divergence

with the U.S. in these respects accounts for its trend to lesser
dependence.
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Japan and Canada are two middle powers across the Pacific Ocean
from each other, differing entirely in geography, language, culture and
history.

Canada, before Confederation in 1867, was a British colony.

Even today Canada still retains a close relationship with Britain.
French occupied Canada before it became a British colony.

The

As a result,

French Canadians comprise one-third of the present total population.
Canada, thus, possesses a unique mixture of mainly British and French
cultures.
Canadian cultural characteristics are not only British and
French, but also American.

Neighbouring on the U.S., Canada is, to a

large extent, influenced by the Americans socio-culturally, economically
and politically as well.

In the postwar period, in particular, the influ

ence of the U.S. on Canada has become so great that some Canadians today
have difficulty in differentiating themselves from Americans in terms of
political, economic, cultural and military aspects.
Historically, Canada has never enjoyed a fully independent
identity.

"Rather," writes Roger Swanson, "it invoked the counterweight

technique of balancing external influences so that it could develop as
1
an autonomous nation."
When Great Britain proposed an imperial defence
federation in the 1870’s, Canada invoked the United States to balance
Great Britain.

In the postwar period, this technique of balancing

external influences has been used to create a counterweight to U.S.
military, economic, cultural and political pressures.
In this respect, Canada presents a great contrast to Japan.
Japan is an Asian country, unique in that it is considered too Westernized
to be entirely Asian, and too Asian to be considered Western.
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Bounded on

3

all sides by the sea, Japan had seldom experienced a threat to its
territorial integrity until the Second World War.

Its geographical

isolation contributed to its cultural and political isolation until
the Heiji Restoration in 1868.

Unlike Canada, Japan does not have

the difficulty of differentiating itself from other countries in
socio-cultural aspects.
Though Canada and Japan contrast in many respects, they also
share some similarities.

Not only are both allies of the Western power

bloc led by the U.S. and classified as'middle powers, but they also
both share in military co-operation with the U.S.

Anong the bilateral

military agreements of the U.S., the North American Air Defence (NORAD)
system between the U.S. and Canada, and the Security Treaty system
between the U.S. and Japan are most important in U.S. defence policy.
As partners in such important bilateral military alliances with the
U.S., Canada and Japan have kept, throughout the postwar period, a
relatively close relationship-with the U.S., economically, politically,
as well as militarily.
Taking this into consideration, it is noteworthy to compare how
Canada and Japan— two very different countries in many respects— have
developed their military relations with the U.S. in this period.
Comparative analysis of the development of their military relations with
the U.S. will draw attention to some important bases from which Canada
and Japan may possibly promote their co-operation in the future.
This paper attempts to analyze comparatively, in three parts,
the postwar development in the military relations of Canada and Japan
with the U.S.

The purpose of taking this approach of comparative
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analysis is to help account for the similarities and differences between
the two countries in their defence policies.
Part I makes a comparative study of

geographical, economic and

socio-cultural factors in the relations of Canada and Japan with the
U.S.

Comparison of their respective public attitudes towards the U.S.,

on the basis of the public opinion poll results, will reveal a divergence
and

convergence existing in their relations with the U.S. Salient inter

national environments of the postwar period

and national interests and

policy objectives of the two countries are also dealt with and compared
in this part.
Part II analyzes, comparatively, the policy-making processes of
Canada and Japan, with emphasis on foreign and defence policies.

First,

structural and functional differences between the Department of External
Affairs in relation to the Department of National Defence and the ministry
of Foreign Affairs in relation to the National Defence Agency are examined.
Next, the differences in background characteristics of senior officials in
both the Department of External Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
are pointed out.

In the following sections, the Prime Minister, the

Cabinet, and the people and opposition parties are comparatively dealt with.
Part III examines how the governments, the oppositions and the
people of these two countries have reacted to the development in their
military relations with the U.S., during the postwar period.

This part

divides the postwar period into three, focusing attention on the conclu
sion and renewal of NATO, KORAD and the Security Treaty.

The coursesof

action taken by the government and the reaction to them of the opposition
and the people in both countries are compared in each period.
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The conclusion attempts to relate this divergence and convergence
betxreen Canada and Japan, in terms of geography, economy, society, culture
and the policy-making process, to the postwar development of their military
relations with the U.S.

In doing so, the conclusion aims at discovering

xdiat is the most important factor determining the similarities or differ
ences in the military relations of Canada and Japan with the U.S.
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PART ONE
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.

Strategic Location
Economic Relations with the U.S.
After World War II
Socio-Cult viral Aspects
Attitude of the Public Towards the U.S.
Salient International Environments
National Interests and Policy Objectives
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Strategic Location
Geographical location and sice have been among the most important
factors shaping the defence policy of a country, and they continue to be
of great importance in the Canadian case.
The land area of Canada extends from the Atlantic to the Pacific,
covering the northern part of the North American continent.

Canada’s

total area of four million square miles is the largest in the Western
Hemisphere and second only to the Soviet Union, in the world.

Bordered

only by the U.S. to the south and north-west, Canada was remote from
possible enemies of conventional war.

Since the ICBH era, which began in

the late Fifties, Canada’s geographical advantages— vastness and remote^
ness— have become greatly reduced.

Situated between the superpowers,

Canada is now a possible area for a nuclear battlefield.
National security nay include not only considerations of terri2
torial integrity, but also of survival of national identity. In consider
ing "survival of national identity," which is widely discussed in Canada
today, it may be viewed that the U.S. constitutes a threat to Canada.
However, -with reference to "territorial integrity," since the end of the
Second Uorld T7ar, the Soviet Union has been considered by military
planners to be Canada’s only possible enemy, and the direction of its
threat has been over the North Pole.
Located on the other side of the Pacific, Japan is only one
twenty-eighth the sine of Canada, which means it is approximately one
3
quarter the size of Quebec or the same size as Newfoundland. Although
Japan is an island country surrounded by the Pacific Ocean to the east
and the Sea of Japan to the west, the archipelago of 3,513 islands is

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

nore vulnerable to military attach— from the continent and fron
submarines.

Especially since its two currently possible enemies, the

Soviet Union and Communist China, are located directly across the Sea
of Japan, its location is inevitably disadvantageous compared to Canada’
location.
This divergence between Canada and Japan is even greater, when
the population of the two countries is taken into consideration.
population is five tines as large as that of Canada.

Japan*

Of the 100 million

Japanese, more than one-third are crowded into the narrow belt along the
Pacific coast, from Tokyo in the north to Kita-Kyushu in the south.

The
4
population density of Japan is 130 tines larger than that of Canada.
5 '
The size, the length of coast line, and the snail population
make Canada difficult and costly to defend.

But Japan, whose huge

population is crowded into such a small area, appears unavoidably open
to possibility of total destruction through nuclear attack.
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Economic Relations with the U»S. after World Uar II
Canada is not only great in land area, but also in abundance of
natural resources.

The mineral production of Canada, which accounted

for $500 million in 1945, has rapidly increased to $1 billion in 1950

6
and $4 billion in 1966.

Bountiful natural resources from coal and

petroleum to nickel and uranium lie under the relatively virgin land
of Canada; only part of which has yet been exploited.
Japan, contrary to the Canadian situation, is rather limited
in natural resources, particularly in mineral resources, which are vital
to defence production.

Iron ore, crude petroleum and nickel ore, which

are important not only for military purposes, but also for modern indus
try, as a whole, are desperately in need.
Abundant in natural resources, the Canadian economy is much less
agriculture-based than that of Japan.

In Canada, approximately 90 per

cent of the labour force is engaged in secondary and tertiary industries,
while in 1967, 7.6 per cent was engaged in agriculture and 3.0 per cent
in other primary industries.

In Japan, over 20 per cent of the total

labour force is still engaged in agriculture and approximately 25 per cent
in primary industries.
The differences in economy between Canada and Japan, however,
are not only found in economic structure, but also in per capita income.
Although Japan*s GNP in 1968 was more than twice that of Canada, per
capita income of Japan in the same year was less than half ($1,110) of
the Canadian counterpart ($2,300).

The rate of increase in Japan*s per

capita income, like that of its GIHi has been much faster than that of
Canada, but it will still take Japan a while to bring its standard of
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TABLE

1.

Year
196u
1961
1962
1963
196 a
1965
1966
1967
1968

Production of Hineral Resources in Canada and Japan
(1960-1568)
in thousands of metric tons
Copper
Iron Ore
Japan
Japan
Uorld
Canada
Uorld
Canada
4,270
395.5
89.2
11,140
1,774
256,600
4,430
96.4
398.3
1,594
246,100
10,528
103.6
4,630
252,300
414.9
14,148
1,442
1,363
4,650
410.6
107.2
16,150
266,700
106.2
4,840
301, 100
20,766
441.7
1,432
5,050
107.1
460.9
326,400
1,427
21,822
111.7
1,370
5,270
339,900
459.1
22,474
5,020
556.4
117.8
337,800
23,433
1, 274
119.9
5,390
562.4
27,349
1, 249
368,100

Year
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965.
1966
196/
196d

world
337,000
374,000
367,000
358,000
395,000
458,000
438,000
513,000
570,000

Nickel Ore
Canada
194,597
211,366
210,686
196,886
207,288
235, 126
202,856
225,569
239,359

Crude
Year
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968

Uorld
1,053,600
1, 122,200
1,217,200
1,305,800
1,409,700
1,510,700
1,641,600
1,760,100
1,923,800

Japan
—
- - -

—
—
- -—

—

Petroleum
Japan
Canada
526
25,630
29,863
657
33,020
760
785
34,845
657
37,147
671
39, 457
43,248
782
47,394
788
782
51,197

Uorld
3,380
3,500
3,640
3,680
4,070
4,360
4,520
4,900
5,070

Zinc
Canada
390.1
402.0
455.4
451.0
662.2
826.4 •
949.8
1,133.1
1,155.1

Jap an
156.7
168.3
192.5
198.0
216.5
221.0
253.6
262.7
264.3

Uorld
2,430
2,420
2,540
2,540
2,570
2,750
2,860
2,900
3,000

Lead Ore
Canada
192.5
165.6
191.7
180.5
187.2
274.8
283.2
308.2
327.6

Jap an
39.5
46.3
53.5
52.7
54.1
54.9
63.1
63.5
62.9

Source: U.N. Statistical Yearbook 1969, Statistical Office* Departmen
of Economics and Social Affairs* the United Nations* New York
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living up to the Canadian one.
Economic divergence between the two countries is also found in
their postwar economic relations with the U.S.

Throughout the postwar

period to the present, Canada has relied on the U.S. for approximately
60 per cent of its exports and 70 per cent of its imports.
Before Japan’s independence in 1951, its trade with the U.S.
was very unbalanced; 66 per cent of its imports and only 18 per cent of
its exports (the average of the four-year period 1947-1950) were with the
U.S.

After the Occupation ended, the American share in Japan’s exports

showed a drastic increase— 14 per cent in 1951 and 32 per cent in 1968.
At the sane time, Japan has gradually decreased the proportion of its
7
imports from the U.S. from 29 per cent in 1951 to 23 per cent in 1968.
Canadian trade with

the U.S., as a rule, has been to the

advantage of the U.S., imports exceeding exports by about 10 per cent.
In 1968, however, Canada’s exports to the U.S. for the first time
exceeded its imports from that country,

lloreover, since 1961, Canada’s

world exports have exceeded its world imports.
In contrast to Canada’s case, Japan, with exception of a few
years, has always imported more than it exported in total foreign trade.
But, as far as its trade with, the U.S. is concerned, exports since 1965
have exceeded imports.
Furthermore, while Canada leaves little more than one-third of
its foreign trade for the rest of the world, Japan divides the remain
ing 66 per cent of its foreign trade between the Asian market and the
rest of the world.

One of Canada’s ’’mother countries,” Great Britain,

has remained its second largest trading partner, but its share has been
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reduced.

France is far below Britain on the list of Canada’s leading
8
trading partners. Canada’s trade with European countries* including

the Soviet Union (2 per cent), occupied less than 20 per cent of the
total in 1966 (24 per cent in exports and .15 per cent in imports), when
the .American share was 65 per cent.

The remaining 15 ner cent was
9
shared by various countries in the world.
Compared with the U.S. nahing up most of Canada’s market, in
1967, all Asian countries, including those in the Middle East and in the

Communist bloc, shared over one-third of the Japanese foreign trade;
34 per cent in exports and 31 per cent in imports.

The rest of the

world occupied another one-third; 15 per cent with Europe, 7 per cent
with Africa, 6 per cent with Oceania, and 4 per cent with the others.
In the period 1950-1968, Japan’s expansion in trade was much
greater than that of Canada, although Canada’s total foreign trade
exceeded that of Japan until as recently as 1964.

However, dependence

on foreign trade is heavier in Canada’s case than in Japan’s.

This

can be derived from viewing total foreign trade as a percentage of
GUP figures.

(Table 3)

In 1968, for example, Canada’s foreign trade

amounted to almost forty per cent of GHP, while the equivalent amount for
Japan was 20 per cent of the GUP.

This indicates that the /merican

market is vital for Canada, while it is much less so for Japan.
Foreign investment by the U.S. is another important factor.in
the economic relations of Canada and Japan.

According to the Batkins

report of 1968 on foreign investment, the Americans control 46 per cent
of manufacturing, 62 per cent of the petroleum and natural gas industry,
10
and 52 per cent of mining and smelting in Canada. Foreigners, mainly
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■Americans, control 97 per cent of Canada*s automobile industry, 97 per
cent of the rubber, 78 per cent of the chemical and 77 per cent of the
11

electric apparatus.

TABLE 3.
Comparison of GNP and Foreign Trade, 1950-1968

Year
1950
1952
1954
1956
1958
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968

GNP (A)
16,500
22,400
23,100
28,400
30,700
33,700
37,700
44,100
53,700
62,500

CANADA
Foreign Trade
5,800
8,400
8,100
10,600
10,300
11,200
11,800
14,600
18,900
24,000

(B)

B/A
35%
38
35
37
33
33
31
33
35
38

in millions of U.S. dollars
JAPAN
Foreign
Trade (3)
GNP (A)
11,100
1,800
3,300
16,900
20,700
4,000
25,800
5,700
5,900
34,900
8,500
49,300
62,400
10,600
77,200
14,600
19,300
97,600
142,000
26,000

B/A
16%
20
19
22
17
17
17
19
20
18

Note: Figures are calculated on a U.S. dollar base equivalent to Canadian
$1.07 and Japanese ¥360, regardless of fluctuation.
Source: Canada Year Bool:, Nihon Tolcei Nenkan and The llilitary Balance,
The Institute for Strategic Studies, London.

The total foreign long-terra capital invested in Canada increased
from Can. $8,661 million in 1950 to Can. $32,012 million in 1966, of
which the U.S. share rose from Can. $6,548 million in 1950 to Can. $25,644
million in 1966.

Throughout this period, the U.S. has been Canada*s

biggest investor, holding an annual average of 77 per cent of total
investments.
Compared with Canada, the capital inflow of Japan has at least
two very significant characteristics:

one is the small scale of foreign

investments, which totalled $848 million in 1967; the other is the very
12

limited participation in management by foreigners.

The small scale of
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investment and management participation strictly limits the possibility
of foreign intervention in Japanese industries.
In 1967, the foreign direct investments x;ere $30 million, a
figure undeniably smaller than the $1,925 million in Canada.

Although

more than 70 per cent of the foreign investments in Japan have been from
the U.S., Japan has successfully maintained its independence from
American control over the economy.
Because of the dominance of the U.S. in its economic relations,
it is not difficult to understand why Canada, compared mith Japan, must
rely much more on the U.S. for its military production.

In view of the

differences in geographical and socio-cultural as well as economic
aspects, Canadafs heavy economic dependence on the U.S. is likely to
continue, uhile Japan mill probably further reduce its reliance upon the
U.S., expanding its market in Asia.
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Socio-Cultural Aspects
In Japan’s case, geographical and demographic factors not only
give rise to certain weaknesses, but also, when fused with socio-cultural
factors, to certain strengths:
unity.

the asset of a high degree of national

The insular, homogeneous population of Japan has preserved its

own culture through its history-

Sooted in this culture, the Japanese

people are far more tightly unified than Canadians.

The extent of

national unification may bear considerable relation to the defence and
foreign policies in Japan’s postwar period.
In Canada there is a great variety of ethnic groups and relicions,
13
while in Japan, there are hardly any. The Canadian people are divided
mainly into two ethnic groups— those of British origin (447.,) and those
of French origii^ (307o).

The rest are Germans (5.87)> Ukrainians (2-67,)>
14
Italians (2.57,)> Dutch (2-4%) and more than thirty other small groups-

Because of pressure from the second largest grouo, the Canadian
15
Government has attempted to promote biculturalism and bilingualism.
However, because of its French-Caiiadian heritage, the province of Quebec
is often alienated from the rest of the provinces where there is an
English-speaking majority.

Uhile the economic interests of the poor

maritime provinces are often in conflict with those of the rich pro
vinces, the western provinces are geographically isolated from the
eastern provinces.
This lack of national unification in Canada may also be related
to the convergence which exists in culture, language and perhaps ideology
between the U.S. and Canada.

The pulls exerted by the great industrial

power of the U.S. have worked in favour of a north-south mentality in
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Canada, rather than an east-west one.

Canadians seem to have made little

effort to preserve their separate national identity, acquiescing in the
maintenance of a cultural, economic and military "togetherness” with the
U.S.

In this respect, Canada has been drawn towards continentalism

rather than towards Canadian nationalism.
In terms of Japan's defence policy, a strong sense of nationalism
has been an undeniable supporter of the desire for increased independence
from the U.S.

Contrary to Japan, Canada does not yet seem instilled with

the kind of strong nationalism which would make it refuse foreign control
of its military operation, although Canadian attitudes clearly have
changed in the last year or so.

16
In earlier history, Canada regarded the U.S. as an enemy.

One

of the reasons for Confederation in 1867 was Canada's fear of being a
victim of conquest by the U.S.

Because of the military threat from the

south and Great Britain's attempts to centralize its imperial defence
17
with the strategic withdrawal of colonial garrisons,
Canadians, as a
whole, became firmly unified and gradually, after Confederation, Canada
expanded its borders from the Atlantic to the Pacific.
Internally, however, the French Canadians developed a "state-ofsiege mentality," after having been continuously dominated by the English.
Mason Wade believes that the French Canadians are reminded, even today,
that "they are a conquered people" and that "the 'English," whether
English-Canadian or American, are heriditary enemies who still seek to
18
anglicize and Protestantize."
In spite of the existence of the French-Canadian antagonism to
Americans, Canada, as a whole, began to move out of the British orbit
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into the American one by the end of the First Uorld Uar.

This was

accompanied by a great increase in American investment in Canada, con19
pared to British investment which remained stable. Friendlier relations
between the U.S. and Canada were also effected, when Canada co-operated
with the U.S. in the Second Nor Id war, after they created a Permanent
Joint Board on Defence in 1940 through the Ogdensburg Agreement.
Joint efforts with the U.S. and Britain in the war economy
brought about a spectacular development of Canadian industry and
agriculture.

After the Uar, however, Canadians came to realize the danger

of excessive dependence on the U.S. militarily, economically and poli
tically.

To counterbalance U.S. influence, Canada quickly launched a

determined effort to develop multiplicity of relationships through the
United Nations, the North Atlantic community and the Commonwealth
organization.
Unlike Canada, Japan had experienced a long period of isolation
from the outside world for about 300 years until 1854.

After opening its

doors to the Uest, Japan commenced modernization, stimulated by modern
Uestem technology.

At the same time, Japan had unequal treaties with

the strong Uestern countries forced upon it.

The modernization or

westernization period which took place after the Neiji Restoration shows
some similarities with the early postwar period of Japan:

acceptance of

unequal treaties; heavy dependence on Uestern countries (the U.S. in
particular); blind admiration of the western (American) culture; and
concentration on establishing a strong economic power.
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the Japanese people
had gradually become sepai'ated from the "powerful" Uestern countries and
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had developed a high level of industrialization.

It might have been

that the Japanese were consciously trying to overcome a sense of infer
iority that had been instilled in them by the phrase "renlica of the
20
Uest." They went on to assume an aggressive spirit with strong over
tones of militant nationalism, and what they had built up in the fifty
years following the Restoration, collapsed at the end of T.'orld Uar II.
In the early postwar period, in contrast with Canada, Japan was
obliged to rely completely on the U.S.
its economic power.

It had to, in order to regain

As if "war made the U.S. and Japan friends," the

U.S. took over the position that China held when Japan borrowed from
it political and cultural ideas in the early period of its history.
Accompanying this process of borrowing, the Japanese people seem to
have felt, during the Occupation (1945-1951), some barrier which they had
to surmount.

Although the Americans embarked on the Occupation with

much "flexibility" and broad "tolerance," they cane with litt_e knowledge
of Japan*s culture, history and tradition, but with great ambitions to
21

enact another "Kew Deal" in Japan.

This socio-cultural barrier between

the Japanese and Americans may be compared to what separates the French
Canadians from "les anglais"— a sense of inferiority and a feeling of
alienation in culture, history and language.
The divergence in socio-cultural relationships with the U.S. indi
cates the difference in what constitutes an acceptable degree of military
dependence in the long term.

Canadians have much more in common with

Americans in culture and language than have the Japanese people.

This

factor seems to permit a higher Canadian tolerance level of U.S. military
dominance, than the tolerance level of Japan.

Although Canada earlier
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on e:iperienced the U.S. threat and had to devote itself to escapin5
from U.S. control when it became unacceptable* it appears easier for
Canada to depend on the U.S. for its defence than for Japan.
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Attitude of the Public towards the U.S.
In spite of the fact that a large proportion of the Canadian
population is of French origin, integration with American culture seems
to be greater in Canada than in any other part of the world.

Except

those who are solely French-speaking, Canadians are greatly influenced
through the media of American television, radio, newspapers and maga
zines.

Host Canadians, living within 100 to 150 miles of the U.S.

border, are easily within reach of the American mass media.
Canadian integration into American culture, thus, derives not
or&y from Canada*s cultural and linguist!cal similarity with the U.S.,
but also from its geographical proximity.

In all these respects, Japan

is much less likely to be integrated with the American culture.
Japan is an island country located at the other side of the
Pacific Ocean, and the Japanese people are entirely different from the
Americans ethnically, culturally and linguistically.

Although great

developments in the mass media and in transportation have made it
inevitable that Japan participate in cultural exchange with the rest
of the world,the distinctive identity of the Japanese culture is still
well-preserved.

It provides a good contrast with the Canadian culture,

which is confronted "with the danger of losing its identity.
The great divergence in cultural ties with the U.S. between
Canada and Japan makes their attitude towards the U.S. very different
from each other, both in terms of general relations and military co
operation.

The differences, as seen in various public opinion poll

results, seem to bear very close relation to the differences in defence
policies taken by Canada and Japan in the postwar period to the present.
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Prior to the conclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
a large number of Canadians (A2%) mere already aware of being more depen22

dent on the U.S. than ever before.

A few years later, a majority of

Canadians (60%) thought Canada should continue to encourage U.S. invest
ment to help develop natural resources, not fearing that their way of
23
life night be dangerously influenced by the U.S.
Before Japan became independent in 1951, the majority of
Japanese honed that Japan would be pro-American rather than pro-Soviet
24
or neutralist. For the Japanese, being pro-Am.erican did not mean,
however, that they approved the presence of U.S. bases in their country25
from the very beginning of Japanese-American military co-operation.
In the mid and late Fifties, the differences in attitude towards
the U.S. between Canada and Japan became increasingly distinguishable.
Canadian opinion of economic relations with the U.S. in 1956 showed that
the public felt development which was financed by U.S. money was benefi26
cial for Canada. More Canadians in 1956 (63%) than in 1951 (AC/i) believed
that their way of life was not being overly influenced by the U.S.,
although at the end of the decade, the majority (50%) knew Canada had
27
become more dependent on the U.S. for air defence.
In Japan, in this period from the mid to late Fifties, an
increasing number of Japanese opposed the presence of American bases in
28
Japan, mainly because it was offensive to national pride. The Japanese,
however, seem to have been in a dilemma, at that time, wondering what
they should do about their own defence.

They opposed the American bases

in Japan, on the one hand, and, on the other, they hesitated to r e a m
29
themselves, although they realized the necessity of military forces.
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When the najority of the Japanese agreed that the best way to protect
Japan’s securitv was either by their own forces or collective security
30
(which required Japan to have its own forces)} they were undecided over
the meaning of "own forces."
In the early Siizties, Canadians felt the danger of a threat from
the Soviet Union, believing that the Russian claims for peace were merely
propaganda and that the Soviet Union was really further advanced militarily
31
than the U.S. Although more Canadians regarded China as the greatest
threat to world peace, the najority, in 1962, favoured an increase in
Uestera military strength in order to counteract the power of the Soviet
32
Union. This indicated that Canadian military forces in Europe, at least,
should not be reduced.
Moreover, during this period, a great majority of Canadians agreed
that Canada was becoming more and more dependent on the U.S. for their
air defence, and that their defence in general had become mors integrated
33
with that of the U.S. In spite of this, the possibility of conn lete
34
dependence on the U.S. for Canada’s defence was strongly rejected.
The Sixties were, for the Japanese, the beginning of the socalled "new era" of Japanese-American relations, following the stormy
period of 1958-1960.

Just before the renewal of the bilateral Security

Treaty with the U.S. in 1960, a majority of Japanese favoured general
co-operation with the U.S. in the future, while a large number of them
worried that the Treaty would increase the possibility of Japanese
35
involvement in war.
In snite of the unprecedented prosperity in Japan, the majority
36
of Japanese were uneasy about their future and the possibility of war.
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37

Strongly opposing to join the Communist bloc, they sought to eliminate
38
war. Although they were uneasy, more than 80 per cent of the people
39
favoured having Self-Defence Forces in the mid Sixties.
In 1S67, when Canada’s foreign policy under the Pearson Govern
ment emphasised the peacekeeping role, the najority of the pecole sup40
ported the government’s policy and considered it satisfactory. Uhile
41
they wished Canada to pursue a more independent role, in 1967, a great
majoritv in Canada favoured continuation of membership in both military
42
alliances— NATO and NCHAD.
By 1970, a najority of Canadians, particularly in Ontario,
expressed the opinion that Canada is more dependent on the U.S. than
43
in previous years. However, they are satisfied vith being Canadians,
and thev believe that Canada is the country which will have the nost
44
to offer ordinary people for their happiness.
In the late Sixties, nost Jananese feared being three tened by
.‘
45
China because of its continual nuclear bonb testings. In spite of this
threat (or perhaps because of the threat) almost 70 per cent of the
majority favoured friendlier relations or
46
relations with Communist China.

normalization of dinlonatic

Although the najority of Japanese agreed that Japan’s economic
47
prosperity had depended on American protection for its security, they
48
considered the U.S. troops no longer necessary for Japan’s security.
This tendency seems to be closely related to their doubt of American
49
sincerity to protect Japan in case of emergency, and to the growing
50
feeling of need for self-defence.
Thus, as the results of public opin5.or. polls show, Canadians, in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

24

general*'are much more favourable to Anericans than are the Japanese.
In military relations, while Canadians prefer "co-operation" with the
U.S. to complete dependence on then, the Japanese people refuse even
"co-operation," if it means allowing the Americans to retain their bases
in Japan.
The favourable attitude of Canadians towards Anericans seer.is to
bear very close relation to Canada's similarity with the U.S. in geo
graphical and socio-cultural aspects.

In turn, the Japanese people talce

a nuch less favourable attitude towards the U.S., particularly with
regard to its military alliance with the U.S., largely owing to its
socio-cultural divergence with that country.

These differences in

general attitude towards the U.S. between Canada and Japan appear to
be closely related to the trends of their military co-operation with
the U.S. in the postwar period to the present.
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Salient International Environments
The foreign and defence policies of a country are, needless to
say, closely related to international environments.

That Canada could

play such a respected role as a mediator in the Suez crisis of 1956 was
not only because of the diplomatic skill of the Secretary of State for
External Affairs, Lester Pearson, and Canada’s advantage of British and
French heritage, but also because international environments were in
favour of Canada at the time.

Japan, too, was economically, to a large

extent, saved by special procurements in the Korean War.

Without the

Korean War, Japan might never have been able to enjoy the gigantic
economic power it basks in today.
No sooner was the United Nations, the successor to the League
of Nations, established in 1945, than the Cold War between the Communist
powers and the Western powers was in progress.

Because of the ideolo

gical antagonism in the Cold War, the United Nations was divided by the
rivalry between the two blocs: the Communist bloc led by the Soviet
Union and the Western bloc led by the U.S.
The tension between the two power blocs reached its peak in
the late Forties with the Berlin blockade (1949), and the proclamation
of the Communist Chinese Government (1949).

At the time of the Berlin

blockade, Canada swiftly moved toward the formation of the North Atlantic
community.

Owing to the ineffective role of the U.N. in the Cold War

disputes and to an unacceptable degree of American control over Canada’s
political independence, Canadian political leaders seized the opportunity
to bring North America into the North Atlantic alliance with the western
51
European countries..

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The Korean War (1950-53) gave two different kinds of opportunity
to Canada and Japan: for Canada— a political one—

to provide foundations
52
for Canada’s reputation for objectivity and independence,
and for Japan53
to give the Japanese economy a decisive injection of prosperity.
After the Korean War, Canada became deeply involved politically
in Asian affairs in Indo-China, Kashmir, Palestine and Lebanon.

Its

reputation as an impartial mediator was at a premium in the Suez crisis
of I960.
While Canada was busy establishing a reputation for independent
diplomacy, Japan was concentrating entirely on economic growth in
54
almost the same manner as half a century before.
Japan, at the time
of the Korean War—

the climax of the Cold War, and just when it became

relieved of the long period of American control, hardly found it pos
sible to envisage independence without alignment with the U.S.
The Fifties was an era of alliance for Japan in contrast to
Canada’s relatively independent diplomacy.

At San Francisco in 1951j

Japan concluded the Peace Treaty and the bilateral Security Treaty with
the U.S., and in 1952, other bilateral Peace Treaties with Taiwan and
India.

In 1956, when Canada was one of the most significant participants

in the U.N., Japan was just beginning its membership in the international
organization.

In spite of its restored relations with many parts of the

world, Japan played a passive role in international activities throughout
the Fifties.
For Canada, the Sixties proved much less favourable than the Fifties
for playing a significant role on the international scene.

The

possession of advanced nuclear weapons by both superpowers and other
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great powers, the rise in international politics of de Gaulle as leader
of an independent foreign policy, the formation of regionalism among
Afro-Asian states, and the preoccupation with biculturalisn and bilin
gualism at home--all these

changes decreased the role Canada could play.

As a result, the loud voice from the French Canadians drew more attention
from Canadians in the mid Sixties than the government’s effort to inte
grate U.!T. peacekeeping forces into the overall structure of its own
55
defence policies. Canada, thus, cane to focus its attention on domestic
affairs, rather than external ones, leaving its defence under the super
vision of the U.S.
On the other hand, for Japan, the Sixties w o e a time of prosperity,
when

it slowly rose to its

at least in Asia.

feet and started to play a more positive role,

The estrangement between the Chinese Communists and

the Soviets developed from the difference of opinion over whether world
56
war could be banished while capitalism still exists. 'Jhon the Vietnam
Far was rapidly escalated after the accession of the Johnson Administra
tion, China simultaneously showed its nuclear capability by conducting
a series of continuous nuclear testings.
Japan’s uneasiness in this kind of Asian environment" was further
aggravated by its heavy dependence on the American military protection,
which allowed the U.S. virtually a free hand militarily on Japanese soil.
In this respect, international environments clearly had some effect on
Japan’s defence policy which has gradually moved from U.S. control to a
form of rather independent self-defence.
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National Interests and Policy Objectives
Since the time of Confederation in 1867, the social and economic
bases of Canadian national interests have, of course, undergone change
but have never been completely transformed.

Even after Canada's active

participation in the Second World War, the components of Canadian national
interest have changed little, although rather different policies have
been adopted.
In contrast to this strong element of continuity in Canada's
social and economic bases, Japanese traditional life underwent a profound
transformation.

After the end of the War and during the Occupation, Japan

endeavoured to obliterate the past period of nationalistic militarism
from its memory.

As a result, the social and economic foundations were

revamped in the postwar period of Japan.
Although there were great differences in the immediate constitu
ents of national interests, both Canada and Japan after World War II
have been strongly concerned with promoting economic relations with
as many countries as possible in the world.

If it is agreed that a

nation's policy should be aimed at promoting its prosperity and security,
to maintain good relations with the U.S. has been one of most desired
ends shared by Canada and Japan.
A nation's policies are, however, conditioned by external and
internal environments.

Immediately after World War II, multiplicity

of relationships became an important objective in Canada's foreign
policy— to secure its independence from the unacceptable degree of control
by the U.S.

While political independence was one of the most prominent

national interests of Canada, Japan’s national policy concentrated on
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economic recovery.

Kith little responsibility in and negligible influ

ence on world affairs, Japan*s realistic policy of economic development
and prosperity has net with spectacular success.
Canada, on the one hand, intended to preserve national security
by means of e::panding its relationships through the U.K.* 1I.AI0 and the
Commonwealth without reducing economic ties with the U.S.

On the other

hand, Japan attempted to regain its economic prosperity, almost entirely
depending on the U.S. for its economic and military co-operation.
In the Sixties, Canada’s prosperity and security became more
interrelated with that of the U.S.

Canadian national policy became more

based upon the interdependence than the independence of nations.

Econo

mically and militarily dependent on the U.S., to a large extent, the
Canadian leaders in the late Sixties came to conclude that:
For Canadians to offer ill-informed criticism of United States
foreign policy, without recognising the enormous responsibili
ties which go with Anerican power, and without recognising the
degree to which our (Canadian) interests coincide with those of
the United States, would be a sign of immaturity and could have
unfortunate consequences.^7
In order to survive as an independent nation, however, Canada
has undertaken a policy of multiplicity of relationships which prevents
a further erosion of Canadian autonomy.

Based on a middlepowermanship

and a bicultural heritage, it seems to be this direction towards which
58

Canada has begun moving within its national capability.
The first step in Japan’s national policy, after rapidly
recovering economically, was to settle basic territorial disputes.
In the Sixties, it became a main aim of Japanese independent foreign
policy to have former territories returned from both superpowers--the
Okinawa Islands and the Cgasawara Islands from the U.S., and the
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Habomai and Shikotan Islands of the ICuriles froa tlie Soviet Union.
In its attempt to establish national prestige, Japan has gradually
become aware of the danger of being too dependent on the U.S. militarily
and economically.

Unlike Canada’s tendency towards interdependence with

the U.S., Japan appears to have already begun, in the late Sixties,
seeking to protect its economic prosperity and security more indepen
dently.
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Structures of the Derartment of External Affairs and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs
Both Canada and Japan follow the parliamentary system, which is
very similar to that of Britain.

Although Canada operates under

federalism and Japan under a unitary system, the political institu
tions of the two countries have rather similar functions.
In both countries, foreign and defence policy-making is
effected through the co-operation of the Prime Minister, other Ministers
whose departments are most related to foreign and defence policy issues,
and senior officials in these departments.

Of these departments, the

Department of External Affairs (or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) is,
without a doubt, most involved with foreign policy-making.
To understand their functions, it is necessary to examine their
structures and certain characteristics of senior officials in the
Department, and the whole foreign policy-making process.

In this

examination, differences may be found not only in the departmental
structure and senior officials, but also in the Prime Ministership,
other Ministers and the opposition parties of the two countries.
Canada's Department of External Affairs, in the early Fifties,
was small in terms of number of employees and expenditures.

But, after

gradual expansion in the late Fifties and early Sixties, the Department
of today has approximately 3»200 employees and receives more than 2 per
cent of the total budget of the Government.

Japan's Ministry of Foreign

Affairs was, in the early Fifties, of notable size; its expenditures
accounted for more than one per cent of the government's total budget.
However, unlike the Canadian Department, the Ministry has not expanded in
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proportion to other ministries.

Today* the Ministry is much smaller

than the Canadian Department in terms of total expenditures, number of
employees and the percentage of departmental expenditures in the govern
ment Ts total budget.

(Table 4)

An examination of the Canadian Department chows that there mere
altogether ten divisions in 1946* based on geography and subjects.
Among then were three political divisions.

The first dealt with "questions

of international organisations and general natters affecting the peace
settlement"; the second looked after political affairs in Europe and the
Commonwealth; the third dealt with the political aspect of American conti
nents and the Far East.

The other divisions were the Legal* Treaty,
1
Diplomatic, Economic, Information, and Administrative Divisions.
The first political division became the United nations Division,
and the second and the third political divisions were divided into three
geographical divisions:

the European, the Commonwealth, and the American

and Far Eastern Divisions.

Moreover, the Diplomatic Division was divided

into the Frotocol and the Consular Divisions.
Defence Liaison Division were added.

A new Personnel and a new

These changes all occurred in 1949.

At the end of the 1940*s, the Department was headed by an Under-Secretary
with a Deputy Secretary and three Assistant Under-Secretaries who super2

vised altogether twelve divisions in the Department.
In the 1950*s, the Department grew from 259 officers to 402, but
3
the total number of employees did not increase proportionately. Its
budget grew from $9,100,000 in 1950, to $40,900,000 in 1955 and to
$70,600,000 in 1959.

During these years, eight more divisions were

added to the Department, bringing the total number of divisions to
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twenty.

Both the Defence Liaison and the Economic Divisions cane to

constitute two independent divisions; the American and Far Eastern
Division becane tuo different divisions; and the Finance* Historical,
Personnel* Supplies and Properties, and Hiddle Eastern Divisions were
newly added,

lloreover, the Inspection Service, Political Co-ordination

Section and Press Office 'were appended as "other units."
By 1968* the Department further expanded'its personnel and
organization.

The number of foreign officers and the total number of

employees increased from 414 to 815 (1960-58), and from 1,998 to 3,192
(1960-68) respectively.

A gradual move in the direction of speciali

zation had tahen place in its organization.

The departmental organi

zation had become more and more complex with each succeeding year.
Included amongst the changes was the establishment of a separate division
for U.S. affairs.
In 1969, the staff of the Department was headed by an Under
secretary with a Deputy Under-Secretary and four Assistant Under
secretaries.

The work of the Department in Ottawa was carried on

4
through 18 divisions, 3 offices, 3 branches and 4 other special offices.
However, the principle of organization by geography and subject remained
intact.
Uhile the organizational principle of Canada’s Department of
External Affairs remained unchanged after Uorld Uar II, the Japanese
Ministry was totally reorganised in principle, in the Occupation period.
In 1948, the Ministry consisted of a Secretai'iat, five Bureaus (General
Affairs, Treaties, Research and Documentation, Control and Civil Property),
two Divisions (Public Relations and Special Records) and a Foreign Service
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Training Institute.

The llinistry, at this tine, was organised, unlike
5

Canada*s Department o£ External Affairs, solely on the basis of subjects.
In 1951, when Japan becane independent with the conclusion of
the Peace Treaty at San Francisco, the llinistry was reorganised, this
tine, on the basis of geography and subjects, similar to the present
Canadian Department of External Affairs.

However, even in the Sixties,

the llinistry w7as one of the smallest among the twelve ministries of the
Japanese Government both in terms of employees and expenditures.
In 1968, there were nine bureaus in the llinistry, divided on the
6
basis of regions and subjects. Four of these bureaus were politicalgeographical ones:

the Asian Affairs, American Affairs, European

Affairs, and Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureaus.

Uithin each

bureau, the designated area of its work was further subdivided into two
to four sections according to smaller regions.

In addition to the

political-geographical bureaus, there were five bureaus which dealt
with specific subjects of foreign policy.

They were the United Nations,

Treaties, Economic Co-operation, Economic .Affairs, and Public Information
and Cultural Affairs Bureaus.
Uhile the Canadian Department of External Affairs places more
emphasis on divisions related to international, organizations, Japan*s
Foreign Ministry, under the direction of the Deputy Under-Secretary,
appears to lay more stress upon the Economic Affairs Bureau and the
Minister*s Secretariat.
The staff of the llinistry is headed by a Minister with a
Parliamentary Vice-Minister and a Permanent Vice-Minister.

As his

advisors, moreover, approximately 15 counsellors are listed at the top

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

36

level, nost of whom are ex-ambassadors.

The work of the llinistry is

carried on under the direction of these top officers, through altogether
9 bureaus, 3 branches, and one Minister*s Secretariat.

TABLE 4.
Conparison of Department of External Affairs and llinistry of
Foreign Affairs by Employees and Expenditures
Expenditures

Year
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
196<-:
1965
1966
1967
1968

in thousands of U.S.
dollars
Department of External An gairs
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
A
Employees Exc-enditures
Employees Exp enditures
B
1,610
43,800
1•0"
1,763
35,900
1.3%
1,701
44,900
1.0
1,796
18,700
0.7
60,200
1,795
1.2
1,837
22,700
0.7
1,831
60,200
1,941
25,900
0.7
1.2
75,500
1,859
1.4
2,059
29,900
0.7
97,200
1,998
2,185
1.7
34,900
0.7
103,000
2,401
2,095
41,600
1.7
0.7
95,600
1.5
2,084
2,451
50,100
0.7
1.3
S5,200
0.6
2,159
2,517
53,100
97,000
58,600
1.4
0.6
2,546
2,298
131,200
64,600
0.6
2, 644
2,611
1.8
85,300
152,500
2.0
2,817
0.7
2,697
230,500
88,800
0.6
3, 069
2.6
2,749
215,700
98,300
3, 192
2.2
2,746
0.6

Fote: A = percentages of expenditures of theDepartment in the total
gove rnne nt a1 e:a:end itur*e s.
B = Percentages of expenditures of the Ministry in the total
gove rnne n ta 1 exp-enditu re s.
Expenditure figures are calculated on a U.S. dollar base equivalent
to Canadian $1.07 and Japanese ¥360, regardless of fluctuation.
Source: Canada, Department of External Affairs, Annual Bcrort, 1955 - I960,
The Queen*s hrinter, Ottawa, and Department of Finance, Budget
Speech, 1955 - 1968, The Queen*s Printer, Ottawa.
Japan, Prime Minister*c Office, ITihon Tokei Nenkan, 1962 - 1968.
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As previously mentioned, the Canadian Department of External
Affairs has been expanding much faster than the Foreign Affairs Ministry
of Japan, in terms of employees and expenditures.

Moreover, the Canadian

Department has three divisions dealing with political-military affairs:
the Worth American Defence and MATO Division, the Peacekeeping and
Military Assistance Division, and the Defence Liaison (2) Division.

In

the Japanese Ministry, there is only one section on military affairs,
which is found in the Anerican Bureau.

This Bureau also deals with

political affairs of the American continents.
In contrast to this small section devoted
the Ministry has two large bureaus:
operation.

to military affairs,

Economic Affairs and Economic Co

One is divided into 10 sections on the basis of regions, and

the other into 6 sections on the basis of subjects.

In Canada, the

Office of Economic Affairs, which is further divided into three divisions,
comes under the direction of the same Assistant Under-Secretary as the
one responsible for Latin American and U.S.A. Affairs.
In the Department of External Affairs, there is a separate
division for handling relations with the U.S., as well as the North
American Defence and MATO Division, and in nearly all the other Divisions,
the work of the officer is influenced by an awareness of Canada's "special"
relationship with the U.S.

However, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign

Affairs has only the Korth American Section, which deals with both U.S.
and Canadian affairs, under the direction of the Chief of the American
Affairs Bureau.

In structure, at least, the U.S. is much less importantly

ranked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs than in the Department of
External Affairs.
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Although both the Department of External Affairs and llinistry of
Foreign Affairs are organised on the basis of regions and subjects, their
differences indicate that the Canadian Department has somewhat of a
political and military character, whereas the Japanese llinistry has the
characteristics of a cultural and economic organisation.

These functional

characteristics may further be related to the possibility that the
Canadian Department of External Affairs has mors influence over defence
policy-making, than has the Japanese Foreign Affairs llinistry.
The national Defence Agency of Japan is not classified, at
least legally, as highly as the Department of national Defence in
Canada.

The national Defence Agency does not enjoy full authority as a

llinistry, although the Director General of the Agency is a Cabinet nenber.
Unlike Japan*s case, the Canadian Department of national Defence not only
has full ministerial status, but also is one of the largest Departments
in the government.
Practically speaking, however, the National Defence Agency is
not necessarily less influential in defence policy-making than the
Department of National Defence.

Because of the emphasis on cultural

and economic affairs within Japan’s Foreign Affairs llinistry, defence
policy-making appears to be the work of the Defence Agency.

In Canada,

on the other hand, defence policy-making is not always a prerogative of
the Department of National Defence, because the Department of External
Affairs is much more concerned with national defence policy.
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Senior Officials in the Department and the Ministry
In addition to the roles the Department and the Ministry play,
the characteristics of senior officers in foreign affairs are also
important.

In both Canada and Japan, the bureaucracy is one of the

most significant factors in the foreign policy-making process.
Senior officials are those who are experts in the field, and therefore,
are very important as well as influential in policy-making.

Their

influence on policy-making becomes much greater when the Minister and
the Prime Minister at the very top level lack special knowledge of
their field.

Furthermore, when these officials are strictly career men,

their view may be very profound but, at the same time, narrow and
inflexible.
Lester Pearson, as Under-Secretary for External Affairs,
explained in January, 1947 how the top posts of the Canadian Department
should be filled:
In the U.S. diplomatic service the very top posts have rarely,
if ever, been held by career men. That I think is not good for
the morale of the Foreign Service. On the other hand, the
British diplomatic service is sometimes criticized as too much
of a closed corporation of officials recruited from a limited
class of persons. I think the Canadian service has given evidence
that it will avoid these extremes . . . . .7
8
Among the top 64 officers of the Department,
careers in the Department.

27 started their

Ten worked for other Federal Government

Departments or Agencies before joining the Department.
from various fields of society.

The rest came

There were news reporters and journal
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•editors(6), lawyers(6), university teaching staff(6), high school
teachers(2), insurance company workers(2), a poet, among others.
However, once they joined the Department, a very limited number of them
9
(4 our of 64) have been transferred to another Department or have
voluntarily worked outside the Department.
The variety of previous experience among the Canadian officers is
one of the most significant differences compared with the Japanese counter
parts.

Another significant difference is in education.

While a

Bachelor's degree from Tokyo University is an established avenue to
higher positions in the foreign service in Japan, it appears that Canada's
foreign service officers are required to have at least two degrees.

10
Among the 63 top officers,

6l have at least one university degree;

59 from Canadian universities and two from a British university. Forty11
four of the 6l have more than one degree.
The remaining two of the 63
have devoted themselves to international studies abroad.

This offers no

comparison with the Japanese case in which there are only seven out of 57
higher foreign service officers who have a Master's degree.
Another distinctive difference between Canadian and Japanese
higher officers in this field is the presence of an academic clique.
Unlike Japan, where more than 80 per cent of these officers are graduates
of Tokyo University, there is hardly any indication of an academic clique
amongst Canadian officers.

There are 16 University of Toronto graduates,

but this is only about one-quarter of those with degrees.

The remaining

45 are from the University of British Columbia(6), the University of
Manitoba(5), Dalhousie and Queens University(4 each), the University of
Alberta and Bishops University(3 each), and fifteen other universities
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and colleges.
By region# 24 of the 61 obtained their first degree in Ontario;
13 in Quebec; 6 in British Columbia; 5 each in Manitoba and ITova Scotia;
and 2 in Britain.

This corresponds roughly with birthplace e::cept for
12

those foreign-born.

This regional distribution changes slightly in

higher education beyond a Bachelor’s degree.

Half of the eleven Bachelor

of Law degrees were obtained in Ontario# while more than half of the ten
Doctor of Law degrees were given in Quebec.

At the blaster’s degree level#

eleven degrees were obtained fron universities in the U.S.(6)# Britain(4)>
and France(1).
As for the Japanese senior officials in the Ministry of Foreign
13
Affairs# fifty-eight top officials (excluding the Minister and Farliamentary Vice-Minister, both of whom are political appointees fron members of
the Diet) are examined in this paper.

In 1968# forty-seven of then in

the Ministry had passed the Foreign Service Examination, a year prior to
or in the sane year as graduation fron the university (this examination
is one kind of higher Civil Service Examination). Access to higher
positions in the Ministry is very much restricted to those

\ t\ i o

have

passed the Examination.
Among those who have passed the Foreign Service Examination# an
important advantage in the Ministry is graduation from Tokyo University.
Eighty-three per cent of these top fifty-eight officers are graduates
of that University, and more than 60 per cent of them have degrees in
law.
Compared with the Canadian top civil servants in External
Affairs, the incidence of education beyond a first degree is significantly
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lover in Japanese civil .servants*

Only seven out of the fifty-eight

have a Llaster’s degree, and none has a Doctor’s degree,

lloreover,

only tvo have studied abroad— both at Cambridge University, cne obtaining
a degree there.

TABLE 5.
Average Ages for Selected Senior Officials in the
Department of External Affairs by Positions (196S)

Uhole Department . . . ........ . . . . . . . .
O t t a v a ...................................
A b r o a d .........
Upon Joining Department . . . . . . . . . . . .
First Secretary ............ . . . . . . . . .
Counsellor
.........
.................................
llinister
Consul (or Consul General) ...................
Assistant Under-Cecrctary .............
Deputy Under-Secretary . . . . . . . . . . . . .
High Commissioner .......... . . . . . . . . .
Head of Division.............
Permanent Representative to
International Organization ........ . . .
Hissron heae . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ambassador
.................
Under-Secretary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ambassador to International Organisation . . . .

51.0
47.2
55.3
29.7
32.5
40.2
43.5
43.8
44.0
46.4
46.5
46.7
47.1
47 *3
47.9
49.0
54.2

Fron the above table, it appears that the importance of
position and promotion in the Department of External Affairs depends
upon seniority, to a large extent.

This table also shovs that Canada

sends older and more e::perienced officers to foreign nations and to
international organisations.

But senior officers at home are rather

young, except for the highest position, the Under-Secretary'.
As far as promotion is concerned, the figures shorn that it
t:ahes some tine to become a Counsellor after having been mronoted to
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First Secretary.

Forever, once one has become a Counsellor} the T.;ay

to the ambassadorial level appears rather clear.

Those mho rere

recruited to the Department at the age of forty or older, nost often
go abroad as an advisor or an ambassador.

At hone, almost all of the

higher positions are filled by career men, and it appears that there is
a close relationship between higher positions and longer careers in the
Department.

Thus, the recruitment in the Department of External Affairs

appears rather closed, at least as far as the top posts at Ottawa are
concerned.
Unlike Canadian officers, the higher civil servants in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs have hardly ever experienced wcrldng for
other iiinistrics or outside the government before the;; started serving
the Ilinistry.

Even after their service started in the Ilinistry, fifteen

out of 57 (data for one of these 5C is not available) have been trans
ferred to other agencies or Iiinistrics of the national government for a
14
limited tine. Because of this career stability in the Ilinistry, it nay
be assumed that important positions are ranked in t ens of seniority.
If this is so, taking an example of the average ages of those who held
high posts within the Ilinistry and of selected ambassadors as 53.5 and
57.0 (in 1S68) respectively, the latter appear higher in classification
than the former (except for the Vice-Hinister and the Foreign Affairs
Councillors).

Furthermore, the average age of those appointed to a

position as an oi'dinary ambassador is 50.7, but for more important
ambassadors (U.K., U.S.S.S., U.S.A., France, Korea, Germany, India,
Australia and International Organisations), it is 55.2.

These figures

seem to indicate a possible classification for positions from Head of a
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Section to Vice-ilinister.

TABLE 6.
Ages for Selected Senior Officials in the
Ilinistry of Foreign -.'iffairs by Positions (1968)

.Upon Joining Ilinistry . . . . . . . . . . . . .
24.1
Section H e a d ...................
37.9
First S e c r e t a r y ...........
39.1
Counsel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
40.2
Counsellor (Abroad) . . . . . . . ............ 44.4
Counsel General
.........
46.8
Vice-Chief of Bureau...........
47.6
Uxnister . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
48 •-1
Chief of Frotocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
49.3
Chief of ilinister*s Secretariat . . . . . . . .
49.3
Chief of B u r e a u ............................... 49.4
Anbassador (General)
50.7
Head of Department............................. 51.8
Head of I n s t i t u t e .........
54.0
56.0
Foreign Affairs Councillors .................
55.2
Ambassador (Selected) .......... . . . . . . .
Vice-ilinister . . .
58.0

Examination of the above information reveals some important
differences between the Canadian senior officers and those of Japan.
First of ail, in spite of the fact that the top posts of Canada*s
External Affairs Department ai*e rather closed to outsiders, the back
ground experience of senior officials in Canada shows much mere variety
than that of Japanese officials prior to joining the Department.
Secondly, there is no established educational institution
required of a senior official in Canada, whereas in Japan there is a
strong tendency for graduates of Tokyo University to have the advantage.
Compared with the Canadian case in which those with higher degrees than
a Bachelor’s can go into this field, in Japan, those who have most
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opportunity to be highly promoted arc those nko get into the ilinistry
as soon as they obtain their Bachelor*s degree.
Thirdly, in contrast to the younger age at which men join the
Ilinistry in Japan, the average ages for higher posts are nuch higher anonr
Japanese officials than Canadian ones.

This indicates that, in Japan,

higher posts require longer careers in the Ilinistry, since very few have
been recruited from, or to other Iiinistrics.
These differences become very important in the consideration of
the scope of foreign policy.

Judging only fron the background character

istics of senior officials, Canadian officials appear to have nuch more
variety and a broader experience for foreign policy-making than do the
Japanese.

As senior officials are often very influential over decision-

making, their broader ideas and information nay help create a more
flexible diplomacy, instead of one effected by narrow, inflexible ideas,
tyoical of Japanese senior officials.
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The Prime Ilinister
Fron the tine the Borden Government brought the Department
15

legally and practically V7ithin the Brine 'Iinister,s authority in 1912
until 1947, it was the Prine Ilinister of Canada xdio held the portfolio
of Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Even after that date, Louis

St. Laurent, the first Secrotarv of State who was not a Prime Ilinister,
16
was, to a large e::tcnt, under the control of the Prine Ilinister.
"The Prime Ilinister," writes Janes Eayrs, "bears inevitably a
unique responsibility for his country*s e::ternal policy even if by taste
and temperament he has little interest in it; and circumstances make it
17
likely that he will have too nuch interest rather than too little."
Because the Prine Ilinister is the leader of the cabinet and foreign
policy is his prerogative, it is difficult for him to avoid direct
involvement in international relations.
In the postwar period t; e ties between the Prine ilinister and
foreign affairs have been special and close, with the exception of the
Diefenbaker Cabinet.

Until Pierre Trudeau-replaced Lester Pearson as

Prime Ilinister, this was so.

Prine Ilinister Diefenbaker, who held the

portfolio of Secretary of State for External Affairs himself for two
periods of twelve weeks, felt that most of the officials in the Department
1G
were "partisan in the direction of the Liberal Party," because they had
19
been appointed by that party. Pierre Trudeau had neither the associations
nor the crrperience with the leadership of the Department that his Liberal
predecessors had.
In addition to the fact that special tics between the Prine
Ilinister and foreign affairs have existed, the powers of the Canadian
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Prime Ilinister are great.

It. IfacGregor Dawson eplains the great

powers of the Prime Ilinister as follows:
They spring fron his position of primacy in the Government re
inforced by his leadership of the majority party, which usually
owes its majority, indeed, to his leadership during the last
election. The Prime Ilinister as such may possess virtually no
legal authority; but operating through the Governor General, the
Privy Council, a minister, or sometimes as a minister in his osm
right, his powers are very great indeed.
Hot only the cabinet ministers who are appointed by the Prime Ilinister,
but also most of his Partyfs members are dependent on him for leadership.
They recognise his pre-eminent position and accept his leadership, because
’’their political survival in the cabinet and in the house of Commons
21
depends on him.”
In Japan, some Prime ministers have held the portfolio of
Ilinister of Foreign Affairs in the postwar period.

The first Prime

Ilinister under the new Constitution of 1946, Yoshida Shigeru, held that
portfolio for three years out of his more than seven-year term as Prime
Ilinister.

The others are Ashida Kitoshi (7 months), Kishi Hobusuhe (5
22
months), and Sato Eisahu (1 month).
However, the fact that some Japanese Prime Ilinisters have held
the portfolio of the Ilinister of Foreign Affairs does not necessarily

mean that they were experts in foreign affairs.

Except for Yoshida and

Ashida, the rest had experience related neither to this field in general,
23
nor to the Ilinistry of Foreign Affairs.
Constitutionally, the Frine Ilinister of Japan has great power; he
appoints all ministers and can dismiss any of them at will; he supervises
his government and is responsible to the Diet for reporting external and
internal affairs.

His power extends to the control of police power in
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emergency situations and to the ultimate decision to order the military
force to be sent out.

His authority is superior to the Chairman of the
24
National Defence Council.
In practice} the pover of the Prime Ilinister of Japan is drastically
weakened by the presence of a unique form of factionalism which creates
intraparty factional struggles.

The Prime Minister’s efforts} therefore}

are spent on keeping his position safe, and he devotes himself more to
factions for support} than to influencing other parts of the policy
making process in the direction he desires.

All Prime Ministers* particu

larly after the merger of the Liberal and the Democratic Parties into the
Liberal Democratic Party in 1955* have lacked control over the Party} as
25
a mhole.
This lad; of leadership of Japan’s Prime Ilinister may also be
explained by the fact that since 1947* eight Prine Ministers have
26
presided over eighteen Cabinets. Almost every year in the 23-year period*
the Prime Minister of Japan has dissolved and formed a Cabinet.

Further

more* the average term of a Prime Minister.from 1947 through to the end
of 1969 is only 33 months* although some Prime Ministers such as Yoshida*
Uceda and Sato have been in pover longer.

It is only half the average

term of the Canadian Prime Ministers in the same period (1946-1968).

The

longer average term seeras to indicate a nuch stronger hold on leadership.
Thus, there is a consider-able difference betv?een Prime Ministers
of Japan ana Canada in terms of their control over the Party.

The

Canadian Prime Minister possesses virtually no legal authority, but in
practice his pover is so enormous; on the other hand, the Prime Minister
of Japan has considerable legal pover, but in practice it is decidedly
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■weakened by Japan*s unique factionalism.
There have been six Frine Ministers in Canada since the end of
the Mar.

Only one, Lester Pearson, was an ex-bureaucrat,

Anong the

eight postwar Frine Ministers in Japan, only two (Tetsu Iiatayana and
Tanzan Ishibashi), were non-bureaucrats and neither of then held their
Frine Ministership for more than eight months.
In spite of their characteristic of bureaucratic background,
the Japanese Prime Ministers generally lack leadership and experience
in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

This, intermingled with their

short-lived term and their lack of leadership in the Cabinet, allows more
power to senior officials of the Foreign Ministry in the foreign policy
making process.

The Canadian Prime Minister, on the other hand, has

better control over senior officials in the Department of External
Affairs, mainly owing to his strong leadership in the Cabinet and the
long-established fact that foreign policy is his prerogative.
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The Cabinet
The Cabinet is the ultimate decision-male inn body both in internal
and external policies.

Under the leadership of the Frine Minister-, most

of foreign and defence policies are made among the Frine Minister and
other Cabinet members whose departments are directly involved in phases
of international relations.

Besides the Foreign Minister (or the

Secretary' of State for External Affairs), the Minister of Finance, the
Minister of Trade and Industry and the Minister of National Defence (or
Director General of the National Defence Agency) are often directly
involved in foreign and defence policy decision-making.
This section attempts to make a comparison of the Ministers of
these two countries in terms of longevity, education and effectiveness of
appointment to their portfolios.

If a Minister is too short-lived, he nay

not be able to exploit his own skill and knowledge in order to form a
dominant policy.

If he is appointed to the portfolio in disregard of

his special background, he may not be able to co-operate with his
Departmental officials and, as a result, may cause the people to be dis
satisfied with the government policy itself.
In the period 1S46-196C, five Prime Mi.listers of Canada made
altogether 153 Ministerial appointments.

The number of Japanese Ministers,

521, appointed by eight Prime Ministers in the sane period is more than
three tines as many as the Canadian appointments.

There were about 20

to 24 members in each Canadian Cabinet in the 23~27ear period.
On the other hand, five hundred and twenty-one Japanese Ministers
were appointed to approximately seventeen posts in each Cabinet in the
same period.

This means that the average term of Ministers in Japan is
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only 9 months, while that of Canadians is 3 years and 5 months.
In the period 1946-1958, there were seven Secretaries of State
for External Affairs, eight Ministers of Finance, seven Ministers of
27

Trade and Commerce and seven liinisters of national Defence in Canada.
In Japan, in the same period, the number of these Ministers is sometimes
double and triple:

fourteen Foreign Ministers, fourteen Ministers of

Finance and twenty-three Ministers of International Trade and Industry.
Even the National Defence Agency, which was established as late as 1952,
has been presided over by twenty-two Directors General, vrho also held
28
the title of Minister of State.
The average terras of not only Cabinet Ministers in general, but
also those Ministers most related to foreign and defence policies, differ
greatly between Canada and Japan.

The average terms for Foreign Minister,

Minister of Finance, Trade and Commerce Minister and Minister of National
Defence (or Director General of the Defence Agency) are 39 months, 34
months, 39 months and 39 months repectively in Canada, compared with 19
months, 19 months, 12 months and 9 months respectively in Japan.
In addition to the longevity of Canadian Ministers, they had a
higher level of education.

In particular, amcng the seven Secretaries

of State for External Affairs, six had more than one university degree.
Three were university professors, and the other four were:
a university, lawyers (2), and financier.

lecturer at

Although the level of education

is lover among other Ministers, seven out of twenty-seven Ministers in
the other three Departments had experience in university teaching. . Five
others practised law.

Those lacking any university degree comprised a

a fairly small minority.
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TABLE 7.
The Number of liinisters in Postwar Cabinets of Canada and Japan.
Canada
Prime Ilinister
N.L. Mackenzie Kinp
Louis S. St. Laurent
John G. Diefenbaker
Lester B. Pearson
Pierre E. Trudeau

Period
Oct. 1935 Nov. 1948 June 1957 April 1963 Arril 1968

Nov.
June
April
April

1948
1957
1953
196G

Total

Japan
Prime Ilinister
Shiperu Yoshida, 1st.
Tetsu Natayana
Hitoshi Ashida
Shiperu Yoshida, 2nd.
tl
3rd.
If
4th.
It
5th.

Period
May 1946 - May 1947
May 1947 - March 1948
March 1948 - Oct. 1943
Oct. 1948 - Feb. 1949
Feb. 1949 - Oct. 1952
Oct. 1952 - May 1953
May 1953 - Dec. 1954

Number of liinisters
25 (since 1945)
32
34
34
24 (up to end of
_______1968)
153

Nunbei of Ministers
24
21
17
16
39
21
25
101

"

Ichiro Ilotoyana, 1st.
"
2nd.
"
3rd.

Dec. 1954 - March 1955
March 1955 - Nov. 1955
Nov. 1955 - Dec. 1956

Tanzan Ishibashi
Mobusuke ICishi, 1st.
"
2nd.

Dec. 1956 - Feb. 1957
Feb. 1957 - June 1958
June 1958 - July 1960

18
35
35
70

Ilayato Ikeda, 1st.
"
2nd.
"
3rd.

July I960 - Dec. 1950
Dec. 1960 - Dec. 1963
Dec. 1963 - Nov. 1964

20
49
36
105

Eisaku Sato, 1st.
"
2nd.
"
3rd.

Nov. 1964 - Feb. 1967
Feb. 1967 - Nov. 1968
Nov. 1968 -

62

Total

J.O

19
18
55

48

110 (ur to Nov.
1968)
521

Source: Canada Year Boo!:, 1945 - 1968; Ilainichi Nenkan, 1966 and 1969.
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Compared with Canadian liinisters, Japanese Ministers have a
lower level of education.

Although anon" altogether 71 liinisters, there

was only one lacking a university degree, those with nore than one degree
are very few.

Among these 71 Ministers, there were two second Bachelor’s

degrees, two Master’s degrees and two Doctor’s degrees.
As far as appointment of Ministers is concerned, it seens to be
nuch nore efficient in Canada than in Japan.

Japanese Ministers have

often been appointed without consideration to their experience or know
ledge in a particular field, and

furthermore, higher appointments are

given to those most often elected to the Diet and those loyal in support29
ing factional leaders. In the past ten years, a long career as Diet man
(at least five terms) has been the most important criterion of a Minister.
Canadian Ministers, on the other hand, have been comparatively
more appropriately appointed and consideration seems to be given to
their previous experience or s^udy.

As for their appointment, the

Canadian Frine Minister is required to take religious and regional
representation into consideration, as well, — a point with which the
Japanese Prime Minister does not have to be concerned.

However, the

qualification of special skill, experience and education is still one
of the most important criteria of a Canadian Minister.
Comparing these Ministers of Canada and Japan in these terns, it
is evident that Canadian Ministers have nuch longer terms in office,
higher education and more appropriate appointment than the Japanese
counterparts.

This means that Canadian Ministers are far better able

to participate in the policy-making process, whereas in Japan, the
senior officials are more influential in the process.

Since Japanese
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senior officials are career men who often have narrow views biased
towards their specialities? national policies nade under these conditions
ultimately lack flexibility and breadth.
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The People and Opposition Parties
Both in Canada and Japan a foreign policy is a Cabinet decision,
however different the influence of senior officials may be in the foreign
policy-making process between the two.

The Cabinet must explain foreign

policies to the House and to the people to secure support for them.

It

must represent public opinion in external and internal policies as
much as possible.
However, it is not uncommon for a gap to exist between govern
ment policy and public opinion.

The political representation of

Canada and Japan may be roughly divided into three parts: the distri
bution of seats by parties in the House; the support of parties by the
people (shown in election results and various popularity polls); and
30

public opinion on foreign policy issues.
The gap between the government and the people very often reflects
a difference between the first and the third parts.
important to know what this difference is.

Nevertheless, it is

To know the difference is to

be aware when the people feel that their present comfortable life is
endangered— -this is the time when a political crisis takes place.
One of the means to determine the difference is the public
opinion poll.

In Canada, the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion

takes public opinion polls in virtually every field.

Canada’s

Government and Department of External Affairs, however, have neither
the proper channels of communication with the public nor the facilities
for the systematic study of public opinion on foreign policy.
past," says R. Barry Farrell,

"In the

"the attitude within the Government

concerning Canadian public opinion seemed to be associated
with the assumption that there were wide areas of foreign policy for
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which the Canadian public appeared to allow the Government to do whatever
31
it wished within very broad limits."
Today, the information about public demand on foreign and defence
policies cones not only fron the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion,
but also fron such sources as newspapers, academic groups, and other
private organizations.

For example, the House of Commons Standing

Committee on External Affairs and National Defence,the most important
committee for members of the House of Commons in international relations,
had many witnesses, the majority of then coming from outside the govern32
nent. The Department of External Affairs and the government as a whole,
are now trying to ameliorate the accusation formerly voiced of their
aloof attitude to the people.
In Japan, one example of crisis caused by

too great a difference

between the government policy and the public demand occurred when the
Kishi Cabinet was forced to resign, after passing the renewal of the
Security Treaty with the U.S. in 1960.

This incident resulted in the

establishment of an independent Public Information Unit in the Prime
Minister’s Office in July, 1960.

The Unit has put more stress, among

other things, on public opinion of special issues that the government is
33
about to make or has made a decision on.
In addition, Japanese nation-wide newspapers also take public
opinion polls on general as well as special issues.

Unlike Canadian

newspapers, at least three newspapers in Japan--Asahi ohin bun, Ilainichi
3hinbun, and Yoniuri Shinbun— are quite capable of analyzing the public
opinion shown in their own opinion poll results.
However, as far as the communication between the Ilinistry of
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Foreign Affairs and the people is concerned, Japan critically lacks
meaningful channels of communication.

Departmental or governmental

publications on foreign and defence policies available to the people
are very limited in terns of quality as well as quantity.

Although there

are an increasing number of publications about party policies on special
issues, information published by the Japanese Government or Ilinistry is
hardly knoTm to the people, unless it cones via newspapers or other mass
media.
Even in the communication system between the government and the
people, the people are, in general, often indifferent to foreign and
defence policies.

Particularly in Canada, where there is less national

unification, the people often react neither positively nor negatively to
foreign uolicv issues, unless the government disregards public opinion
34
too flagrantly.
Both in Canada and Japan, there arc opposition parties, repre
senting a large part of the people, in Parliament.

The concerns and needs

of a political system today have grown too. fast, too conple:;, and too
specialized for the popularly elected representatives to provide effective
35
control over every foreign and defence
policy issue.Nevertheless,
opposition parties

are, without a doubt, bodies with the most power to

prevent domination

by the government. One means to achieve this is

to

gain nore seats in the House.
The two major parties in Canada, the Progressive Conservative
and Liberal Parties, are "alternating in and out.of power in part as the
36
mood of the country,1' sharing a relatively equal balance of power. An
important aspect of Canada’s political parties, according to J.Il. Uallory,
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is that "at any given time only one party is in tune with a national
mood— and that party is likely to stay in power until the mood changes
37
and leaves it politically high and dry.”
The New Democratic Party (formerly, the Co-operative Commonwealth
Federation), which is a "mass” party compared with "cadre" parties of the
38
Liberals and the Conservatives,
has never been the "one party in tune
with a national mood."

As a result, Canada's official opposition has been

formed either by the Liberal or the Conservative Party.

Both Parties, as

far as foreign and defence policies are concerned, support basically the
same principles.
In Japan there were, until 1955» numerous conservative parties
of varying names.

In the fall of 1955, the conservative parties (at

that time there were two, the Liberal and the Democratic Parties) merged
into a new party-— the Liberal Democratic Party.

At the same time, the

Socialist parties, the Right-wing, the Left-wing, and the Labour Farmer
Party formed the Japan Socialist Party.

In i960, the Democratic Socialist

Party split off from the Socialist Party, and, in 1964, the religious
group, the Sokagakkai, established its own party called the Fair Play
Party.

Although these changes have occurred in the Japanese political

parties, the opposition has been, since 1949, the collective group of
progressive parties.

Before the 1955 merger, there were some conserva

tive parties other than the majority party, but they could hardly be
called "the opposition.”
One of the significant differences between the Canadian and
Japanese oppositions is that, in Canada, the opposition and the govern
ment stand on basically the same principles of foreign and defence
policies, whereas the Japanese opposition and the government differ
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fundamentally in ideology.
Secondly, perhaps largely oning to this ideological divergence*
the

Japanese Socialist opposition has only once been in pover* and then,

only in a coalition.
Ilore contrast bet-seen the tno countries can be seen in the number
of seats the respective oppositions occupy.

In the past eight general

elections in Canada, the Liberals have held an average of 49 per cent of
the

seats in the House of Commons in comparison with 38 per cent for the

Conservatives.

Contrasted with this, the conservatives in Japan, in the

period 1947-1955, have averaged sixty-seven per cent of the total number
of seats in the five House of Representatives elections.
parties altogether in

the sane period

mergers of the LD? and J5P in

The progressive

held only 28 per cent.

Since the

1955 up to the recent election in 1969,

the average percentages of the Liberal Democrats and Socialists have been
60 and 29 respectively.

Because of their slight chance of winning pover

in the Diet and their ideological gap, the opposition in Japan appears to
have less effect in preventing the government’s domination than the Canadian
opposition.
lioreover, there always exists a gap between the percentages of
the seats in the House and of popular vote in elections.

The Canadian

Conservative Party has non an average of 36 per cent of the popular vote
in the past eight general elections compared to 38 per cent of the seats,
while, at the sane time, the Liberal Party has non an average of 42 per
cent of the popular vote compared to 49 per cent of the seats.
.Among the Japanese parties, too, almost the same gap exists.
In the five elections prior tc the 1955 merger, the conservatives vron
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63 per cent of the popular vote and 67 per cent of the seats, compared
with the progressives (excepting Independents) who won 28 per cent of
the popular vote and 28 per cent of the seats.

In the remaining five

elections (1958-1969), the Liberal Democrats, in contrast to winning 60
per cent of the seats, have iron only 53 per cent of the popular vote,
while, in the same period, the Socialists have won 27 per cent compared
to 29 per cent of the seats.
Another important factor is that Canadian opposition party
members often become members of important committees on international
relations.

For example, the House of Commons Standing Committee on

ISxternal Affairs, in May 1967, elected a Conservative member for its vicechairman and had many other opposition party members among the twenty-four
40
total. This Committee used to have little to do with the actual formation
of policy, but since the fall of 1968, under its new name, the Standing
Committee on External Affairs and National Defence began to display a
41
"remarkable demonstration of activity."
Unlike Canada’s case, the role of the Japanese opposition party
members is very restricted in committees which place emphasis on foreign
and defence policies.

As a consequence, the government party, the Liberal

Democratic Party, dominates proceedings whenever it is willing to pay the
price of doing so.
Moreover, opposition members in general, have a difficult time
obtaining detailed information on foreign relations, compared to the
government party members.

The establishment of the Parliamentary Research

Centre in Ottawa in late 1968 was, in this respect, a great advantage for
Canadian opposition members.

The Research Centre is designed to provide
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non-partisan information and research to any member of Parliament.
Compared *:ith this, Japanese opposition members, in spite
of their other disadvantages, have, for a Ions time, had a non
partisan research section in the national Diet Library.

This research

section--the Desearch and Lesislation Deference Bureau— mas designed mith
a purpose similar to that of the nem Canadian Parliamentary Desearch
Centre in Cttama.
Talcing all these aspects into perspective, the Japanese oppo
sition parties are still less influential over the government than
those in Canada in the formation of foreign and defence policies.
This lach of influence by the opposition may be related to the rather
narrov and relatively inflexible foreign policy of Japan.

Conversely,

the strong influence of the Canadian opposition tends to make Canada’s
foreign policy more flexible and much broader.
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TABLE 8

Results of General Elections;

:ieats
Progressive
Conservatives

1949
A

B

Seats

1953
A

Canada

B

Seats

(1949-68)

1957
A

B

Seats

1958
A

B

41

29.7

15.6

51

31.0

19.2

112

38.9

42.3

208

53.6

78.5

193
Liberal
Net7 Democratic
13
(or CCF)

49.5

73.7

171

48.8

64.5

105

40.9

39.6

49

33.6

18.5

13.4

5.0

. 23

11.3

8.7

25

10.7

9.4

8

9.5

3.0

10

2.3

3.8

15

5.4

5.7

19

6.6

7.2

0

2.6

0.0

5

5.1

1.9

5

3.5

1.9

4

2.9

1.5

0

0.7

0.0

262

100.0

100.0

265

100.0

100.0

265

100.0

100.0

2.65

100.0

100.0

Social Credit
Others
Total .

c
\
N3
Seats
Progressive
Conservatives

1962
A

B

Seats

1963
A

B

Seats

1965
A

* B

Seats

1968
A

B

116

37.3

43.8

95

32.8

35.8

97

32.4

36.6

72

31.4

27.3

100
Liberal
New Democratic
(or CCF)
19

37.2

37.7

129

41.7

48.7

131

40.2

49.4

155

45.5

58.7

13.5

7.2

17

13. 6

6.4

21

17.9

7.9

22

17.0

8.3

Social Credit

30

11.7

11.3

24

11.9

9.1

5

3.7

1.9

0

0.8

0.0

Rallienent de
Creditistes

-

-

-

-

-

-

9

4.6

3.4

14

4.4

5.3

Others

0

0.3

0.0

-

-

-

2

1.2

0.8

1

0.9

0.4

265

100.0

100.0

265

100.0

100.0

265

100.0

100.0

264

100.0

100.0

Total

Note: A = Percentages of popular vote; B = Percentages of seats
Source: J. Hurry Beck, Pendulum of Power* Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., Scarborough, Ontario (1968).
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Results of General Elections:
1947
Liberal
Democratic
People’s Conservative
Democratic Liberal
Progressive
Hatoyana Liberal
Yoshida Liberal
Socialist
Left-wing Socialist
Right-wing Socialist
Labour Farmer
Communist
Others
Independents
Total

Seats
131
121
29

A
26-9
25.0
.7.0

B
28.1
26.0
6.2

Socialist
Democratic Socialist
Communist
Fair Play
Others
Independents
Total

-

69
14
264

-

15.7
3.4
43.9

(1947-1969)

1952
B
-

14.8
3.0
56.7

Seats
240

A
47.9

B
51.4

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

48

13.5

466 100.0 100.0

466

3.7
5.4

0.8
5.4

13

5.8

2.8

12

6.6

1
1

2.6
0.7

0.6
0.2

12

6.0

2.6

-

467

100.0 100.0

6

11

4
25

-

2.4

4.1

-

2.0
9.9
5.2

35.5

4.4

6.8

-

7
35
17

-

89
67
4
2

_

19

m

-

32.9

15.4
14.2
1.1
0.2
0.2

2.6

-

-

-

13.1
13.5
1.0
1.9
0.4

1.0

-

166

16.3
7.5
42.7

1.5
7.5
3.6

-

3
61.5

17.9
8.8
39.0

72
66
5
1
1

-

A
57.3

76
35
199

11.6
12.2
0.9

-

Seats
287

18.2

9.6
11.6
0.7
2.6
2.6

-

100.0 100.0

18.2

54
57
4
0
7

-

466

85

10.3

-

1960
A
Seats
XX
296 57.5

0.0

100.0 100.0

1963

466 100.0 100.0

1967
Seats
A
.277 48.3

16

5.3

3.3

29.0
7.4
4.0
0.2

30.8
4.9
1.0
0.0

140
30
5
25
0

27.9
7.4
4.8
5.4
0.2

28.8
6.2
1.0
5.1
0.0

4.8

2.5

9

5.5

1.9

0.3

0.2

5

2.8

1.0

12

467 100.0 100.0

467

m

100.0 100.0

467 100.0 100.0

18.5
6.4
2.9
9.7
0.0

31.0
3.6
0.6

1

1.3

21.4
7.7
6.8
10.9
0.2

B
60.6

144
23
5
0

3.3

90
31
14
47
0

A
54.7

27.5
8.7
2.9

O
X
.

«
•

19.1
14.3
0.9
0.4
0.4

B
59.2

Seats
283

145
17
3

_

15.3
13.9
1.0
2.0
1.3

1969
B Seats
A
57.0 288 47.7

B
63.3

-

B
24.0
39.6

-

-

-

-

-

-

30.7

-

1955
Seats
A
112 26.6
185 36.6

-

-

26.2

-

B

-

-

143

1953
Seat s A

-

-

1958
Liberal Democratic

1949
Seats
A

Japan

486 100.0 100.0

486 100.0 100.0

Note: A = Percentages of popular vote; B = Percentages of seats.
Source: Robert Hard, Japan’s Political System, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J. (1967), and
Asab-i Bhimbun, December 28, 1969.
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I. The First Period (1947-1953)
a. The Conclusion of IIATO
b. The First Security Treat}?- between
Japan and the U«3.
II. The Second Period (1957-1963)
a. The Conclusion of.1'OFAD
b. The Itenexral of the Security Treaty
III. The Third Period (1966-1959)
a. The Senetral of 1IOPJO and 1TAT0
b. The Automatic intension of the
Security Treaty
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Japan and Canada provide a good contrast with each other in many
respects— geography, population, history, and political culture*

Kow-

ever, in the postwar period, both countries share close relations with
the U.S., particularly in terns of military co-operation.
In the late Forties and early Fifties, Canada was one of the
strongest nations in the Uest, whereas Japan*s dream of establishing "a
Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere” collapsed, and the country fell
under the control of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Fowers.

Under

these circumstances, the conditions of joining in the military alliance
with the U.S. were entirely different.

By fostering the idea of NATO,

a multilateral alliance, the Canadian political leaders sought to bring
North America into an alliance with western Europe, in particular with
Britain and France.
On the other hand, while Japan had undergone complete reconstruc
tion by way of Uestemization fcr democratization in another sense), it
had no choice but to join a bilateral military alliance with the U.S.
Japan*s alliance with the U.S. was hastened into being and strengthened
by Maofs announcement that he would form the Peking Government and by
the outbx*eak of the Korean Uar.
Throughout the Fifties, the revival of western Europe was rapid,
and, at the end of the decade, Canada was no longer a big power.

Concomi

tant with its reduced importance in NATO, this vast and rich land was
threatened by possible Soviet air attack over the North Foie.

The increa

sing antagonism between the U.S. and the Soviet Union sparked the begin
ning of the North America Air Defence Command agreement between the U.S.
and Canada.

Thus, Canada reverted to heavy dependence on the U.S.,
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from which it previously had been most anxious to escape.
As for Japan’s alliance with the U.S., external and internal con
ditions were quite different from Canada’s.

Instability in the Far

Eastern and Southeast Asian regions continued in the Fifties, at the
time Japan was making a comeback as an economically powerful country.
The more Japan’s economy grew stable and expanded, the more it became
necessary for the U.S. to pay attention to Japan.

Consequently, the

unequal military alliance between the two changed to one of mutual co
operation in security and economy.

In contrast wmth Canada, Japanese

political leaders were still reluctant to assume increasing responsibility
for peace and prosperity in East Asia.
In the Sixties, the U.S. domination in

NATO and NOEAD continued,

while, at the same time, Canada’s strategic role in both alliances was
gradually reduced.

Although Canada became less influential over European

affairs and gradually decreased in military strength, expenditures on
modern expensive weapons did not decrease proportionally.

Nonetheless,

at the end of the Sixties, it has decided to remain in the U.S dominated
alliances.
Japan has been expanding in military strength rather significantly,
but its tremendous economic growth is incomparable.
decade, Japan’s GNP ranked thirdin the x?orld.

At the end of this

Itsmilitary strength is

one of the largest in the East Asian region, including Communist China.
Economically, Japan is a giant among nations.
The military alliance between the U.S. and Japan does not take
the one-man command system under the direction of the U.S., as found in
NATO and NORAD.

The U.S. supervisional service in the Japanese armed
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forces has been greatly reduced, whereas Canada*s forces have become
almost integrated as a snail part of the U.S. military forces.
These trends in Canada-U.S. and Japan-U.S. military relations
can be examined in three periods:
1969.

(1) 1947-1953, (2) 1957-1963, (3) 1966

The first period centers on the conclusion of NATO and the first

Security Treaty.

The second period deals with the exchange of the NORAD

agreement and the conclusion of the second Security Treaty.

The last

period focuses on the renewal and automatic extension of NORAD and NATO,
and the automatic extension of the Security Treaty.
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THE FIRST PERIOD

(1947-1953)

The Conclusion of MATO
(1)

The Government Policy
One year after the end of the Second World War, the western

Allied powers in Europe drastically reduced their forces.

While the

Soviet armed forces remained virtually unchanged at more than four million
men, the U.S., Britain and Canada, the three strongest Allied powers,
reduced their total number of men under arms from five million to less
than one million.

The western Allies, thus, were outnumbered by the Soviet

Union four to one in 1946.

It took the West more than one year and a great
1
effort on the part of the British Prime Minister to react to the Communist
threat in the region.
In March 1947, the Anerican President finally asked Congress for
four hundred million dollars to assist Greece and Turkey against the

threat of Communism.

At this time, the U.S. was not considering involve

ment in the political affairs in Europe, but rather economic aid.

The

economic aid motive was further heightened by the establishment of a
European Recovery Programme (the Marshall Plan).
Unfortunately, the implementation of the Plan played a contribu
ting part to splitting Europe into east and west.

The Plan, which also

offered aid to the countries of eastern Europe, was refused by the Soviet
Union.

At this time, Canada began its "crusade" for a North Atlantic

3
Treaty.
In early 1948, at the National Liberal Federation, Prime Minister
Mackenzie King supported the British view that it was an urgent necessity
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to rally the forces of Western civilisation to stem further encroach
ment of the Soviet tide in Europe.

’’Force has not in itself*" said the

Prime Minister, "the power to create better conditions.
4
of security is the first essential."

But a measure

The great step taken by Mackenzie King towards collective defence,
however, came only after persuasion from senior officers in the Department
5
of External Affairs. After heavy involvement in the Mar, the Prime
Minister was deeply pessimistic and began to retreat to his pre-war
isolationism.
Only a month after the Prime Minister*s speech, the Soviet Union
supported the Communist coup d*etat in Czechoslovakia. Not only did this
6
incident hasten the conclusion of the Brussels Treaty between Britain,
France and the Benelux countries, it also convinced the Canadian Secretary
of State for External Affairs, Louis St. Laurent, to organize a collective
defence force in which Canada and the U.S. would participate.

On the

topic of allying western Europe with North America, Louis St. Laurent
spoke in the House of Commons on April 29, 194S, as follows:
One thing we must constantly keep in mind as we approach this
fateful decision is that the western European democracies are
not beggars asking for our charity. They are allies whose
assistance we need in order to be able to defend ourselves
successfully and our beliefs. Canada and the United States
need the assistance of the western European democracies just
as they need ours.7
To seek a regional defence within the framework of the North Atlantic
community became a firm governmental policy.

8
After the Vandenberg Resolution was passed by the U.S. Congress
in June 1948, negotiations between the Brussels Treaty powers, the U.S.
and Canada began in Washington.

The negotiations at the ministerial
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level took a full eight months before arriving at the final draft of the
treaty.
During lengthy negotiations, the scope of alliance came into
question.

While the U.S. and the European countries were primarily

interested in economic aid, Canada urged that the North Atlantic Treaty
9
cover the widest possible ground. Lester Pearson, External Affairs
Minister, expressed his ideas on the alliance in the'House of Commons:
In the past, alliances and leagues have been formed to meet
emergencies and have been dissolved as the emergencies vanished.
It must not be so this time. An Atlantic union must have a
deeper meaning and deeper roots. It must create conditions for a
kind of co-operation which goes beyond the immediate emergency. 10
With this in mind, Canada fought for the incorporation of Article
2, which dealt with political institutions and economic co-operation,
11
into the Treaty.
The North Atlantic Treaty was finally concluded by thirteen
North American and western European countries in Washington on April 4,
1949, and ratified in Parliament on April 29, 1949.

(2)

The Opposition and the Public
On March 28, 1949 the draft of the North Atlantic Treaty was

first brought before the Parliament of Canada.

In spite of the Liberal

Government*s late submission to the House, George Drew, Leader of the
Opposition, expressed the Conservative Party*s view that they approved
12
the draft wholeheartedly. Traditionally in favour of Britain and less
in favour of the U.S., the Conservative Party accepted the Liberal
Governments policy.

Since Britain had diminished in power relative
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to the U.S. in the postwar period, Canada, threatened by U.S. control,
13
desperately needed a counterweight to it. Under these circumstances, the
government's call to bring the U.S. into the alliance with Europe, in
particular, with Britain and France, was "wholeheartedly" accepted by
the opposition.
The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation also supported the
government*s policy.

The National President and Leader of the Party,

M.J. Coldwell, went as far as saying he would resign if the Party did
not support the Treaty, even though CCF provincial organizations in
14
Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and British Columbia opposed it.
In the ten months between July, 1948 and April, 1949, not much was
known by the Canadian public about what had been going on behind the
scenes.

However, the political leaders predicted that "the public would

be much more ready to support a treaty with a constructive aim than a
15
mere military alliance." This prediction won great support from the
Canadian voters in the June 1949 election, increasing the Liberal seats
from 125 in 1945 to 193 and its popular vote from 40.9 per cent in 1945
to 49.5 per cent.

(3)

Military Co-operation with the U.S.
It was not considered that the conclusion of the North Atlantic

Treaty would increase Canadian defence expenditures, but rather reduce
then, since the Treaty would result in a "pooling of the defence forces
of the allies Tdiich would be more efficient than unco-ordinated defence
16
forces." Contrary to expectation, the defence e:;penditures increased
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from $385 million in 1949 to $1»SS2.5 million in 1952*
The main factor for the increase of the budgetary e:ipenditures
of defence was not membership in NATO* but rather involvement in the
17
Korean 'Jar. However, Canada*s rearmament, required by the conclusion
of the Treaty, accounted for a large part of the e:cpenditures.
In addition to this, Canada*s military co-operation with the U.S.
was revived in October, 1949, when the Permanent Joint Board on Defence
decided to initiate a new programme for reciprocal military procurement.
One year later, having been stimulated by the outbreak of the Korean Uar
in Hay, 1950, the two governments affirmed the decision to develop co18
operation in production of military essentials.
The imbalance of this co-operation was revealed in the early
1950*s.

The American purchases in Canada amounted to $100 million in

1951, which was five times more than Canada originally anticipated.
reached as much as $300 million in the succeeding fiscal year.

It

However,

Canada spent $850 million on defence purchases in the U.S. in less than
19
two years (April 1, 1951 to December 31, 1952).
Furthermore, the drastic increase in defence purchases led the
Canadian Government to establish a new Department of Defence Production.
The imbalance of Canadian purchases from the U.S. showed that the mili
tary co-operation night increase Canada*s heavy economic dependence on
the U.S.
Canada*s circumstances in the period between the end of the
Second Uorld Uar and the end of the Korean Uar provide a sharp contrast
with those of Japan.

Canada was not only on the victors* side, but

also was the third strongest power among the western Allies at the end
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of the War when Japan suffered total destruction and control by SOAP.
Canada had been, in history and in culture, closely related to
the U.S., Britain and France.

Through these relations, it strove in

its own interests to bring these countries into the alliance with North
America.

Japan, on the other hand, had no choice but to accede to the

alliance with the U.S.

In this period, international as well as domes

tic situations differed greatly between Japan and Canada.

The First Security Treaty between Japan and the U.S.
(1)

The Government Folicy
The proclamation of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan

provided the groundwork for the erection of an "Asian bastion" against
Russian Communism.

The U.S., though it had almost complete control over

Japan*s occupation, strongly supported the establishment of Japan*s o^m
20
armed forces. Formation of self-defence forces was a far cry from the
SCAP policy of democratization and demilitarization.
While Canada had a chance to ease its heavy dependence on the
U.S. by e:q?loiting the threat of Communism in Europe, the tense atmosphere
of the Cold War meant, for Japan, only tightening of U.S.-Japan relations.
First of all, Japan, unlike Canada, was not an independent and strong
nation at the time.

Secondly, the international situation, particularly

the establishment of the Peking Government in October* 1949, stimulated
a closer alliance with the U.S.

Thirdly, although Japan*s economy had

been rapidly recovering, instability was still rife on the political and
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21

social scene.

And finally, the Korean Uar, which began before Japan*s

independence* without a doubt became a main factor forcing it to stay
militarily allied with the U.S.
When the U.S. was heavily drawn into the Korean Uar, the economic
<"l *"Y

aid to Japan became an oppressive burden.

The American intention to ease

this burden coincided with the evident anticipation of the Japanese
leaders and of the anxious public to regain their independence from the
six-year long occupation.
Three years prior to the outbreak of the Korean T7ar, the conserva
tive government of Japan had already decided to have the U.S. reinforce
23
Japan*s defence, rather than relying upon the United Nations. But there
were no further developments in this direction until January 1951, when
U.S. Secretary of State, John Dulles, cane to Japan.

The U.S. represen

tative and the Japanese Government reached an immediate understanding that
"there could be no peace treaty and independence unless Japan*s security
24
was guaranteed."
Unlike the North Atlantic Treaty, the Security Treaty was not a
treaty of mutual security.

Through this Treaty, Japan, unable to afford

rearming itself politically and economically, was to depend on the U.S.
to maintain "certain of its armed forces in and about Japan."

The armed

forces stationed in Japan were to be used to counteract not only outside
aggression, but also any large-scale disturbances within Japan.

However,

throughout the closed negotiations, Japan devoted itself to improving
"close relations and friendship," rather than pressing the U.S. for an
25
automatic provision similar to the one in the North Atlantic Treaty.
Moreover, Article 3 of the Treaty left the disposition of "the
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U.S. troops in and about Japan” to be discussed in administrative agree26
nents between the two countries. .There were two main reasons for the
postponement.

One was that the matter concerned was "mainly of a purely

technical nature,” and ”a considerable amount of time would be lost" in
reviewing them with the Americans— time which Japan could ill afford,
because it might "let slip the opportunity presented to Japan to conclude
27
an early peace treaty." The other reason was that
the same sort of talks were then in progress between the United
States and the nations of western Europe for the stationing of
United States forces in those countries in accordance with the
North Atlantic Treaty signed in April 194S, and it seemed to us
(Japanese) an advantage for both parties if the terms eventually
to be agreed upon between the United States and the countries of
western Europe were available for reference, and such a procedure
was likely to prove advantageous to (Japan).28
Following the example of NATO, Japan replaced, jointly with the
U.S., the Administrative Agreement in 1953, which had originally given
the U.S. extra-territorial rights, with one similar to "the Agreement
between the Partners of the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status
29
of their Forces."

(2)

The Opposition and (die Public
The greatest difference in the process of defence alliance of

Canada and of Japan was the degree of support the opposition parties
gave to the government.

TJhile in Canada the government^ policy towards

multilateral military alliance was unanimously upheld by the opposition
parties, the opposition in Japan stood entirely opposed to the govern
ment.

The governmentfs policy on security did not ease the uncertainty
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30
of the public who felt U.S. troops in Japan might hinder the course of
its independence, or lead to another war.
On July S, 1950, immediately after the outbreak of the Korean
War, the government announced to the public the establishment of a
Police Reserve of 75,000 men, without informing the Diet.

The opposition
31
had no chance to decide or even discuss what the Police Reserve would do.
This faux pas by the conservative government provoked the opposition to
strongly oppose the government.

In the eyes of the opposition, the esta

blishment of the Police Reserve was not only unconstitutional, but also
completely against the Potsdam Declaration which called for Japan*s
32
complete demilitarization.
In addition to this, the Liberal Government made another blunder
which aggravated the opposition*s antagonism toward the conservatives.
This was committed by ratifying the Security Treaty together with the
Peace Treaty.

The opposition found most provocative the preamble, which

included the phrase:

"Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibi

lity for its own defence against direct and indirect aggression."

The

phrase clearly indicated the possibility that Japan, which had already
established the Police Reserve, would rush into rearmament.

Both opposi

tion parties and a large number of the Japanese people attacked the govern
ment, through the mass media and street demonstrations, in an attempt to
eliminate the phrase from the Treaty.
Disregarding the dissatisfaction of the opposition, the govern
ment passed the Security Treaty 289 to 71 in the House of Representatives
and 147 to 76 in the House of Councillors.
Of more significance than the difference of opinion on military
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alliance was the uproar on the natter of the Administrative Agreement.
Contrary to its promise to follow the example of NATO, which required
member nations to obtain a simple majority support in Parliament, the
Japanese Government ratified the Administrative Agreement without follow
ing the proper procedure of having a simple majority in the Diet, ratio33
nalizing that it was not considered a treaty.
In a public opinion poll taken by Kainichi Shinbun on September
13-14, 1951, results showed that the governmentfs policy was in great
3A
favour. This did not mean that the public supported its policy "whole
heartedly, " as Canadian Conservatives did.
the feeling of inevitability.

It seems they did so with

It may be reasonably postulated that signs

of their anxiety over the government policy towards bilateral military
alliance were revealed in the two election results of 1952 and 1953; the
Socialist Parties (Left- and Right-wing) increased their seats in the
lo"er house from AS in 1949 to 111 in 1952 and to 138 in 1953, and the
percentages of popular votes from 13.5 in 1949 to 21.2 in 1952 and to
26.6 in 1953.

(3)

Military Co-operation with the U.S.
Consideration of the possibility of establishing Japari*s own

armed forces started as early as in 1947.
daringly added the clause:
preceding paragraph . .

Foreign Minister Ashida

"In order to accomplish the aim of the
to the beginning of the second paragraph of

Article 9 of the new Japanese Constitution.

By this, he meant that
35
Japan should be able to maintain the right of self-defence.
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However* it was not until the Hew Year of 1950 that General
MacArthur, SCAP, proclaimed that the new Constitution would not deter
Japan from establishing its ora self-defence forces.

Japan was ordered

to immediately form a Police Reserve of 75*000 and a Marine Security of
8*000 men.
Since most of the former Japanese military officers were purged
by SCAP after the Mar, the entire managenentof the Police Reserve during
36
the first half-year cane under the direction of the U.S. commander. From
thebeginning, close military co-operation with

the U.S. was inevitable.

In spite of the nation’s anti-war sentiment, Japanese youth were attracted
37
by the relatively high wages and the name "Police Reserve."
In the deteriorating situation of the Korean TJar, the new Police
Reserve "naturally" co-operated with the U.S. troops on Japanese soil.
Hot

until April, 1952* was the 8,000 strong Maritime Guar-d formed.

It,

too, came under the American command, borroT.7ing all equipment from the
3G
U.S.. Moreover, in August, 1952, a Security Agency was appended to the
Prime Minister’s Office.
to 110,000.

At the same time, the Police Reserve increased

Both the Police Reserve and the Maritime Guard were com

pletely modernized, and their budgetary expenditures were increased from
$86.1 million to $164.3 million.
Further steps to rearm Japan we re taken in 1953, when the Korean
armistice came into effect.

The end of the War resulted in a decrease

in special war procurements from the U.S. to Japan ($809 million in
39
1953; $596 million in 1954). The Japanese economy once again became
very unsteady.

It was at this time that the U.S. announced its plan

to include Japan in the Mutual Security .Assistance programme (MSA).
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After lengthy and heated negotiations, the Mutual Defence Assistance
Agreement (1IDA) between Japan and the U.S. was signed on llarch 8, 1954.
Through this Agreement, "special procurements" stayed at the
500 million-dollar level throughout the rest of the 1950*s.

In addition

to the procurements, military aid (in the form of gifts) and economic
aid

(mainly in loan form), which had been cut out in 1953, gradually

increased.

Most of the new equipment for the National Security Force

(this had developed from the Police Reserve in 1952, with the addition
of a Maritime Security of 6,000 men) was provided by the U.S.
Only three months after the conclusion of IDA, the Security
Agency further evolved into the National Defence Agency.

The Security

Force (army) and the Maritime Guard became the Ground Self-Defence Force
and the Maritime Self-Defence Force.

Moreover, a new Air Self-Defence

Force was added, which was filled by officers who had been trained in
40
the U.S. Air Force.
While Canada e:iploited the multilateral alliance in order to
ease the encroaching control of the U.S., Japan was drawn increasingly
into closer relations with the latter.

It almost appeared as if the

Pacific Mar had never e::isted.
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TA B LE

10.

Year
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957

Total Budgetary E:cpenditures and Military Expenditures
(1951 - 1957)
In nillions of U.S. dollars
Canada
Japan
Total(A) Uilitary(B) B/A
Total(A) Ililitary(B) B/A
2,711
731
27%
2,083
352
17%
3,439
1,352
39
2,428
507
21
4,054
1,342
45
2,825
348
12
4,066
1,733
43
2,891
375
13
3,996
40
1,778
2,828
13
378
4,143
40
1,652
2,970
397
13
4,532
1,667
37
3,299
425
13

Note: B includes e:q?erises of National Defence* Defence Production
(or Defence Establishment) and Industry. All figures are
calculated on the base of the U.S. dollar which is equivalent
to Canadian $1.07 and Japanese ¥360 regardless of fluctua
tion.
Source: Canada, Department of Finance, Budget Speech, 1952-58,
The Queen*s Printer, Ottawa; Japan, Prime Minister*s
Office, Nihon Tokei Een*kan, 1962 and 1963, Tokyo.

TABLE 11.
Military Strength, 1951 - 1957

Year
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957

Total
63,427
95,394
104,427
112,529
117,005
117,172
119,414

Canada
CRA
CPJT
11,032 34,986
13,508 49 ,273
15,546 43,453
16,955 49,978
18,806 49,447
19,000 47,632
19,815 47,938

CPvAF
22,359
32,611
40,423
45,596
48,750
50,540
51,661

Total
75,000
116,038
117,000
144,738
166,000
179,000
184,500

Japan
MSD?
GSDF
75,000
6,038 110,000
7,000 110,000
8,000 130,000
8,500 150,000
10,500 160,000
15,000 160,000

ASDF
6,738
7,500
8,500
9,500

Source: Canada, Department of National Defence, Annual Report, 1952-53,
The Queen*s Printer, Ottawa; Japan, Asahi Shimbun Sha, Jieitai,
Tokyo (1969).
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THE SECOND PERIOD

(1957-1953)

The Conclusion of NORAD
(1)

The Government Policy
The diplomacy of the Liberal Government of Canada based on

multiplicity of relationship reached its heyday in the middle of the
1950*s.

Canada expanded its prestige as a peace-keeping mediator not

only between the great powers, but also between the Nest and the East,
through the arena of the United Nations.

As a member of both NATO and

the U.N., it seemed Canada could provide a good channel of communication
between the U.S. and Eritain and France, the two strongest powers in

41
western Europe.
However, this heyday was short-lived.

International circum

stances in the late 1950*s gradually became less favourable to Canada
than they had been in the 1940*s and early 1950*s.

European countries

steadily regained their power; newly-born states in the Afro-Asian region
were inclined to consider Canada as a "bourgeois" western power; Japan
had risen from ashes to revive in the Pacific; China expanded its sphere
of political influence throughout the world.
After a hegemony of more than tuo decades, the Liberal Government
was replaced by the Progressive Conservative Party.

Unlike the Democratic

Liberals* succession to the Liberal Government in the early 1950*s in
Japan, the changeover in Canada was less easily accepted by the bureau
cracy.

In Japan, no natter which conservative party came to power, it

had little trouble co-operating with the bureaucracy.

Unlike Japan's

case, the Conservative Government under John Diefenbaker found it
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difficult to see eye to eye vith the Liberal oriented higher officials
of the Department of External Affairs.
Subsequently* Canada*s contribution to NATO became less military
42
and more political and economic. As far as the North American continent
was concerned, however, increasingly sophisticated military equipment
posed a greater threat from the Soviet Union via the North Pole.
The joint air defence commands between the U.S. and Canada had
43
been established in 1954. The integration of the military co-operation
with the U.S. was continued by the Conservative Government under John
Diefenbaher.

With a firm understanding of the operational control of the

continental air defence, Prime Minister Diefenbaher accepted that "the
Liberal Government had, before the general election of June 10, 1957, all
44
but formally
given its approval to the NORAD agreement."
The Diefenbaher Government

had

no

choice but to agree to the

establishment of the North American Air Defence Command (NGRAD) on
September 12, 1957.

However, detailed agreements for NORAD were post

poned until after the twenty-fourth election of 1958.
The Conservative Party, contrary to the results of the final poll
45
taken by the
Canadian Institute of Public
Opinion, widely increasedits
seats in the

House of Commons from 112

seats for the Liberals.

in

1957 to 208, leaving only49

The 208 majority was unprecedented in Canada.

Within two months after the greatest victory ever of the Conser
vatives, steps were quickly taken towards reaching agreement on KORAD.
On May 12, 1958, the Canadian Ambassador to Washington, H.A.. Robertson,
presented the U.S. Government with the proposal of the eleven principles
on NORAD.

According to the proposal, the two countries were to agree
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on the "necessity for integration of operational control of Canadian
and United States air defences." The system was to provide for "authori
tative control of all air defence weapons which must be enployed against
an attacker."

The purpose of the agreement was "to counter the threat
46
and to achieve maximum effectiveness of the air defence system." NORAD

would not hinder the existence of the Canada-U.S. Regional Planning Group
of arrangements for the air defence of North America.

The Commander-in-

Chief NORAD and his Deputy Commander would not be from the sane country.
This proposal was accepted on the same day by the U.S. Government.
To fulfil the purpose of the agreement. Prime Minister Diefenbaher was
obligated to announce, xrithin four months, a large expenditure for the
47
modernization of Canada*s NORAD equipment. Moreover, the government had
to take steps to face the nuclear age, which had been rapidly advanced
by the Soviet Union and the U.S.

Manned aircraft became notably less

effective and the U.S. wanted t'.e Canadian component of NORAD to be
48
nuclear-armed, just as the American one was.
The Prime Minister hinted at the eventual necessity for nuclear
49
warheads as early as September 1958. However, the mysterious and indeci
sive Diefenbaher policy on defence and foreign affairs continued even
through the Cuban missile crisis of October* 1962— the culmination of
nuclear anxiety between the U.S. and the Soviet Union— until the
50
Conservative Government was replaced by the Liberals in April, 1963.
The following brief statements of Diefenbaher reveal his indeci
sive attitude towards nuclear weapons:
. . . by the 1960*s manned aircraft . . . will be less effective . . .
It has therefore been decided to introduce the Bomarc guided
missile (which) can be used with either a conventional high explo-
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sive warhead or a nuclear warhead.
(September 23, 1959)
Eventually Canadian forces nay require certain nuclear wea
pons if Canadian forces are to be kept effective . . . . the
necessary weapons can be made available for Canadian defence
units if and when they are required.
(House of Commons, Canada
January IS, 1960)
If and when the Canadian government should decide to equip
its forces with nuclear weapons those weapons would be under
Canadian control and would be used in Canada only as the
result of a decision by the Canadian government.
(House of Commons, Canada
July A, 1960)
Ue have made it perfectly clear that when and if nuclear wea
pons are required, we shall not accept them unless we have
joint control.
(House of Commons, Canada
November 30, 1960)
Ue take the stand . . . (that) the nuclear family should not
be increased so long as there is any possibility of disarma
ment among the nations of the world.
(House of Commons, Canada
February 26, 1962)

(2)

The Opposition and the Public
With confirmation that the Soviet Union now possessed the means

of striking western Europe and North America, the opposition confronted
the Diefenbaher Government, urging it to strengthen the military alli
ance with the European countries and the U.S.

The important question

was whether to possess nuclear weapons.
As early as 1955 the NATO Council decided that the defence of
51
western Europe must be conducted with nuclear warheads. However, the
question of nuclear weapons did not become a serious issue for Canadians

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

85

until the Soviet Union announced that they had successfully fired an
inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) on August 26, 1957, and that
they had sent Sputnik I into orbit on October 4 of the same year.
The superiority of the Soviet Union in offensive missiles gave
Premier Nikita Khrushchev confidence to deliver ultimata on Berlin in
late 1958 and mid-196l, to walk out from the U.N. Assembly and Dis
armament Council in Geneva, and finally, to place missiles in Cuba
52
in 1962.
At the beginning of the nuclear armament race, the Liberal oppo
sition, by and large, agreed with the Conservative Government.

The

Leader of the Opposition said in the House of Commons, on February 20,
1959:
I . . . agree with the Prime Minister that anything that can
be done to limit the extension of the manufacture of (nuclear)
weapons should be done. I welcome his statement these nuclear
weapons are not to be manufactured in Canada. Nevertheless,
with regard to the nuclear warheads of Bomarc missiles and
defensive weapons of that kind, it seems to me that it would
be quite insupportable . . . to have Canadian air squadrons
without them and United States squadrons with them.53

_

Two years later, the opposition, with its own electoral ends in
mind, changed its attitude towards nuclear weapons.

The Leader of the

Opposition, supporting the bar>-the-borab movement in Canada, said at the
opening of the National Liberal Party Conference in Ottawa in January, 1961:
. . . (We) should not acquire or use nuclear weapons under any
kind of national or joint control. The extended possession of
nuclear weapons by individual nations . . . will greatly
increase the difficulty of abolishing all nuclear weapons, and
will also greatly increase the danger of nuclear war.54
The government gradually moved in the direction of disarmament.
On the other hand, the opposition further reversed its policy on
nuclear weapons.

Paul Hellyer, senior member of the Party and later
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Minister of National Defence in the Pearson Government* said in
December* 1962:
In order to resolve this dilemma (expensive but ineffective
Canadian forces) I have come to the conclusion that . . .
Canada should sign a bilateral agreement with the United
States which will permit the supply of atomic weapons to
Canadian forces . . .
Annoyed by the governments indecision on possession of nuclear
weapons, the Opposition Leader, supporting the speech of Paul Hellyer*
criticized the government policy.

In the House of Commons, on January

25, 1963, he made the following statement:
. . . (B)oth in NATO and in continental defence (NORAD), the
Canadian Government has made certain defence pledges and has
accepted certain defence commitments on behalf of Canada which
can only be carried out by Canadian forces if nuclear warheads
are used. . . . (l)t is humiliating and dishonourable for
Canada to discharge them or put our men in a position to dis
charge them if they were called to do so in an emergency . . . .
(W)e must be prepared to do the job in that sector until we
agree to do something else . . . .56
The trend of Canada*s foreign and defence policies is clearly
illustrated in this example.

It is a fact that both government and
57
opposition in Canada are, particularly since the King era, "cadre"
parties.

The bulk of the Japanese opposition parties xras greatly

restricted by the ideology of pure Marxism, and had little flexibility
in their policies.
its

But the Canadian opposition has frequently changed

policy, based on "a justification of the democratic political process

as such, without any attempt to evaluate the quality of decisions result
ing from this process in the light of a formulation of the public
58
interest," but with orientation primarily towards electoral victory.
There was obvious indecision on the issue of nuclear weapons in
the defence policy on the part of the Conservative Government and the
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Liberal Farty.

According to the Gallup Foil, however, the Conservatives

gradually came into disfavour with the public.

Unlike Japan, the

Canadian public had the advantage of the right to choose between two
very similar parties.

(3)

Military Co-operation with the U.S.
The military integration embodied in the KORAD agreement of

1958 extended to defence production.

Uhen the plans for the Canadian
60
Ground Environment system (CAGE) and the CF-105 Arrow were cancelled,
it became imperative that the Canadian defence industry gain access to
the U.S. defence market.
quickly worked on.

This idea was -welcomed by the U.S., and

By September 1958, John Diefenbaher was ready to

announce that the U.S. Government was now "prepared to work out pro
duction sharing agreements" with Canada.
Having established a bilateral committee on the matter in
October, 1958, both governments reached agreement in nid-1959 that "the
production sharing programme would cover a wide range of United States
defence programmes in which Canadian industry could establish its
ability to compete with American industry on the basis of technical
61

competence, delivery and price."

Canada had become involved with the

U.S. in defence production long before, but now it reached the point of
being protected and being taught the technology of defence by the Ameri
cans.

Although Canada was increasingly successful in developing its
62

defence industry in the 1957-62 period, Canada*s deep involvement in the
military co-operation with the U.S. seems to have put Canada in a more
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difficult position to become independent of U.S. defence policy.
Moreover, in the field of military strategy, the U.S., in the
period 1958-63, became very dominant in the operational control of
KORAD, as it had been in NATO.

First of all, the KORAD headquarters

were located at Colorado Springs, Colorado.

The post of Commander-in-

Chief (CINCNORAD) was filled by an American general who owed his first
responsibility to the U.S. President.
Secondly, CINCNORAD and the majority of officers assigned there
were American.

This U.S.-dominated system had the authority to control

all forces, including Canadian forces, assigned to the NORAD defence
system.

This authority, with an American CINCKOR.AD at the top* had

included the power of "transfer of forces from one area to another and
63
the crossing of the U.S.-Canada boundary."
Thirdly, since Canada was no longer devoted to developing a
major weapons system in the military strategy of North American defence,
it was largely dependent upon the newly developed weapons of the U.S.
Canada, like Japan in the 1950*s, was integrated industrially
and strategically into the military co-operation with the U.S.

Although

the Canadian and Japanese cases were rather different, both countries
accepted the integration for mainly economic reasons.

For Canada, it

was to prevent increase of its heavy economic dependence on the U.S.,
by balancing its defence purchases in the U.S. with those of the U.S.
in Canada; and, for Japan, it was to maintain Japan*s favourable eco
nomic relations with the U.S. in general.

Both

entered into military

co-operation under U.S. dominance, diligently attempted to alter it,
but reverted to the former position of being dominated by the U.S.
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The Renewal of the Security Treaty
(1)

The Government Policy
The feeling of helplessness the Japanese people had towards the

Security Treaty of 1950 gradually changed to an antagonism to the nresence
64
of the U.S. bases in Japan by the end of the Fifties. This change of
attitude helped the progressives (Socialists, Communists and other minor
opposition parties) increase their popular vote as well as the seats
they held in the Diet.
To confront this gradual and steady increase of the power of
the opposition, a complicated struggle for hegemony among the conservatives
followed, which resulted in their unification within the Liberal Democra
tic Party (ID?) under Ichiro Katoyama.

But, contrary to the conservatives*

expectation, the general election of 1958 indicated a decrease for then
of 5.4 per cent in popular votes and 10 seats.
In external affairs, the Hatoyama Government began to normalize
Japan*s relations with the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union had refused

to sign the Peace Treaty at San Francisco, and constantly vetoed Japan*s
entrance into the U.N.

After the death of Stalin and the termination of

the Korean hostilities, signs of "a less unfriendly Russian attitude"
65
appeared.
It was at this tine that the Hatoyama Government reverted to a
less pro-American or more neutral policy.

By December, 1956, the Soviet

Union finally allowed Japan’s admission to the world organization.
However, the normalization policy of Hatoyama cost him his Prime
Ministership.

Hatoyama was replaced by Tanzan Ishibashi a few days

after Japan’s admission to the U.N.

His position as Prime Minister
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lasted only two months, because of ill health.

In late February, 1957,

ITobusuke Kishi, who had been famous for his pro-/merican sentiment,
succeeded Ishibashi.
Since the conclusion of the first Security Treaty, Japan’s
economy rapidly increased in terms of G1TP: $16,900 million in 1952,
$22,900 nillion in 1955, and $28,900 million in 1957.

Japan’s economic

revival on the international scene and unsatisfactory state of military
domination by the U.S. created a confused feeling among the Japanese
majority.

It made them wonder whether Japan would ever be able to

recover its economic power without U.S. military protection, or whether
Japan could continue its economic relations xrith the U.S. without the
66

U.S. military bases in Japan.
Under these domestic and foreign circumstances, the Kishi
Government proceeded with the revision of the first Security Treaty
between Japan and the U.S.

In Washington in June, 1957, Prime Minister

Kisni expressed his governments desire to strengthen its defence forces
in order to fight Communism.

To carry through this intention, Kishi felt

the 1952 Security Treaty should be revised to coincide with the "new era"
67
of Japan-U.S. relationships. Although the U.S - negotiators in Washington
did not agree with the revision of the Treaty at that time, the American
attitude rapidly grew more flexible in the next year.
The Kishi Government’s policy on a new Security Treaty stood on
68
four principles. The first was to continue its military alliance with
the U.S., but to put an end to U.S. intervention in Japan’s domestic
affairs, allowed by Article I of the Security Treaty of 1952.
The second principle was to include a date when a new Treaty
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should be terminated, with or without a notice of denunciation by either
of the partners.

The old Treaty was to be terminated only when the U.S.

and Japanese Governments agreed that an alternative security arrangement
had been found.
Thirdly* Japan desired clarification as to whether the U.S. would
commit itself to defend Japan, and that it would consult with Japan
beforehand, regarding the use of Japanese bases for military operations
outside Japan or before introducing nuclear weapons into Japan.

This

principle was an attempt to justify Japan’s co-operation with the U.S.,
even when Japan was not under attack, though it was. unconstitutional.
However, the right of self-defence was not against the Constitution.
The last principle was to promote, through a new Treaty,
economic co-operation between the two countries.

This was a completely

new principle in the Japanese-U.S. alliance, but one most stressed during
the negotiations.

The Prime Minister put much emphasis on the new

economic aspect of the U.S.-Japan alliance.
The government seemed to have learned the importance of the
69
economic aspect, especially from Canada’s experience. Canada, as
mentioned earlier.* negotiated industriously to have incorporated into
the North Atlantic Treaty, /article 2, ^diich dealt with the economic
co-operation between the Treaty partners.

Furthermore, Canada’s devotion

to the economic and political aspects of an alliance made Canada the most
prestigious mediator in the Uest, if not in the world.
On January 6, 1960 the final draft of a new Treaty was completed,
and, on the nineteenth of the same month, the Prime Minister flew to
Washington to sign the Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and Security between

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Japan and the U.S.

Abiding by the Charter of the U.N., the four prin

ciples on which the Kishi Government rad based the revision of the first
70
Treaty, were largely accepted by the U.S.

(2)

The Opposition and the Public
Japanese opposition to the military alliance with the U.S. had

very different sources than those of Canada.

Uhile Canada’s opposition

was mainly because Canadians felt that the defence system was ineffective
and very expensive, the Japanese opposition had its sources in the
71
cultural and ideological differences between the U.S. and Japan. Three
most significant factors in the Japanese opposition to the military alli
ance with the U.S. seem to have been:

(1) the presence of foreign

bases in Japan, (2) the difference of race and culture— a factor
antagonistic to the Japanese nationalistic feeling, (3) the strong
opposition of the U.S. to Communist ideology— an ideology on which the
Japanese opposition bases its principles.
The anti-U.S. feeling in Japan brought about an unexpected
upheaval in the opposition, stimulated by the crimes of American service72
men against Japanese civilians. However, when the time to decide to revise
or abolish Japan’s military alliance with the U.S. arrived, the Japanese
73
people became more and more uncertain. It is very difficult to determine
what made the people more confused about this special issue, but too
great a difference betw’een the policies of the government and the
opposition could account for one reason.

Uhile in Canada the Conserva

tive Government and the Liberal opposition shared basically the same
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policy, there was, in Japan, a radical difference between the Liberal
Democratic Govemirjent and the opposition parties headed by the Socialist
Party.

This great difference of opinion night have frightened an

’’unspecified majority" into thinking that there could be complete chaos
if the opposition parties were supported.
Uhen the Joint Statement to revise the first Treaty was
announced by the Japanese and .American Governments in September 1958,
the opposition parties had already gone be2rond the point of compromise,
74
talcing the stand of "absolute opposition." The policy of "absolute
opposition" focused on four points:

the withdrawal of all U.S. bases;

neutrality; establishment of relations with Communist China; and a
peace treaty with the Soviet Union.
However, it was not until late Harch, 1959 that all opposition
parties were united with the purpose of preventing the revision of the
Security Treaty.

Because of ideological differences betcreen the Socialists

and Communists, it was difficult to establish the "People's Council for
75
Preventing Revision of the Security Treaty." Even after its establish
ment on Harch 28, 1959, the differences in view among ideologically
76
organized parties and groups often resulted in clashes and splits.
In the 1958 general election, the newly-formed Socialist
Party gained 1.2 per cent more seats in the House of Representatives.
However, the total strength of the opposition parties was only 168
seats (or 36.3 per cent) against the 287 seats (or 61.5 per cent) the
conservatives held.

Having no chance to defeat the government's policy

because of their small numbers, both the Socialists and the Communists
depended on public support outside the Diet to demonstrate their dissatis-
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faction with the government.
The Socialists sought an organized support fron Sohyo (the
General Council of Japanese Labour Unions)* which had about 3.7 million
members. The Communists, too, relied on the Zengakuren (the All-Japan
Federation of Student Self-Government Association), which had already
split-into "mainstream" and "anti-mainstream" groups in 195S.
In addition to the fact that it had a slim chance to defeat
the government’s policy in the Diet, the Socialist opposition was much
77
too preoccupied with the definition of the words in the new Treaty,
although it had already been signed in January, 1960.

In February, 1960

a special committee on the new Security Treaty was organised in the
House of Representatives; it debated a total of 150 hours on the new
Treaty.

However, the opposition, particularly the Socialists, hoping

to filibuster until the Diet session ended, spent most of the time
demanding a definition of "the Far East" and "previous consultation"
78
used in Article 4.
The diqpute between the Liberal Democratic Government and the
opposition reached a climax on May 19-20, 1960.

LTien the Liberal

Democrats, with the exception of some anti-ICishi factions, tried to pass
a 50-day extension of the session, the Diet became a violent battlefield
of Socialists, Communists, Liberal Democrats and the Diet police.

After

a lengthy period of fighting, the conservative proposal to extend the
session was passed, and, immediately after that, the new Treaty was
approved without forewarning and debate and in the absence of opposition
79
parties (including some anti-ICishi factions of the IDF).
The complete lack of democracy and peace in the Diet during the
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"May 19 Incident" caused quite a controversy.

Almost all the leading

newspapers, magazines, and millions of Japanese people violently attacked

80
the government, but not necessarily the revision of the Security Treaty.
However, the majority of the Japanese mass media again refocused its
attack, this time on the opposition.

This reached a crisis in the

political unrest which occurred between June 10 and 19. The first
incident in the continuous violence occurred when Press Secretary
Hagerty and Ambassador MacArthur arrived at Tokyo International Airport
«

on June 10.

Thousands of anti-American demonstrators, associated with

the anti-Kishi forces, surrounded their car so that both of them had
to be taken to Tokyo by military helicopter.
The second was the eruption of violence in the vicinity of the
Diet on June 15•

Thousands of demonstrators demanded the immediate dis-

81
solution of the Diet and the abolition of the Treaty.

Demonstrators

clashed with the police, causing the first death of a demonstrator and
an attack by police on some newsmen and university professors.
The third was the government's cancellation of President
Eisenhower's visit.

The Kishi Government was intending to welcome the

President who was coming to celebrate the centennial of JapaneseAmerican friendship, after the ratification of the new Treaty.
These violent activities made the Japanese mass media and
public criticize the anti-government movement.

The violent demonstrations,

largely supported by the opposition parties, turned the public's senti
ment against them and in favour of the status quo of the conservative
government.
In July, i960, Kishi was replaced by the low-postured Prime
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Minister Ikeda.

Prime Minister Ikeda stressed economic prosperity

rattier than the establishment of a strong military power allied with
the U.S.
held.

In November, 1960 the twenty-ninth general election was

The LDP increased its seats to 296, a gain of 9.

The JSP decreased

in popular vote by 5.4 per cent and suffered a loss of 21 seats.

The

reason for this decrease was mainly because of the formation of the DSP,
which broke away from the JSP early in 1960.
The opposition in Japan, thus, was in an entirely different
situation from the Canadian opposition in this period.

This was probably

because there was too great an ideological gap between the Japanese
conservatives and the progressives.

It may also have been because party

politics were not deeply rooted in Japan.

It seems that the people voted

for the LDP on the basis of the personality of the candidates, rather than
of party policies.

(3)

Military Co-operation with the U.S.
It was no accident that the U.S. and Japanese Governments agreed

to incorporate economic co-operation into the new Treaty.

In order to

build up armed forces in Japan, the U.S. military aid (gifts) had
increased gradually and in 1959 reached $147 million.

Special war

procurements, even after the Korean truce, remained at the 500 milliondollar level.

The Japanese defence industries increased in productivity

from $200 million in 1955 to $322 million in 1960.

(Table 12)

The Canadian Government reduced its military obligation to equip
itself with modern weapons, and developed, instead, the Defence Production
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Sharing Programme with the U.S.

By producing and exporting military

equipment, Canada attempted to meet its military obligation in the
alliance and, at the same time, to offset the economic demand at home.
In other words, it exploited the military alliance in terms of defence
production.
However, compared with the Canadian example, Japan*s economic
exploitation of the military alliance with the U.S. did not rely so much
upon defence production.

(Table 12)

mutual co-operation of general trade

Rather, Japan took advantage of the
with the U.S.

The average three

and a half per cent of Japan*s share in the total of U.S. imports in the
82
1950*s rose to an 8.8 per cent average in the early half of the 1960*s.
From Japan*s point of view, it meant that while it reduced its import
dependence on the U.S. from 37.8 per cent in 1957 to 30.8 per cent in
1963, it increased its exports to the U.S. from 20.9 per cent to 27.6
83
per cent in the same period.
As far as defence production was concerned, in the period down
to the conclusion of the new Treaty, U.S. integration with Japan did
not yet occur. In June, 1957 the first Defence Supplies and Equipment
84
Programme, which was to be completed by 1960, was introduced by the
Defence Council.

It was, however, intended

only to fill thevacuum
85
caused by the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Japan and to lay the
foundations for the growth of a military-industrial complex tightly

bound to the American defence industry.
The American
Defence Supplies

integration of defence

production beganwith the second

and Equipment Programme of

the period 1962-66, which
86
was planned to modernize weapons, including the missile system. This
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five-year programme of $3,611 million included the first Defence
Production Plan.
home.

This plan called for the manufacturing of weapons at

The main reason for the home-manufactured weapon plan was said to

be to prevent inefficiencies such as late delivery and inferior quality
G7
of goods.
During the first Production Plan of 1961-64, 43 per cent of the
S3
1,480 million-dollar production was spent on Japanese defence industries.

In the second plan of the same type (1965-67), the percentage was
expected to greatly increase.

It seems that the real reason for the

home-manufacture, in this instance, was the intention to reduce Japan’s
heavy dependence on the American defence industry.

In fact, home-

manufactured airplanes and warships were more expensive than those
bought from the U.S., and the increase in cost of home manufacturing in
the first plan was mainly owing to the practice of buying American
89
licences, required in order to nroduce the same defence weapons in Japan.
The more Japan’s defence products were manufactured at home, the
more independent the Self-Defence Forces became.

However, the most

important force, the Air Self-Defence Force, was, at least until the end
of the second Defence Programme in 1966, under the command of the U.S.,
90
in spite of the existence of the Burns-Matsumae agreement, which gave the
ASDF its own command and authority in 1959.
Strategically, the Air Self-Defence Force worked and trained with
the U.S. Air Force in the sane office and under the same regulations.
The only difference between the two Forces was that regulations were
91
written in Japanese and operation control was often done in Japanese.
Economically, Japan gradually eased its dependence on the U.S. defence
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industry> but the U.S. still dominated the command system of the Japane
forces.
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TAB LE

12.

Defence Production and its Percentages in GNP, 1954 - 1966

Year
1954
1955
1956
1957
1953
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966

Canada
Defence Production
1,007
652
673
516
664
508
672
470
455
436
511
666
964

in millions of U.S. dollars
Japan
Defence Production DP/G2T?
DF/GNP
1.0%
4.4%
217
0.9
2.6
208
0.9
2.4
241
1.0
1.7
302
0.9
2.2
282
0.7
278
1.6
2.0
0.7
322
0.5
1.3
287
0.6
1.2
354
1.1
0.5
354
0.6
463
1.2
1.4
0.4
371
0.3
1.8
303

Note: All figures are calculated on the base of the U.S. dollar
which is equivalent to Canadian $1.07 and Japanese ¥360
regardless of fluctuation.
Total amount of defence production for Canada is the net value
of all contracts issued by the Department of Defence Produc
tion, and for Japan is the sum of domestic procurement by
the National Defence Agency and special procurement by the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry- Defence
production usually includes aircraft, ships, tank-automotive,
weapons, ammunition and explosives, electronics and communica
tion equipment, fuels and lubricants, clothing and equipage,
construction, and others.
Source: Canada, Department of Defence Production, Annual Report,
1954-67, The Queen*s Printer, Ottawa; Asahi Shimbun Sha,
Jieital, Tokyo (1969); llainichi Shimbun Sha, Mainichi Nen*l;an,
1969, Tokyo.
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TA B LE

13.

Year
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963

Total Budgetary Expenditures and Military E:cpenditures
(1958'- 1963)
in nillions of U.S. dollars
Japan
Canada
Total(A) Ifilitary(B) B/A
Total(A) Ililitary(B) B/A
33%
11%
3,699
412
4, 754
1,568
11
5,013
4,153
437
27
1,348
9
5,330
444
1,432
27
4,842
510
9
26
5,568
1,437
5,732
25
569
8
6,094
1,532
7,102
675
8
6,140
24
8,456
1,494

Note:B includes eicpenses of National Defence, Defence Production
(or Defence Establishment) and Industry. All figures are
calculated on the base of the U.S. dollar which is equivalent
to Canadian $1.07 and Japanese ¥360 regardless of fluctua
tion.
Source: Canada, Department of Finance, Budget Speech, 1959-64,
The Queen*s Printer, Ottawa; Japan, Prime Uinisterts Office,
Nihon Tokei HenUcan, 1964 and 1968, Tokyo.

TABLE 14.
Hilitary Streng th, 1958 - 1963

Year
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963

Total
120,848
120,400
120,000
119,300
122,500
123,700

Canada
CRN
CRA
20,252 48,682
20,300 48,400
20,500 48,000
20,000 47,800
20,000 50,000
21,700 50,000

CRAF
51,914
51,700
51, 500
51,500
52,500
52,000

Total
203,000
221,000
232,000
233,000
235,000
249,500

Jar?an
HSDF
GSDF
170,000
18,000
23,000
170,000
30,000
170,000
30,000
170,000
24,500
171,500
171,500
34,000

Source: Canada, Department of National Defence, Annual Report,1959;
Asahi Shimbun Sha, Jieitai, Tokyo(1969); The Institute for
Strategic Studies, Hilitary Balance, London.
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ASDF
15,000
28,000
32,000
33,000
39,000
34, 500
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THE THIRD PERIOD

(1966-1969)

The Renewal of NORAD and NATO
(1)

The Government Policy
Even in the period 1963-1968* when the Liberal Government was

headed by Lester Pearson, Canada*s position in the NATO and NORAD alli
ances became less important.

Exercising influence through the alliance
92
was hardly enough reason to remain both in NATO and NORAD.
However, Canada*s original intention of creating collective
security under a common alliance framework was maintained in the
alliances in which Canada had been involved.

Faithfully adhering to

its commitments to NATO and NORAD, Canada accepted the principle of

53
•'flexible response," which was introduced by the U.S.

It left ultimate

control over deterrence of war to the U.S. and acquiesced to its increa9A
sing domination in the alliances.
In spite of its reduced importance in the alliances and its
acceptance of the "flexible response" principle, the Liberal Government
added a new dimension to its foreign policy.

This was a policy for the

continuation of a multinational association, laying more stress on the
U.N. than on regional alliance.

Prime Minister Pearson, insisting that

there had been no better possibility than collective security at the
time of the birth of NATO, advocated that a number of middle powers
like Canada should take the initiative to establish a genuine and
95 .
powerful U.N. force.
Canada*s reasoning for remaining in NATO was further shaken
when the French Government under General de Gaulle refused to accept
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the principle of "flexible response."

The French Government announced
56
its complete withdrawal from the military role of NATO in Harch, 1966.
Since one of CanadaTs greatest advantages of being a member of MATO was
"some assurance against eventuality of conflict" between its principal
partners in Europe--Britain and France, it seems that the reason for
97
remaining in MATO had lost its meaning for Canada.
Nevertheless, the Pearson Government upheld its allegiance to
the alliance as firmly as ever.

In response to the French departure

from MATO, Prine Minister Pearson expressed the following optimistic
view:
In my judgment . . . (France*s) arguments . . . do not support
the conclusion that unified command and planning arrangements
are no longer necessary for the defence of Uestem Europe . . . .
Providing MATO itself does not disintegrate . . . the imme
diate military consequences of the French action are thought
to be manageable . . . . 98
As far as Canada*s bilateral relations with the U.S. through NORAD
were concerned, the policy of the Pearson Government appeared to be con
fused.

On the one hand, the Government supported the U.S. hard-line

policy toward the Vietnam Uar and regarded its involvement there as
"a necessary and justified attempt by the United States to prevent
international Communist aggression and hence, to guard the security of
99
the free world." On the other, the same government denounced the U.S.
intervention in Vietnam, rationalizing that it had an obligation to be
objective by virtue of its membership in the International Control
100
Commission.
In addition to this contradiction, Canada supported, though
indirectly, the U.S. military actions in Vietnam by way of providing
munitions to the U.S.

The fact that a large number of arms were
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sold by Canada to the U.S. was admitted by the Prime Minister, but he,
at the sane time, refused to DUt an end to it, because where the Canadian
101

arms were destined was beyond Canadian responsibility.
Compared with Canada’s situation, Japan was not a member of ICC.
The Japanese Government, having supported the American position in the
102
Vietnam Uar, had gained, by 1966, a total of $470 million from the Uar.
The increase of exports directly related to the Uar was not as successful
as the war procurement during the Korean Uar, but the Vietnam Uar
obviously helped to increase Japan’s e::ports to third countries, such as
Korea and Taiwan, of goods for manufacturing items which the U.S. bought
103
for the Uar.
Leaving a feeling of confusion among the opposition parties,
the Canadian Government secretly extended the KOPJE) agreement for another
five years on April 1, 1968.

The secret process of renewing the agreement

was in complete contradiction to the government’s previous acceptance of
requests by the opposition parties for a full debate on the issue.
Uhen the new Liberal Leader, Pierre Trudeau, took over, it was
expected that he would review Canada’s foreign and defence policies.
During the election campaign in May, 1968, Trudeau stated the necessity
of re-examination of Canada’s alliance.

He said:

They (NATO and NOR/D) are an integral part of the delicate
balance of power on which the peace of the world has rested
during a long and difficult period. Ue shall take a hard
look . . . at our military role in NATO and determine whether
our military commitment is still appropriate to the present
situation in Europe. Ue shall look at our role in K0HAD in
the light of the technological advances of modern weaponry
and of our fundamental opposition to the proliferation of
nuclear weapons.104
The Trudeau Government differed from the previous Liberal
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Governments in that neither Trudeau himself nor his Secretary of State
for External Affairs had the associations or experience with the leader
ship of the Department of External Affairs.

For the first time, the

new Prime Minister ventured to mahe the statement that "the first priority
105
for Canadians is not NATO."
In 1969, RATO was about to celebrate its 20th anniversary.
From that time on, any party in the Treaty could terminate membership
one year after its notice of denunciation.

Prime Minister Trudeau

allowed a number of witnesses from the academic community to have the
opportunity to explain their objections to the Pearson-Martin alliance
106
policy. Extensive hearings were held across Canada for eight weelcs
between January and March, 1969, by the Eouse of Commons Standing
Committee on External Affairs and Rational Defence.
The result did not change much, however.

The Government reached

the conclusion that Canada would continue membership in NATO and would
107
co-operate closely with the U.S. within NOEAD and in othe: ways. But
the Liberal Government under Pierre Trudeau had never submitted the
renewal of the NORAD agreement to Parliament for approval.

It inherited

that equivocal role of peacekeeping as well as fulfilling its commit
ment to NATO and NORAD, although the number of the Canadian troops in
Europe was to be reduced by half.

(2)

The Opposition and the Public
■When the North Atlantic alliance was first discussed in the

late 1940*s, the Liberal Government justified the need for the alliance
in four points:

first, the alliance would reduce Canada*s dependence
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(militarily and politically and economically) on the U.S.; secondly,
Canada would increase its influence in international affairs through
the alliance; thirdly, the instability of Europe night endanger North
.America with the threat of Communism; and finally, regional collecti\re
security was the best means to protect an unstable Europe (the U.K.
Security Council was impotent because of the bitter division between
its permanent members).
These reasons were widely accepted, and Canada’s participation
in the alliance became a reality.

However, in the late 1960’s, it was

questionable whether these reasons for remaining in NATO were still
valid.

Although the U.K. Security Council and the General Assembly

are still as ineffective, Canada’s role in NATO has not; become much less
effective, mainly owing to the recovery of Europe.
Since the North Atlantic Treaty allowed withdrawal within a
year’s notice of denunciation (after 1969), the question of whether to
stay in the alliance became the main bone of contention for the opposi
tion parties.

While NATO was diminishing in importance for Canada, the

U.S. was, too, growing less dependent on Canada for its North American
108
defence. This indicated that Canada could no longer expect to influence
American foreign policy, since Canada hoped, that its military contribu
tions to NATO and NORAD would increase its political influence.
Not only the opposition parties, but also many Canadian people
began to doubt if their country could really gain any advantage from
109
its multi-million dollar commitments in NATO and KORAD. The Conservative
Party, however, failed to propose any specific alternative to the defence
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and foreign policies of the Liberal Government.

Nor did it advocate

withdrawal from NOEAD and NATO, promising only to review then in the
110

1968 election campaign.
While the Conservative Party made no significant change in NATO
and NOEAD, many Canadians came to show an increased interest in the defence
and foreign policies of their government in the 1960*s, particularly after
Pierre Trudeau attained Prime Ministership.

This tendency of the people

might have been, to some extent, influenced by the increasing danger of
new missile interceptors, destroyers and nuclear-equipped missiles.
However, the public was more likely to be concerned, in their
participation in foreign policy, about human morality, while the oppo
sition parties were more concerned with the high expense of the Liberal
Government*s policy.

Problems in Vietnam and Nigeria/Biafra, accordingly,

gained higher priority for the Canadian people than the NATO and NORAD
111

questions.

Lack of support from the public made the opposition in Ottawa

less effective in teminating Canada*s participation in NATO and NORAD.
One of today*s most prominent experts in the field of foreign
policy, however, takes a view opposed to increased public interest in
Canada*s defence and foreign problems.

He believes that most Canadians

should have no influence in Vietnam, the ABM system or any other foreign
policy problems.

International affairs, according to him, should be left

to "the small group of highly educated and broadly experienced men," because
those problems are "too difficult, too complex, and too technical for the
112

average man."
Although the Canadian public participate to an increasing extent
in defence and foreign policy problems, it seems the view ex-pressed by
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this former senior official of the Department of External Affairs is
still the dominant one in Ottawa.

That Canada has unusually rich

resources of information available for a country of its size cannot be
disputed, but because nore and more Canadian people are becoming
interested in foreign affairs, it will not be long before the government
will have to display a greater willingness to improve the channels between
the government and the people.

(3)

Hilitary Co-operation with the U.S.
The following is part of Prime Uinister Pearsonfs letter

replying to 360 representatives of the University of Toronto*s teaching
staff in 1967.
The U.S.-Canadian production-sharing arrangements enable the
Canadian Government to acquire from the U.S.A. a great deal of
the nation*s essential defence equipment at the lowest possible
cost, while at the sane tine permitting us to offset the
resulting drain on the economy by reciprocal sales to the U.S.A.
Under these agreements, by reason of longer production runs,
Canadian industry is able to participate competitively in U.S.
research, development, and production' programmes, and is exempted
from the "Buy American" Act for these purposes.“ 3
This was also the Prime Hinis ter’s answer to many other
critics who insisted that "weapons going to Vietnam are weapons for
aggression and, unless we can have an assurance that our weapons are
not going to Vietnam, we will not‘sell Anericans any arms."
In the mid-I960*s, the Canadian procurements in the U.S.
increased from $130.1 million in 1965 to $332.6 million in 1966.
15)

(Table

How Canada spends its money in the U.S. can be derived from the
114
following example. Of the $332.6 Canada spent in 1966:
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Aircraft and components
50%
Navigation and comnuni cat ion equipment 32
Conponents for ammunition
10
Ship components
2*6
Vehicles and conponents
2.4
Research and miscellaneous
3
Almost all these items were for component parts rather than
complete weapons, which are assembled in Canadian factories.

The U.S.

buys arms assembled in Canada as well as purely made-in-Canada goods.
Thus, from 1959 to the end of 1969, more than $2.9 billion were sold
to the U.S. "from fill for land mines to jachets for bullets, from
complex electronic gear to the Green Berets."

115
lloreover, the factories

producing these goods provide about 100,000 jobs for Canadians.
It is virtually impossible, however, for Canada to produce
anything as large and as complex as a jet interceptor at a competitive
116
price. The U.S. spent $317.1 million in 1966 on Canadian-made arms and
other items.

They were all items smaller than aircraft.

This means that

Canada, whenever it has to employ modern equipment required fcr KORAD,
must buy it from the U.S., not being able to produce it at home with
Canadian labour and brainpower.

It seems, therefore, very' unlikely that

Canadian industry will be exempted from the "Buy American" Act in the
near future.
Strategically, there has been a great development of the air
defence system in the 1960*s.

First of all, in the Sixties, a new

warning system against ICBlf*s called the Ballistic Missile Early Warning
System (BIIEUS) was established in addition to the DEU Line and SAGE.
E1EWS in the ICB11 era did not require Canadian soil for fulfilling its
purpose.

Bases were established in:

and Fylingdalc Moor, England.

Thule, Greenland; Clear, Alaska;

Furthermore, all EMEUS radar at these
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sites is operated by the nor.-Canadian command, although it is part of
117
NORAD.
Secondly, the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system was introduced
by the Johnson Administration in September, 1967.

Since then, the

Canadian Government has refused to agree that the ABM system is at all
relevant to 1I0RAD.
the installation

Nhen the Ni:;on Administration decided to proceed with

of the ABM system, Frime Minister Trudeau insisted in

March, 1969, that the ABM, as the Pearson Government had said, would not
be a part of KORAD.

It was purely an American defence system

on which

Canada should not demand any consultation.

But he did not deny that
118
Canada night participate in that system at will.
Thirdly, there were tiro other changes proposed for NCR.AD, which
were introduced by U.S. Defence Secretary McNamara in Congress in February,
119
1968, although they as yet remain undecided for Canada. These changes
are, unlike the ABM system, obviously included in NORAD, if decided.
of chen is the introduction of the F-106 Delta Dart.

One

Once this is

accepted, the old Bonarcs and even the Voodoos in Canada night be
replaced.

The other is a new Air-borne Naming and Control System (AUACS).

ANACS is lilcely to replace the DEN Line and even BUEWS.

If they are
120
deployed, it is estimated to cost Canada up to $14 billion.
More important than the e:q>ense of modem weapons is the fact
that the development of the defence system never ceases and continually
increases in cost.

It is very clear that Canada will never be able to .

deploy the new defence system at the sane pace as the U.S.

Therefore,

the government nay have to alter its traditional view that an increase in
military commitments in the alliance is justifiable because, it means an
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increase in the sphere of political influence.

The Automatic Extension of the Security Treaty
(1)

The Government Policy
Following the stormy period accompanying the revision of the

first Security Treaty» Japan enjoyed enormous economic grotrth throughout
the Sixties.

Japan surpassed Britain in GNP by 1967, then France by

1968, and T/est Germany by 1969.

Mith a GNP that is expected to reach

$200 billion in 1970, Japan now ranks third in the xrorld, behind the
121

U.S. ($932 billion) and the Soviet Union ($600 billion).
The enormous increase of Japan*s economic power has created, in
the minds of a majority of Japanese, price in being Japanese.

It has

also caused a great number of Japanese to feel their country has a
vital role to play in sharing more responsibility for world peace, in
122
particular, peace in Southeast Asia and the western Pacific region.
This change of attitude was well illustrated when Japan
asserted its request for the return of the southern islands (the
Ogasawara Islands and the Okinawa Islands) from the U.S.

Soon after

his assuming the post of Prime Minister in late 1964, Eisaku Sato
insisted that, until Okinawa was returned to Japan, the "postwar period"
would not be over for the Japanese.
In the House of Representatives, on December 5, 1967, the Prime
Minister announced possible dates for their return, which were arrived
at in his consultation with President Johnson.
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In ny recent consultation with the President of the U.S., I
have become certain that we will.reach an agreement on the
date of reversion (of Okinawa) which is to be within three
years . . . .
On the other hand, it was agreed that the Ogasawara
Islands would be returned to Japan within one year . . . J-53
The reversion of Okinawa, however, has created very complex
problems in relation to the Security Treaty, the escalated Vietnam Uar
and nuclear weapons.

The Japanese refused to accept Okinawa with U.S.
124
nuclear bases and weapons. The sensitivity of the Japanese people to
nuclear weapons caused complications for the government, which planned
125
to gain prestige by having Okinawa returned as soon as possible.
On the other hand, Okinawa has been one of the most important
126
U.S. military bases in the Far Eastern and Southeast Asian regions.
Geographically, it is situated right in the center of those regions:
900 miles from Tokyo; 750 miles from Seoul; 400 miles from Taipei;
900 miles from Manila; and 1,750 miles from Saigon.
Previously, the Prime Minister had flatly stated that any
nuclear weapons on the Ogasawara Islands had to be removed before they
were returned.

He stood firmly on his famous "three basic principles on
127
non-nuclear proliferation.” As a result, the Ogasawara Islands have been
returned to Japan devoid of nuclear weapons.
Because of the importance of the bases there, Prime Minister Sato
did not immediately clarify whether the conditions applied to the

Ogasawara Islands would be applied to Okinawa, too, at the time of the
reversion.

In April, 1968, he refused to go into further discussion on

the question of Okinawa, other than saying that the conditions concerning
12G

the U.S. bases in Okinawa were still in the stage of "blank paper."
According to him, Japan should first concentrate on having Okinawa and
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its one million people returned to Japan, before demanding further
conditions regarding the military bases there.

The Prime Minister*s

purpose was to strengthen Jaoan*s ties with the U.S., instead of
129
arousing resentment and susp/icion. This was clearly expressed in the
communique after he consulted with President Nixon in late llovember, 1969.
During the consultation, the Prime Minister was successful in
having the U.S. agree to withdraw its nuclear weapons from the strate
gic island before its reversion to Japan in 1972.

However, he consented

to the U.S. deploying nuclear weapons on Okinawa "in an emergency after
130
close consultation with the Japanese Government." He also agreed on the
expansion of Japanese defence forces in proportion to its national power.
The Sato Government dissolved the House of Representatives a
month after the announcement of the communique.

The Liberal Democratic

Government returned with a decrease in the popular vote, but with more
seats.

In June, 1970 the Security Treaty between the U.S. and Japan was,

according to the previous announcement, automatica11y extended without
any complications.

(2)

The Opposition and the Public
Since 1964, the nuclear power of China has been slowly but

steadily developing.

On the Korean peninsula, the confrontation

between North and South Korea at the 38th parallel has been intensified
by the North Korean attempt to assassinate the President of -South Korea
in January, 1968.

Immediately following that, the American Navy intel

ligence ship, the Pueblo, was captured by the North Korean guard on the
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Sea of Japan.

In Vietnam* the U.S. transferred its main B-52 base from

Guam Island to Okinawa, in order to shorten the bombing run and to
counteract a heavy attack by the national

Liberation Front.

Under these circumstances, in the late 1960*s

a large number

of the Japanese people feared possible involvement in war since Japan
served as an offensive military base of the U.S.

According to the

opposition, the possibility of involvement in war was because of Satofs
131
renewal of the Security Treaty with the U.S. The opposition further
denounced the government*s failure to adhere to the "previous consulta
tion" clause which was interpreted to require "consent" of the Japanese
Government.

^Jhen the U.S. nuclear submarines visited Japanese ports

in 1968, the government took a very indecisive attitude towards them.
The lack of firmness with the U.S. in the negotiations on the Okinawa
reversion policy also made the opposition attack the government for
Japan*s possible involvement in war.
However, unlike 1960, the opposition parties proposed their own
policies on the Security Treaty and the reversion of Okinawa.

Although

there were some minority opinions within the opposition parties, their
policies towards these two main issues of
132
classified as follows:
I.

the late Sixties can be

The Security Treaty
The Japan Socialist Party:
Denunciation of the Treaty through diplomatic procedure;
the withdrawal of the U.S. troops and bases; the gradual
dissolution of Japanfs Self-Defence Forces and reforming
into a National Police; the establishment of a peace
treaty with the Soviet Union and the restoration of
relationships with China.
The Democratic Socialist Party:
Continuation of the Treaty, but with no U.S. troops in
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Japan, except in an emergency; the' retention of a minimum
of Self-Defence Forces, upon public consensus; then, a real
security dependent upon Japan*s independent foreign policy.
The Fair Play Party:
Gradual annulment of the Treaty through refusing the increase
of armed forces and U.S. bases, and adhering to stricter
"previous consultation"; the establishment of a perfect neutral
foreign policy; and the maintenance of Japan*s national Guard
reduced from the Self-Defence Forces.
The Japan Communist Party:
Exparte denunciation of the Treaty; the proclamation of
Japan*s neutral policy, which denies any foreign troops in
Japan; immediate dissolution of the Self-Defence Forces;
then, the conclusion of a real international peace treaty
through which Japan would be protected from all external
enemies.
II.

The Question of Okinawa
The Japan Socialist Party:
Immediate complete reversion with no U.S. military bases
and troops.
The Democratic Socialist Party:
Complete reversion without nuclear bases but with other
bases, which are on similar conditions to those of the
fatherland.
The Fair Play Party:
Immediate complete reversion and immediate withdrawal of
the U.S. bases; some inevitable bases, if any, should be
withdrawn in five years.
The Japan Communist Party:
Immediate complete reversion with no conditions; immediate
complete withdrawal of the U.S. bases.
There were public polls on the Security Treaty, the Self-

Defence Forces, and the question of Okinawa, taken by two nation-wide
newspapers, Yoniuri Shinbun and Hainichi Shimbun, between April and
June, 1968.

How much public opinion is represented by the government

or the opposition parties is indicated in their results.
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Yoniuri Shinbun
1.

2.

3.

4.

(April 7 - 9 ,

1968)

Question:

Japan has concluded the Security Treaty with the
U.S. Do you think the Treaty is useful for Japan’s
security?

Answer:

Very useful
Somewhat useful
Useless
Can’t say
Others
Don *t know
No answer

Question:

The year 1970 is the tine vhen this Treaty is to
be re-exanined. At that tine, which of the
following do you think is the most desirable?

Answer:

Solidification of the Treaty for
a longer tern
Automatic extension
Revision to weaken it
Denunciation
Others
Don *t know
No answer

127.
43
17
10
1
16
1

6.8%
11.6
36.1
10.8
7.5
25.2
2.0

Question!

Do you think the U.S. military bases in Okinawa
are useful for Japan’s security?

Answer:

Very useful
Somewhat useful
Useless
Can’t say
Others
Don*t know and
no answer

5%
24
45
12
1
13

Question:

Uhen Okinawa is returned to Japan, do you think
the U.S. nuclear bases should remain, or should
they be taken away beforehand, or are they
inevitable?

Answer:

Should remain
Should not remain
Inevitable
Can’t say
Others
Don’t know andno answer

3%
66
20
4
1
6
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5.

Question:

The Sato Government has a policy that Japan nust
neither produce nuclear weapons, nor possess then,
nor acquiretheir, fromabroad. Do you approve or
disapprove of this policy?

Answer:

Approve
Disapprove
Canft say
Others
Donrt know and noanswer

tlainichi Shinbun
1.

78%
8
7
1
1

(June 14 - 15, 1968)

Question:

Do you think it is necessary for Japan to have
the Self-Defence Forces?

Answer:

Necessary
Unnecessary
Others

827.
15
3

(for those who answered it was necessary)
Question: Why is it necessary?
Answer:

To use against aggressive enemies
For the maintenance of public peace
For disaster relief
Because most countries have their
own armed forces
Others

17%
31
27
6
1

(for those who answered it was unnecessary)
Question: Why is it unnecessary?

2.

Answer:

Unconstitutional
Useless for defence
No danger of aggression
Japan should automaticallysurrender
Waste of taxes
Othe rs

5%
2
1
3
4
0

Question:

At present the total number of the Self-Defence
Forces (Ground, Maritime and Air) is about 250,000.
Do you think it should be increased or reduced?

Answer:

Increased
Left intact
Reduced
Abolished
Others and no answer

17%
62
8
8
5
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In addition to this, IInini chi Shinbun took three polls in
Okinawa on how the U.S. bases should be changed when the Okinawans
come under Japanese rule.

None of these polls were taken before the

Sato-Nixon consultaion, in which the specific date of returning Okinawa
to Japan was set.

nevertheless, the results of the polls show their

uncertainty about the status of the U.S. bases, intermingled with their
desire to become Japanese citizens.
Public Opinion Poll Results on Status of the U.S. Bases in Okinawa

Same as Fatherland
Complete vJithdrawal
Free Use without
Nuclear Ueapons
Free Use with
Nuclear Ueapons
Others and No Answer

A

B

C

117,
25

27%
18

21%
14

24

43

26

12
28

5
7

7
32

(Hote: A=Decenber 1-5, 1967; B=?ebruary 26-lIarch 3, I960;
C^September 7-11, 1968)
According to these public opinion polls, the majority of the
Japanese people preferred gradual weakening of its military alliance
with the U.S., xjhile, at the same time, approved the present Self-Defence
Forces.

Although a large number of the people were uncertain or were

inconclusive about the Security Treaty in the year 1970, most of them
approved of the non-nuclear policy of the Sato Government.

Therefore,

in view of public sentiment, it is understandable that the Government
pursued a policy of automatic extension of the Security Treaty in June,
1970, after having set the specific date of the reversion of Okinawa
without U.S. nuclear bases.
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(3)

Military Co-operation with the U.S.
While in Canada the defence industries buy components from

the U.S. and are restricted from making anything as large as a jet
plane, the Japanese defence industries produce most of their m o d e m
airplanes at home.

By the second Defence Production Plan (1965-67)

defence items, including F-104 J fighters, were to be manufactured at
home.

As a result, the Japanese industries succeeded in manufacturing
133
64 per cent of the thirty F-104 Js.
The third Defence Supplies and Equipment Programme which was
set up in November, 1966, with the $6,500 million estimated cost, included

the Nike Hercules, the Hawk, light and heavy tanks, large- and middle134
size helicopters, and others to be manufactured at home.
The total cost
of home-manufactured defence products came to $1,388.9 million.

Only

34*4 per cent of the estimated cost of $6,500 million in the Programme
was to be spent on defence weapons, of which more than 60 per cent was
135
to go to,Japan’s defence industries.
Consequently, Japan's defence industries have been rapidly
growing. However, as in the Canadian case, Japan's research on military
development is negligible compared with that of the U.S.

This means the

"home-manufacturing" policy encourages closer link-ups between the
military industrial complexes rather than reducing Japan's dependence
on the U.S.
The closer link-ups between the two military-industrial complexes
are, moreover, supported by governmental bilateral agreements, for
example, the "Memorandum on Military Research and Development" in 1968
136
and "U.S.-Japan Aerospace Co-operation Agreement" in 1969.
The latter was
said to pave "the way for American aerospace industry assistance in the
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Seventies in the development of Japanese IGBM-type rockets" which could
137
be armed with nuclear warheads rather than space research satellites.
In fact, most of the top Japanese defence contractors are closely tied
to the top 100 American defence industries by licensing agreements and
joint ventures.
In strategy, on the other hand, U.S.-Japan military co-operation
has entered a new era.

It is a known fact that since 1965 at least,

Japan's Maritime and Air Self-Defence Forces have been conducting joint
maneuvers with South Korean, Nationalist Chinese, and the U.S. Seventh
138
Fleet forces.
Its joint maneuvers with the U.S. Navy (mainly the Seventh
Fleet) began as early as 1959*

The period of exercise has been extended
139
from 5 days in 1959 to 11 days in 1968.
Every year since 1962, the Ground Self-Defence Force has been
sending its missile operators to the McGregor missile-test field in New
140
Mexico.
In addition to this, GSDF sends 150 to 200 of its best soldiers
to the U.S. to study the technology of new weapons.
In spite of this, the Self-Defence Forces of Japan have steadily
become more independent from the U.S. in their system of command.

It is not

only because of the decrease in the number of U.S. troops in Japan, but
also because the quantity as well as quality of the Forces have become
close to par with those of the U.S. forces in Japan, after the completion
of the third Defence Programme.
ASDF, the force most integrated with the U.S., no longer conducts
japanese-American joint exercises in as large a scale and as long a period
141
as it had been doing.
Furthermore, the Matsumae-Bums Agreement, in which
Japan and the U.S. held their own command separately, unlike NORAD and
NATO, has lapsed.

In fact, the U.S. bomber squadrons were removed from
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Japan in June, 1S66.

Since then, Japan has been guarded only by A3D7,

and a new Base Air Defence Ground Environment (BADGE) system installed
in April, 1968.
Japanese military co-operation with the U.S. has indeed moved
in the direction of depending less on the U.S. for command, while, at
the same time, becoming increasingly characterized by economic inter
relations.

This is significantly different from the situation of Canada

which has become gradually dependent on the U.S. both military operation
and defence production.
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TAB LE

15.

Procurements Under Canada-U.S._Defence Sharing Programme
(195'9~-~1967)
in nil! .ions of Canadian dollars
Year Canadian Procurement in U.S. U.S. Procurement in Canada
96.3
1959
45.3
1960
51.7
112.7
1961
37.7
142.6
127.4
254.3
1962
1963
152.0
142.0
173.3
1964
166.S
130.1
1965
259.5
332.6
1966
317.1
1967
293.8
307.7
Source; Canada* Department of Defence Production, Annual Report,
1960-68, The Queen*s Printer, Ottawa.

TABLE 16.

Year
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968

Total Budgetary 5:n?enditures and Ililitary E;ipenditures
(1964 - 1968)
in millions of U.S. dollars
Jan an
Canada
Total(A) Hilitary(B) B/A
Total(A) Hilitary(B) B/A
8%
764
1,610
25%
9,197
6, 422
9
954
10,347
6,695
1, 482
22
8
11,831
946
1,492
21
7,178
7
1,058
14,454
19
1,583
8,168
3
16,163
1,172
1,641
18
9,179

Note; B includes eizpenses of National Defence, Defence Production
(or Defence Establishment) and Industry. All figures are
calculated on the base of the U.S. dollar which is equivalent
to Canadian $1.07 and Japanese ¥360 regardless of fluctua
tion.
Source; Canada, Department of Finance, Budget Speech, 1965-69,
The Queen'*s Printer, Ottawa; Japan, Prime llinister*s Office,
Nihon Tokei Nentkan, 1969, Tokyo.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

123

TABLE 17.

Military Strength, 1964 - 1958

Year
1964
1965
1966
1967
196S

Total
120,000
120,000
107,000
103,000
101,600

Canada
CRA
CRN
20,700 49,000
20,700 49,000
18,000 44,000
17,000 42,000
16,600 41,500

CRAF
50,600
50,600
45,000
44,000
43,500

Total
244,000
246,COO
246,000
246,000
250,000

Japan
HSDF
GSDF
171,500
35,000
35,000
172,000
171,500
35,000
171,500
35,000
36,000
174,000

ASDF
39,000
39,000
39,500
39,500
40,000

Source: The Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance, 1964-69.
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Since the end of h'oriel liar II, both Canada and Japan have
maintained a close military co-operation with the IT.S.
stage, as

In the first

examined in the previous chapter, the two countries were

situated in completely different international environments.

Canada in

the late Forties and in the early,Fifties was the strongest nation among
middle powers.

Abundant in natural resources and land area, it had an

industrial capacity ranb.ed as one of the highest in the world after the
collapse of the economies of the west European countries follow-ing the
T-Tn
** -ti

„

•

In spite of this, its strong economic power did not effect
military independence from, the U.S.

This contrasts with the Japanese

trend towards reducing military dependence on the U.S., after the re
establishment of its economic power in the early Sixties.

By that time,

antagonism, between the U.S. and the Soviet Union had escalated the develop
ment of offensive weapons.
In the ICBII era--the late Fifties and early Sixties--Canadals
geographical remoteness from enemies of conventional war became much less
important for Canada’s security.

The problems of continental defence were

characterised by a completely new and unprecedented urgency.

Up to the

time of the Cuban crisis, the military integration between Canada and
the U.S. had been taking place rapidly.
In the Fifties, when Canada was busy in international affairs, it
was also occupied with establishing a continental defence system with the
U.S.

Japan had just become independent at the beginning of the decade

and was seeking admission to the United Nations.

Almost completely

protected by the U.S., Japan was militarily a small power with one-fifth
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to one quarter of Canada’s military expenditures throughout the Fifties.
In spite of Japan’s proximity to the eastern border of the Soviet Union>
Japan’s small economic and military poirer hardly provided the Soviet
Union sufficient provocation for attach.
Canada has been gradually losing its strategic significance in
continental defence.

In the nid Sixties* with the development and construc

tion of the Ballistic Hissile Early Taming System (BUSTS), Canada’s role
vis-2t-vis the U.S. declined in importance.

Since then, Canada’s contribu

tions to continental defence have grown even less important than the
contributions it made to NATO and EOP.AD in the Fifties and in the early
Sixties.
In contrast to Canada’s diminishing strategic significance,
Japan, in the Sixties, was gradually moving away from dependence on the
U.5.--economically, politically, and militarily.

Thile Japan’s '’perpetual”

conservative governments have maintained a pro-Anerican policy, Japanese
military power has been rapidly re-established with the accompanying
diminution of dependence on the U.S.
Politically, the U.S. needs a Japan sufficiently strong to
defend itself because it serves as a "bastion" of American democracy
in Asia and also to deter potential enemies on the west and the north.
Contrary to this, Canada is no longer essential to the U.S. in the
1CB11 era, unless the U.S. decides'that it must meet the threat of
missile attach by means of the anti-ballistic missile (ABIl) system

1
installed on Canadian soil.
Throughout the postwar period, Canada’s military co-operation
with the U.S. has been very close.

In particular, since the exchange of
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the KOEAD agreements in 1953, Canada has become integrated for military
purposes with the U.S. to a degree higher than ever before.

At present,

Canada’s military power compared with that of the U.S. is so small that
it may not be significant to the U.S. for continental defence.
Uhile the Trudeau Government has decided to reduce Canada’s
military contributions to NATO and promises to take a hard look at the
alliance of NOEAD with an eye to decreasing its commitments, the Sato
Government anticipates an increase in Japan’s military forces in propor
tion to its economic power.

In light of this, Canada and Japan have reached

turning points in their military relations with the U.S.

As shown in the

gradual decrease of its military expenditures in percentage of total
expenditures, Canada’s military contributions both to KOEAD and NATO
might be further reduced.

Japan, on the other hand, will continue to

increase its military expenditures in proportion to its rise of GUP,
but whether this means it will expand its military responsibilities over
the Southeast Asian and the western Pacific regions remains unclarified.
These trends in military relations with the U.S. between. Canada
and Japan can be related to geographical, socio-cultural and economic
divergences.

Moreover, the trends may also be related to cone character

istics of the Canadian and Japanese political systems.

Geographical factors of the two countries have influenced the
postwar trends of military relations with the U.S. to a high degree.
Because of its geographical location, Canada has become more closely
related in strategy to the U.S. than to any other NATO member under the
Canada-U.S. Segional Group of arrangements for air defence of North
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America.

As partner to such a giar.t military power, Canada has hardly

any chance to influence the U.S. armed forces in its collective security
with the U.5.
In the late Fifties and in the early Si::ties, Canada’s close co
operation with the U.3* based on geographical location, became more apparent,
fince the Itussian introduction of the Inter-continental ballistic Ilissiie
(ICBII) in 1957, there has been a growing arms race between the Soviet
Union and the U.S.

The increasing threat of the Soviet Union over the

Forth hole by the ICBII strengthened Canada’s military co-operation with
the U.S.
In addition to the DBF Line along the coast of the Arctic Ocean,
there are the Hid-Canada Line across Canada at the 50th parallel, the
Line Tree Line on the U.S.-Canadian border, and the Semi-Automatic Ground
Environment (3AGE) system--all are designed to defend Forth America
against the Soviet long-range bombers and missile attach over the Forth
hole.

Canada is geographically situated first in the line of Soviet attach.

Yet an Soviet missile technology improves, the warning time these systems
provide the U.S. declines.
In

th e m id and l a t e

w a r has become le s s l i k e l y ,

S i::tie s ,

d e s p it e th e f a c t t h a t a l l - o u t n u c le a r

C an ad a’ s g e o g r a p h ic a l lo c a t i o n has b e e n l a r g e l y

responsible for continuing close relations with the U.S.

By cutting down

on personnel e:q'.enses» the Canadian Government could afford to modernise
2

the FOItAD equipment.

However, Canada’s military establishment has lost

the strategic significance it once possessed.

Owing to geographical

location, the remaining significance of Canada to the U.S. is that it
provides an early warning system and that it allows the Americans free
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.access to Canada in time of emergency.

Even this significance may

become greatly reduced, once the recently launched spy satellite,
which makes it possible for the U.S. Air Force to observe long-range
missile launching sites in China and the Soviet Union, comes into
3
operation.
As for Japan, in the late Forties and early Fifties, it was
only a part of the "Asian bastion" against Soviet Communism, which had
already encroached on the Asian continent.

When the Chinese Communists

established the Peking Government in October, 1949» the military
protective front of "American democracy" was fortified along the crescent
shaped line of Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines.
In the Korean War, the Peking Government explicitly expressed its
opposition to the U.S. and its allies.

The fortification of the U.S.

military front in Asia, including Japan, was further strengthened.
In the late Fifties and early Sixties, however, Japan's geographical
remoteness from North America created a doubt among some Japanese about
whether the U.S. would seriously come to protect their country.

Japan's

rapidly growing economic power gradually drew attention from the Peking
and Moscow Governments.

With two potential enemies only across the Sea

of Japan, the Japanese political leaders busily devoted themselves to
acquiring a military power, at least capable of self-defence.
Ever since China's first nuclear bomb testing in 19&4» nuclear
bomb experiments have been occurring every year there.

Faced with the

possibility of the Chinese Communists producing a long-range ballistic
missile system, the Japanese budgetary expenditures on armed forces
4
suddenly doubled in 1965 the rate of increase of the previous year.
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To oppose a long-range ballistic nissile attack, Japan built
the Base Air Defence Ground Environment (BADGE) system in 1968.

In the

case of bomber attack, Japan nay non be able to defend itself for a
limited length of tine.

In this field, the Self-Defence Forces operate

almost completely independently from the U.S. command.

Examination of

this trend of Japan’s military relations with the U.S. also shows that
geographical factors have been, to a considerable degree, responsible for
the resulting independent operation of Japan’s armed forces.

Socio-cultural factors may also explain differences in the postwar
trends of military co-operation with the U.S. between Canada and Japan.
In Canada’s case, the U.S. has always posed a potential threat to Canada.
Then Canada eagerly fostered the idea of establishing a Forth Atlantic
community, which brought the U.S. into the west European sphere, its
main motive was to ease its heavy dependence on the U.S. and to create
"a more healthy balance" within the community.

Canada sought to escape

from a renewed threat of an unacceptable degree of control by the U.S.,
immediately after the Uar.

This seems to be one of the reasons'which

caused the External Affairs llinister at that tine, Lester Fearson, to say:
An Atlantic union must have a deeper meaning and deeper roots.
It must create conditions for a kind of co-operation which
goes beyond the immediate emergency.-*
The French Canadians have developed a "state-of-siege mentality"
for a long period of their history.
tion

They have continuously felt domina

either by the English-speaking Canadians or Americans.

Since the

postwar period the English-speaking Canadians, .too, have developed a
feeling that they are being threatened from the south.

The fact that,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

131

presently, both French-speaking and English-speaking Canadians share
a similar sentiment may serve to encourage reduction of Canada’s heavy
dependence on the U.C.

L'oreover, in the Seventies, the growing role

of French Canadians in the government nay also lead Canada to closer
relations with French-streaking countries, not only in Europe, but
also in Africa* Asia and the Caribbean, because of the desire to weaken
its heavy cultural* economic, military and rolitical dependence on the
6

U.S.
Historically, Japan was considered as a potential enemy of the
U.S.

After it e::panded its sphere of economic, political and military

influence in Asia, Japan embarked on a campaign of destruction precipi
tating Uorle Uar II.

Although Japan has rebuilt a close friendship with

the.U.S. and its allies after the bar* the U.S. as well as other Asian
neighbours have been careful to watch for any sign of a militarist
revival in Japan.
with the increased economic power, the possibilit2? of Japan’s
becoming once again a military giant has also increased.

Uhile Canada

is threatened by "familiarity” with the U.S., the U.S. may feel
threatened by a Japan militarily independent cf the U.S. and growing in
strength.

From the beginning of the military co-operation with the U.S.
in the postwar period, the Canadian majority expressed their support for
it, while a large number of the Japanese people were confused by or
opposed to their military alliance with the U.S.

In Japan, cultural and

linguistical differences between the U.S. and Japan has been one of the
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greatest barriers to pronoting or even maintaining a close military
relationship with the U.5.
On the other hand, in spite of (or perhaps, because of) the socio
cultural convergence, the U.S. has posed a threat for Canada culturally
as veil as politically, militarily and economically.

The barrier, in this

case, is caused by fear of losing the Canadian identity, and, perhaps in
the long run, Canadian sovereignty and independence, nevertheless, the
7
Canadians, as a rule, maintain a trust in the U.S., and the U.S. is
Canada’s closest friend and ally and mill remain so.
In the late Si:;ties, the Japanese people continued to display a
distrust of American bases and troops in Japan.

Generally, the majority

of the people do not believe that, in spite of the existence of the
Security Treaty between the two, the U.S. mould protect Japan in case
8
of emergency. This lach of confidence seems to have some relation to the
great differences in culture between the U.S. and Japan.

One Gallup

International survey re accomplishments in the Sixties provides evidence
contrasting Canadian admiration of the U.S. with Japanese self9
.
admiration.
Question:

Uhich countin' in the world can looh bach on the years
1960 to 1969 with the most satisfaction for what it has
achieved?

Answer:

.
Own country
U.S.A.
West Germany
U.3.S.R.
China
Others
Can’t say

Canada
25%
• 35
5
16
19

Japan
35%
20
10
3
4
2
26

Economic factors also figure significantly in the postwar trends
of the military co-operation with the U.3.

Throughout the postwar period
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Canada's econorrry has, without a doubt,

been heavily dependent uponthe

U.S.

accounted for sixty per

Canada's trade with the U.S. has

its exports and seventy per cent of its imports.
Canada has been the leading trading partner.

centof

For the U.S., too,

The high figure of U.S.

investments in Canada has long controlled a large part of the Canadian

economy.
The Japanese economy, similarly, has been heavily dependent on
the U.S., but much less so compared with that of Canada.

In the Fifties

and in the Sixties, less than 30 per cent of Japan's total foreign trade
was with the U.S.

Taking into consideration that Canada's foreign trade

occupies one-third of its GNP compared to one-fifth in Japan, it appears
much more important for Canada to maintain close economic relations with
the U.S. than for Japan.

As economic prosperity is for both Canada and

Japan a most important national interest, a change in their military
relations with thw U.S. must not cause

a reduction of economic

operation—

for Canada.

and this is much more true

co

In addition to these factors of geography, socio-culture and
economy, the differences of political systems between Canada and Japan,
as already mentioned, may also bear relation to the postwar trends of
their military co-operation with the U.S.

Absence of any noticeable

academic clique among Canadian senior officials and a higher level of
educational background may make for a higher degree of variety in Canada'
policy outputs compared to Japan.

The tendency towards variety of policy

outputs is also produced in Canada by the convergence of the two major
parties, the Progressive Conservatives and the Liberals, which share
the same basic principles on foreign and defence policies, thus
permitting the exploration of various means to implement these principles
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In such cases as NATO, NORAD, and the U.N. Peacekeeping force, decisions
on Canada’s foreign and defence policies have basically been shared by
the two major parties.

Both parties also agree on reducing military

expenditures.
Compared with the Canadian case, the existence of an academic
clique and a large number of career men in the Japanese bureaucracy
provides a hindrance to the working of foreign and defence policies.
Another obstacle to more flexible and broader policy outputs is, in Japan,
the uncompromising difference between the conservative government and the
opposition.

Because of their lack of co-operation in policy-making, policy

outputs are very limited in comparison to those of Canada.
While the Canadian opposition has wide representation in the
bureaucracy, the bureaucracy of Japan contains hardly any members of the
opposition.

Furthermore, mainly because of structural and functional

characteristics of Japan’s Foreign Affairs Ministry, defence policy-making
is much more restricted among the bureaucrats of the National Defence
Agency.

In Canada, the Department of External Affairs and National

Defence co-operate with each other, as far as foreign and defence
policy-making is concerned.

The Japanese bureaucrats in the Defence

Agency, on the other hand, suffer the disadvantage of isolation from
the Foreign Affairs Ministry.

This has some effect on the degree of

flexibility and tolerance in their policy-making.
The Japanese military policies which support promotion of
increased independence from the U.S. by expanding national armed forces
may be near-sighted in terms of the dangerous developments in the Thirties
and the Forties.

On the other hand, Canada’s wide variety of policy
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.outputs may result in finding a means of escaping from an unacceptable
degree of military integration with the U.S., without significantly
increasing the cost of defence, such as Canada's support of the U.N.
Peace-keeping forces.
< Most important of all these factors is the geographical and
socio-cultural divergence between Canada and Japan.

Thid divergence

may indicate a possible direction of the two countries' military co
operation with the U.S., at least in the near future.

On the one hand,

Canada's heavy dependence on the U.S. will probably continue with little
chance

of reviving its strategic significance.

Japan, on the other

hand, is likely to continue to become more independent from the U.S.,
militarily, economically and politically.

Its rapid increase of military

expenditures and armed forces seems to suggest that it may expand its
military commitments over the western Pacific and Southeast Asian regions.
However, it is still too early to say that this will become a firm govern
mental policy in the near future.
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way of life was not being overly influenced by the U.S.
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The poll taken in September, 1950 showed the following result.
Question:

Should Japan be pro-American, pro-Soviet, or neutralist?

Answer:

Pro-American
Pro-Soviet
Neutralist
Others and don*t
know

557,
0
22
23

25. Ibid., pp. 102-21.
The poll on the same date showed this result:
Question:

Do you approve or disapprove the presence of U.S. base:
in Japan?

Answer:

Approve
Disapprove
Others and don*t know

307
38
32
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26. llildred A. Schwartz, _co. cit., p. 67.
Sixty-eight per cent thought it was good for Canada that so nuch develop
ment had been financed by U.S. money. (The poll was taken on July 13> 1956.)
27.

Ibid., p. 66 and p. 70.

28.

Douglas Hendel* Jr., ao. cit., pp. 102-21.

Question:

Uhy do you approve (or oppose) the presence of American
bases in Japan?

Answer:

Approve because
Self-defence inadequate
Fear Communist invasion
Others or no reason

February 1953 February'
4%
21%
3
5
1
7
33
8

Oppose because
Offence to national pride
Self-defence adequate
Hay involve us in war
H a m s national morals
Economic costs
Others or no reason

25

Ho opinion on bases
29.

20
14
9
4
11
58

11
7
4
5
8
7
42
"

34

Ibid., pp. 68-74.

Question:

Do you approve or oppose the idea that Japan needs milita:
forces?

Answer:
Approve
Oppose
Others or
Question:

don’t

Hay 1954
52%
30
know 18

August 1957
647.
19
17

Do you approve or oppose Japan’s rearmament?

Answer:
Approve
Oppose
Others or

don’t

January' 1953
50%
.
20
know 30

August 1957
31%
42
27

30. Ibid., pp. 68-74.
This poll was taken in- August, 1957.
Question:

Ifnat is the best way to protect Japan’s security?

Answer:

Our own forces
Collective security
American forces
Others or don’t know

37%
27
4
32
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31. Peyton Lyon* Canada in Uorld Affairs* 1961-63* Oxford University
Press, Toronto (I960), Appendix B.
September 1961
Question: TJhich country do you think is further ahead in the field
of long-range missiles and rockets--the U.S.A. or Russia?
Answer:

November 1961
Questi.on:

U.S.A.
Psussia
About the sane
Don*t know

21.2%
50.9
15.5
12.A

The Russian radio often claims that Russia wants to end
the Cold h'ar and seek only peace. Do you feel that this
is sincere, or do you think this is only propaganda?

Answer:

Sincere
Propaganda
Qualified (write in)
Don’t know

14.0%
73.4
2.8
9.9

Question:

Should war come, do you think it is more likely to arise
through the U.S.A., Russia or some other way?

Answer:

Both U.S.A. and Russia
U.S. ii.
Russia
China (volunteered)
Other way
Don’t know

25.3%
3.5
33.3
5.5
12.9
18.3

32. R.B. Byers, Canadian Foreign Policy and Selected Attentive
Publics, Prepared for the Department of External Affairs, (Unpublished),
December 1967.
Question:

Answer:

Some people think that the best way to prevent war is for
the Uest to increase its military strength so as to be more
powerful than theRussians. Others think that this would
lead us to an armed race which may cause a war. That do
you think? Should the Uest try to increase its military'
strength or not?

Yes, should increase
No, should not increase
Others or don’t know
(This poll was taken in November, 1962.)

58%
32
10
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33* Peyton Lyon, og. cit., Appendix B.
September 1961
Question: Some people say that Canada is becoming more and more
dependent on the U.S. for our air defence. Do you, or
do you not think thatthis is happening?
Answer:

Yes, it is happening
No, it is not happening
Can’t say

66.1$
19*4
14.2

Question: If Canada’s defence becomes merged more and more
with that of the U.S., would you approve or disapprove?
Answer:

Approve
Disapprove
No opinion

68.2$
21.7
10.1

34.
The Gallup Report, The Gallup Poll of Canada, The Canadian Insti
tute of Public Opinion, April 11, 1964*
Question: Canada’s defence policies are being argued about a good
deal. Which of these statements comes closest to what
you think Canada should do?
Answer:

The U.S. should take responsibility for
defending Canada
Canada should maintainher owndefence
Defence should be a joint effort between
Canada and the U.S.
Canada should disarmandbecome
aneutral nation
Can't say

3$
17
67
11
2

35* Tokyo Shimbun. July 19, 1959*
Question: Do you think that the new treaty will involve Japan in
war or make Japan more secure?
Answer:

Will involve Japan in war
Will guarantee Japan's security
Don't know

44*5$
21.5
34»0

Central Research Company (for the Prime Minister’s Office), October 9, 1959*
Question: Are you in favour of or opposed to Japan's general co
operation with the U.S. in the future?
Answer:

In favour
Opposed
Uncertain

53$
17
30
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36.

Central Research Company? December 1965.

Question:

Are you reassured or worried about Japan’s security in
the future?

Answer:

Reassured
Uorried
Don’t know

Question:

Do you, or do you not think that, as civilisation progresses,
the possibility of war decreases?

Answer:

Yes, decreases
No, does not decrease
Don’t know-

37.

Answer:

\Je now belong to the "free world" bloc. Do you think
that we should continue to be part of the "free world"
bloc, change to the Communist bloc, or be neutral?
The "free world" bloc
The Communist bloc
Neutral
Don’t know

50.0%
0.9
25.4
23.8

Ibid.

Question:

Answer:

39.

14.5%
59.7
25.8

Ibid.

Question:

38.

22.1%
49.3
29.1

If conditions cail for it, do you think that we should
be involved in war?
Should not be in war
Depends upon the conditions
Don *t know

75.8%
12.6
11.6

Ibid.

Question: Do you approve or oppose the Self-Defence Forces?
Answer:

40.

Approve
Oppose
Don’t .know

81.9%
4.9
13*2

R.B. Byers, op. cit., June 1967, pp. 85 and 95.

Question:

At the present time Canadian foreign policy places
considerable emphasis on the peacekeeping role. Do
you feel that this emphasis is—

Answer:

Not enough
About enough
Too much
Undecided
No answer

26.6%
54.4
15.2
2.5
1*3
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Question:

If Canada only had the military and financial capability
to support one of the following foreign policy activities
— NATO, HOP AD, or peacekeeping— which would you consider
most important?

An swe r :

P eaceke ep i ng
NATO
NOPAD
No answer

53.2%
26.5
15.2
5.1

-ibid., June 1967, p. 96.
Question:

Should Canada pursue a more independent foreign policy?

Answer:

Yes
No
Undecided
No answer

42*

63.3%
20.2
7.6
8.9

Ibid., June 1967, pp. 96 and 33.

Question:

In your opinion should Canada renew the NORAD agreement
with the United States in 1968?

An swe r:

Yes
No
Undecided
No answer

Question:

Presuming NATO continues after 1969 should Canada remain
a member of the alliance?

Answer:

Yes
No
Undecided
No answer

43.

63.3%
21.5
12.7
2.5

75.9%
13.9
9.9
1.3

The Gallup Report, Harch 28, 1970.

Question:

Do you think Canada is becoming more dependent on the
U.S., or less dependent, than it was, say, ten years ago?

More dependent
Less dependent
No difference
Can*t say

National
50%
22
18
10

Quebec
42%
22
15
19

Ontario
57%
20
15
8

Uest
54%
20
19
7
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Ibid., January 24, 1970.
Question:

/inewer:

Looking ahead ten years, which country do you think will
have the most to offer ordinary people for their happiness?
Canada
U.S.A.
Others
Canft say

54%
14
8
24

45. Yoniuri Shimbun Sha, Kirokut
vol. 2, p. 204.
April 7-9, 1968

Kokkai Anpo Ronso, Tokyo (1968),

Question:

They continue to produce nuclear weapons in Communist
China. Do you, or do you not feel threatened by it?

Answer:

Yes, strongly
Yes, somewhat
No, not at all
Can*t say
Others or don*t know
No answer

46.

35%
37
17
4
6
1

Ibid., p. 188.

Question:

Concerning relations with Communist China, which of the
following would you think the best?

Answer:

Remain intact
10%
Promote friendlier relations 35
Normalize relations
34
Keep out
8
Others or don*t know
22
No answer
1

47.

Asahi Shimbun, January 5, 1969.

Question:

Some people say that JapanTs economic prosperity in the
postwar period depends upon the American protection of
Japan. Do you approve or oppose this?

Answer:

Approve
Oppose
Others
No answer

48.

55%
26
6
13

Ibid.

Question:

Do you think that the U.S. soldiers and bases in Japan
are necessary or unnecessary to protect Japan today?
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Answer:

49.

28%
56
2
14

Ibid•

Question:

Answer:

50.

necessary
Unnecessary
Others
No answer

Do you, or do you not third; that the Americans will
seriously protect us in case of an emergency?
Yes, they will
No, they won*t
Others
No answer

24%
51
6
19

Mainichi Shimbun, July 1, 1968.

Question:

Answer:

Do you, or do you not think that the Self-Defence Forces
are necessary’’?
Necessary
Unnecessary’
Others

82%
15
3

51. John Holmes, "Canadian External Policies Since 1945," International
Journal, The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, XVIII, (Soring, ,
1963), pp. 137-47.
52.

Ibid.

53. Japan, Ministry of International Trade and Industry?, Japanese
Export Picture.
It shows that in 1952, for example, 65 per cent (or $800 million) of the
total exports of Japan was war income (offshore pr-ocurenents) resulting
from the Korean Mar.
54.

Shigeru Yosnida, _ojy. cit., p. 175.

55. David Cox, "Peace-keeping in Canadian Foreign Policy," An
Independent Foreign Policy for Canada?, Stephen Clarkson (cd.), McClelland
and Stewart Ltd., Toronto (1968), p. 188.
56. Richard Lowenthal, "Diplomacy and Revolution: The Dialectics of
Disputes," China Under Mao: Politics Takes Command, Roderick HcFarquhar
(ed.), The HIT Press, Cambridge, Hass. (1967).
57. Paul Martin, "Canada and United States1 Foreign Policies,"
Statements and Speeches, Information Division, Department of External Affairs,
No. 67/4.
58. Pierre Trudeau, "Canada and the Uorld," Statements and Speeches,
No. 68/17.
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f ootnotes

(Part II)

1. Canada, Department of Tnternal Affairs, Report of the Secretary
of State for External .Iffairs, The King’s Printer, Ottawa (1547), pp. 68-9.
2. Canada, Department of Internal Affair-, Annual Deport, 194G and
1949, The King *s Printer, Ottawa.
3. The nunber of officers increased from 259 in 1950 to 402 in 1959,
and the total nunber of enployecs were 1,350 in 1950 and 1,859 in 1959.
4. They are the Central Planning Staff, the Inspection Service, the
Special Research Bureau and the Departnental Advisor on Bilingualism.
5. Supreme Commander for the Allied Toners, Political Reorientation
of Japan, Report of the Government Section, September 1945 to September
1948, U.S. Go'/ernnont Printing Office, Uashington, D.C. (1943), viii.
6. The organization of the Hinistry of Foreign Affairs is referred
to in: ICohkai Benran (Handbook of the Diet), 43.8, Nihon ICeizai Shimbun
Sha, Tokyo (1968); Mainichi Nenkan (Mainichi Yearbook), 1966 and 1969,
Mainichi Shimbun Sha, Tokyo; and Asahi Nenkan (Asahi Yearbook), 1966,
Asahi Shimbun Sha, Tokyo.
7. Quoted from The Art of the Possible by James Eayrs, University
of Toronto Press, Toronto (1961), p. 43.
8. Si::ty-four higher officials have been chosen for this paper;
31 are officials at home and the rest are those who were posted abroad in
1968. These officials at home held such high positions as Under-Secretary,
Deputy Under-Secretary, Assistant Under-Secretary, Head of Division, or
Director General of Office in October, 1959. Those abroad were all ambas
sadors or high commissioners to important nations or international
organizations at the end of 1958. (The decision on what nations are
considered important is made by the author.)
9. This number excludes those who have left the Department tempo
rarily for education, military training and wartime services.
10. The data on education for one of these 64 officials is not
available.
11. Among then there are: 10 second Bachelor’s degrees, 28 Master’s
degrees, a second Master’s degree, 11 Bachelor of Law degrees, 5 Ph D s,
and 10 Doctor of Law degrees (including honorary degrees).
12. Among the 64 officials there are 27 who were torn in Ontario, 13
in Quebec, 4 in British Columbia, 3 each in Manitoba and Nova Scotia, 2
each in Hex: Brunswick and Saskatchewan, one in Newfoundland, and 9 in
foreign countries such as the U.S.(3), Chir.a(2), Britain(2), Russia(i) and
France(l).
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13. The top 5C officials in 1S6S are those who held such high positions
as remanent Vice-Minister, Foreign Affairs Counsellor, Chief of the
Minister*s Secretariat, Chief of Bureau, Chief of the Training Institute,
Chief of the Osaka Local Liaison'Office, Vice-Chief of Bureau, Chief of
Protocol, Chief of the International Haterial Department, and 36 ambas
sadors (considered important by the author).
14. Of the fifteen, ten have been temporarily transferred to the
llinistry of International Trade and Industry.
15.

James Eayrs, op. cit., p. 12.

16. S. Barry Farrell, The Making of Canadian Foreign Policy, PrenticeIlall of Canada, Ltd., Scarborough, Ontario (1566), p. 12.
17.

James Eayrs, o£. cit., p. 3.

IS.

11.3. Farrell, _on. cit., p. 12.

19. He 'eras an associate professor of law before elected to the House
of Commons in 1565. As an HP, he was appointed Parliamentary Secretary to
the Prime Minister (1566 and 1967) and minister of Justice and Attorney
General of Canada (1667).
20. R. MacGregor Dawson, The Government of Canada, 4th ed., University
of Toronto Press, Toronto (1963), p. 204.
21.

R.B. i’arrell, op• ext., p. 13.

22.

Mainichi llenkan, 1969.

23. Yosliida had been an ambassador to Great Britain before the Second
Horld liar and one of the leading officials in the llinistry ofForeign
Affairs. Ashida also started his career in the Foreign llinistry, became
a Dietnan and was reputed to be most fluent in English in the Diet. Kishi
was a career man in the Ministry of International Trade and Industry.
Sato, a brother of Hobusuke Kishi, was also a career man in the Ministry
of Transport before he was elected to the House of Representatives in 1949.
24. Naoki Kobayashi, Kenpo o Yomu (Comprehending the Constitution),
Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo (1966), pp. 164-5.
25. Junsei Misawa, ”3eisaku Kettei Katei no Gaikan" (Outlook of the
Folicy-Making Frocess), Hempo: Se1jigaku, 1967, Nihon Seijigaku Kai (ed.),
Iwanari Shoten, Tokyo (1967), pp. 16-7.
26. Ail Brine Ministers except Tetsu Katayana have represented conser
vative parties. Katayana was a Socialist and formed a Socialist coalition
government with the conservatives in 1947.
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27. In the Department of Internal Affairs there have been seven
Ministers: L. St. Laurent, L. Pearson, J. Diefenbaher, S. Smith, IT.
Green, P. Martin and II. Sharp. Seven in the Department of finance:
I). Abbott, II.
Harris, D. Fleming, G. ITowlan, h. Gordon, If. Sharp- and
II. Benson; seven in the Department of Trade and Commerce: J. MacKinnon,
C. Hotre, G. Churchill, G. Heec, II. Sharp, R. I/inters and C. Drury § and
si;: in the Department of national Defence: B. Clanton, S. Campney, G.
Fearkes, D. Harkness, p. He 1Iyer and L. Cadieu::.
28. 'All Foreign Ministers in the period are: S. Yoshida, II. Ashida,
R. Menoto, K.
Hirokawa,IT. Okazaki, IT. Shigemitsu, II. Kishi, A. Fujiyama,
2. Kosaka, II.
Ohira, S.Shiina, T. Hiki, B. Sato and K. Aichi. There have
been thirteen Ministers of finance: T. Ishibashi, 3. Yano, T. Hurusu, T.
Kitamura, S. Izuniyana, II. Ike da, T. Mukai, 3. Ogasawara, II. Ichinada, 2.
Sato, II. ITisuta, IT. Tanaka and T. Fukudaj twenty-two Ministers of Inter
national Trade and Industry: J. Iloshijina, C. Kisutani, 3. Oya, IT.
Inagaki, H. Ikeda, S. Takase, R. Yokoo, R. Takakashi, S. Ogasawara, 3.
Okano, IT. Aichi, T. Ishibashi, II. Misuta, 3. Maeo, T. Takasaki, II. Ishii,
E. Shiina, II. Fukuda, Y. Sakurauchi, T. Iliki, M. Sugano, and II. Ohira§
twenty-two Directors General of the Rational Defence Agency: 3. Yoshida,
A. ITimura, 3. Hinura, A. Cugihara, -3. Sunada, II. Funada, T. Ishibashi, H.
Kotaki, J. Tsushima, G. Sato, 3. Ino, M. Akagi, II. Esaki, IT. ITishimura,
S. Fujieda, IT. Shiga, T. Fukuda, J. Koizumi, Y. Mat sumoto, E. Kambayashiyama, IT. Masuda and IT. Arita.
29. Marren Tsuneishi, Japanese Political Style, Harper and Ron7
Publishers, New York. (1966), p. 49; and Robert Yard, Japanese Political
System, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N . J . (1967), pp. 95-5.
30. Takeshi Ishida, “Yoron to Gaiko Seisaku." (Public Opinion and
Foreign policy-IIaking), Sek.ai, July 1967, p. 37.
31.

R.B. Farrell, on. cit», p. 170 .

32.

Ibid., p. 161.

33.

Junsei Ilisawa, _on. cit., p. 31.

34. For exanple, a large number of Canadians (46!4) were dissatisfied
with the defence policy of the Diefenbaker Government in 1960, and a
majority of Canadians (62k) approved nuclear weapons for the Canadian
Forces in 1961. Although government policy had changed very little in
reaction to these public opinion poll results, the people did not
actively oppose the government. (For the public opinion poll results,
see R.B. Byers, pjrepared for the Department of External Affairs,
Canadian Foreign Policy and Selected Attentive Publics, pp. 67-9.)
35.

Robert Yard, _oe. cit., n. 91.

35.
J.R. Mallory, “The Structure of Canadian Politics,“ Farty
Politics in Canada, High G. Thorbura, Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd.,
Toronto’ (1963),""p. 24."
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37*

Ibid., p. 26.

38. The definition of "cadre” and "mass” parties is ta!:en from
F.C. Engelnann and 11.A. Schwartz, Political Parties and the Canadian
Social Structure? Trentice-Hall of Canada* Ltd., Scarborough, Ontario
(1967), ”p.~ 6.
39. In the
of seats (143),
had to set up a
Democratic (121

1947 election, the Socialist Tarty non the largest nunber
but, since it was far from the majority (234 seats), it
coalition povernnent with the Liberal (131 seats) and
seats) Parties, both of which were conservatives.

40. Canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs,
Uinutes of Proceedings and Evidence, Ottawa, Hay 30, 1967.
41.

S.3. Farrell, <on. cit., p. 161.
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FOOTNOTES
(I art III) .

1.
It was the British rrimc Ilinister Uinston Churchill, who
first used the famous phrase, "iron curtain," in his telegram to U.S.
President Harry Truman in Hay, 1945. Since then, Churchill devoted
himself to warning the U.S. and other European allies of the Soviet
Coronunist threat in Euroce on various occasions.
2.

John Gellner, Canada in KATO, The Eyerson Press, Toronto (1970),

p. 5.
3. Escott Eeid, "The Birth of the Forth Atlantic Alliance,"
International Journal, vol. XXII, Summer 1967, p. 427.
4. Statement of Prime Ilinister King, quoted by E.A. Spencer, in
Canada in Torld Affairs, Oxford University Press, Toronto (1967), vol. V,
1946-1949, pp. 249-50.“
5. Escott Eeid, "The Birth of the Forth Atlantic Alliance," on. cit.,
pp. 428-29.
6. The Brussels Treaty was concluded between Britain, France, Belgium,
the Ketherlands and Luxemburg on Uarch 17, 1948. The most important part
of the Treaty was Article 4, which based the defence policy of the treaty
partners on the principle of "one for all and all for one," without room
for evasion or limitation of responsibilities.
7. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, Statement of Secretary of State
for External Affairs St. Laurent, 1948, vol. IV, p. 3449.
8. The Vandenberg Eesolution allowed the U.S. Government to pursue
within the U.K. Charter its participation in "regional and other arrange
ments for individual and collective self-defence."
9.

John Gellner, ov» cit., p. 14.

10. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, Statement of Secretary of State
for External Affairs Pearson, 1949, vol. I, p. 239.
11. Article 2 of the Forth Atlantic Treaty reads:
The Farties will contribute toward the further development of peace
ful friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions,
by bringing about a better understanding on the principle upon which these
institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and
well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international
economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any
or all of them.
12. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, Statement of George Drew, 1949,
vol. Ill, pp. 2066-71.
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13. Jon B. lieLin, Canada* Changing Defence Policy, 1957-1963,
The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore (1967), p.12.
14. Aignes J. Groone, If.J. Coldwell and C.C.F. Foreign Policy,
(li.A. Thesis), University of Saskatchwan, Regina (1967), p.214.
15. llichael Barkway, ''Atlantic Pact— lie;; Horizons," Saturday Night,
May 2, 1950, p.11.
16. Escott Reid, "Canada and the North Atlantic Alliance," Behind
the Headlines, vol. XXVII, June, 1969.
17. Brooke Claxton, Speech to the House of Commons, on February 5,
1951, quoted fron Canada in NATO, by John Gellner, oj>. cit., pp.26-8.
18.

Jon B. Me Lin, _0 £. cit., pp.173-5.

19.

Ibid.

20. Yasukichi Yasuba, "Anerika
(The Economic Foreign Policy of the
Kankei no Xenkvu, (The Study of the
Takagi (ed.), Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan

Tai-lTichi Keizai Gaiko Seisaku,11
U.S. towards Japan), ITichi-Bei
Japanese-U.S. Relations), Hasshaku
ICai, Tokyo (1968), vol.I, pp.260-69.

21. Sone examples which show social instability at that tine are
incidents such as the Taira, Shinoyana, Hitaka and llatsukawa Incidents.
22.

The American Economic Aid to Japan, 1946-52
in millions of U.S. dollars
Gifts
loans
Year
Total
14.0
1946-8
965.7
979.1
1949
501.5
501.5
1950
365.3
365.3
1951
290.3
'290.3
63 .'6
1952
63.6
Source:U.S. Foreign Assistance and Assistance from International
Organisation, United States Aid.

23. Shigeru Yoshida, The Yoshida Memoirs, The Riverside Press,
Cambridge, Mass. (1962), pp. 264-5.
24.

Ibid., p. 266.

25. Katsuo Okazaki, in the three-man talk on "Gyosei Kyotei no
Jittai o Tsuku," (Talk about the Truth of the Administrative Agreement),
K aizo, April 1952, pp. 51-2.
26. The article read:
The conditions which shall govern the disposition of armed forces
of the United States of America in and about Japan shall be determined
by administrative agreements between the two governments.
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27.

Shigeru Yoshida* op. cit.> p. 269.

28.

Ibid., p. 270.

29. The Agreement ras ratified by all members of NATO other than
the U.S. in June, 1951. Uhat it was mainly concerned with was that an
offence committed while the offender was on official duty should be
judged by United States military courts, while an offence committed
when off duty should be judged by the courts of the country in which
the offender was stationed.
This agreement was opposed by the U.S. Senate on the grounds that
the American forces were remaining in Europe in order to preserve the
freedom of the Europeans.
30. The public opinion poll taken by Yomiuri Shimbun on September
29-October 2, 1951 showed the uncertainty of the public whether the
Security Treaty would increase Japan's security.
Question:

Do you think the Security Treaty between the U.S. and
Japan md.ll increase our security?

Answer:

Yes
No
Don't know

31.1%
16.4
52.5

31. Kirotake ICoyama, et. al., Aapo Joyaku Ron so Shi, (Historical
Survey of the Security Treaty Controversies),Shakai
Shimpo, Tokyo
(1968), pp. 16-18.
32.

Ibid.

33.

Katsuo Okazaki, _op. cit., p. 50.

34.

Mainichi Shimbun, September 14-15, 1951.

Question:

Do you support the Japan-U.S. Security Pact?

Answer:

Yes
No
Donft knowOther answers
Don't know the Pact

79.9%
6.8
10.4
2.4
0.5

35.
Hitoshi Ashida, "Kempo mTa Nishukan de Dekitaka?", (Symposium:
t/as the Constitution made in two weeks?), Kaizo, Special Issue, 1952,
pp. 19-20.
^
The first paragraph of Article 9 of the Constitution reads:
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and
order, the Japanese poople forever renounce war as a sovereign right of
the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling inter
national disputes.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

152

And the second paragraph of the Article originally read as follows:
Land* sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will
never be maintained; the right of belligerency of the state will
not be recognised.
Foreign Ilinister Ashida merely added: "In order to accomplish the aim
of the preceding paragraph," in front of the original second paragraph.
Thus, remains the possibility of interpreting the whole Article to
allow Japan to keep the right of self defence.
36.

Hainichi Shimbun Sha, Anpo to Jleitai, on. cit., pp. 19-30

37*
Ibid. There were 380,000 applicants forthe fixed
number
of jobs— 75,000. The 'wage was 4,500 yen per month,and aretirement
pension of 60,000 yen was also guaranteed.
38.

Ibid., p. 43*

39.

Yasukichi Yasuba, on. cit., Appendix 5, p. 315.

40. During the negotiations, the U.S. insisted that the Japanese
forces be increased to 350,000, and, possibly in the future, take over
the military role in the Far East which had been played by the U.S.
But Japan refused the U.S. request, because of these internal
conditions: (1) legal condition (the Constitution), (2) political
and social condition (the completion of peace education), (3) economic
condition (the domestic instability of the economy)* (4) practical
condition (the impossibility of collecting enough people). Finally,
in October, Japanls offer to increase men to 180,000 in three years
was accepted by the U.S. in 1953. (Anpo to Jieitai, o p . cit., pp. 49-54.)
41. J.L. Granatstein(ed.), Canadian Foreign Policy since 1945,
The Copp Clark PublishingCo., Toronto (1969), p. 93.
42.

John Gellner, ^on. cit., pp. 50-53.

43.

Jon B. McLin, _0£. cit., Chapter III.

44.

Ibid., p. 41.

45. The final sampleof the Canadian Institute ofPublicOpinion
showed a-37 to 43 per cent margin for the Liberals, although the final
result of the Gallup Poll showed, in mid-March, 1958, 56 per cent of
valid votes for the Conservatives. (J. Hurry Beck, Pendulum of PowTcr,
Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., Scarborough, Ontario, 1968.)
46. Canada, Department of External Affairs, External Affairs,
June 1958.
47. Prime Minister John Diefenbaker’s Statement on September 23,
1958. (See Jon B. McLin, _££. cit., Appendix II.)
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48.

John Gellner, o£. cit., p. 61.

49. Prime Minister Diefenbaker*s Statement on September 23, 1958,
op. cit.
50.

Jon B. HcLin,

cit., p. 146.

51.

John Gellner, _o p . cit., p. 44.

52.

Ibid., pp. 59-60.

53. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, Statement of Lester Fearson,
1959, vol. II, p. 1225.
54. Quoted from Canada in ITATO, by John Gellner, Statement of Lester
Pearson, p. 62.
55. Peyton Lyon, Canada in T.'orld Affairs, Oxford University Press,
Toronto (1968), vol. XII, 1961-63, p. 124.
56. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, Statement of Lester Pearson,
1962-63, vol. Ill, p. 3117.
57. Donald Smiley, The Canadian Politcal Nationality, Ilethuen,
Toronto (1967), xii.
58.

Ibid.

59. The Gallup Poll on Popularity of the Progressive Conservative
Party and the Liberal Party. 1957-1963:
PC
Lib
August 1957
35%
47%
Januarv 1958
50
35
September 1960
43
38
September 1961
32
47
Hav 1962
36
44
February 1963
33
44
Source: J.M. Beck, _op. cit., pp. 291-373.
60. Both CAGE and the CF-105 Arrow (aircraft) had been developed
bi' the Canadian Defence Hesearch Board in order to discover a cheaper
alternative to the American-developed semi-automatic ground environment
system (SAGE) and Bomarc aircraft.
61. Canada, Department of Defence Production, Deport of the Depart
ment of Defence Production, 1959, The Queen’s Printer, Ottawa (1960), p. 25.
62.

U.S. Expenditures in Canada
1957 - 1958
1957 Can. $61.1 million
1958
68.2

1957
1958

1957 - 1958
Can. $36.1 million
41.7
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62.

U.S. Expenditures in Canada
1959 - 1962
1959 Can. $96.3 million
1960
112.7
142.3
1961
254.3
1962

Canadian E:q?enditures in U.S.
1959 - 1962
1959
Can. $31.2 million
1960
58.7
51.8
1961
37.7
1962

Source: Canada, Department of Defence Production, Report of the
Department of Defence Production, (1957-62).
63. John Uamock, "Canada and North American Defence," Alliances
and Illusions: Canada and the NATO - NORAD Question, H.G. Hurting
Ltd., Publishers, Edmonton (1969), pp. 47-43.
64. Douglas K. Mendel, Jr., The Japanese People and Foreign Policy,
University of California Press, Berkley and Los Angeles, Calif. (1961),
pp. 102-121.
The public opinion poll results in October 1957 and February 1958
show strong opposition to the presence of U.S. bases in Japan.
Question:

Do you approve or oppose the presence of U.S. bases in
Japan?

Answer:
Approve
Oppose
Don*t know

October 1957
18%
60
22

February 1953
8%
58
34

65. Theodore McNelly, Contemporary Government of Janan, Houghton
Mifflin Co., Boston, Mass. (1963;, p. 197.
66. George Packard III, Protest in Tokyo: The Security Treaty
Crisis of 1960, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. (1966),
pp. 3-10.
67.

Hirotake Koyama, _op. cit., p. 78.

68* Asahi Janaru (weekly magazine), November 1, 1959.
These four principles arc taken from Foreign Minister Fujiyama*s
answers to the publicly-announced questionnaire from the academics.
69.
The provision of economic co-operation was seen not only in
the North Atlantic Treaty (Article'2), but also in the U.S.-Philippines
Mutual Defence Treaty (Article 2), the AN2US Treaty (Article 2), the
U.S.-Korea Security Treaty (Article 2), the S3NT0 Treaty (Articles 2 and
3) and the U.S.-Formosa Treaty (Articles 2 and 3). However, the Foreign
Minister particularly stressed the importance of the Ottawa Proclamation
of the NATO Council in September, 1951, and the result of the NATO Council
in Paris in May, 1956, both of which dealt with economic and political
co-operations among the NATO partners. Later the Prime Minister agreed
with the Foreign Minister. (Morinosuke Kajima, Nihon no Heiwa to Anzen
(Peace and Security of Japan), The Kajima Kenkyujo, Tokyo (1969), pp<> 57-67.)
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70.

Theodore HcUelly,

71,

Douglas H» llendel, Jr., _o d * cit,, pp. 101-110,

72*

Ibid,, p, 95 and pp. 115-16.

ojd .

cit,, p, 181,

73. The public opinion polls shown in Protest in Tokyo by George
Packard III, (pp. 147-52), and in The Japanese People and Foreign Policy
by Douglas llendel, Jr., (p. 102).
Question:

Do you approve or oppose the presence of the U.S. bases
in Japan?

Answer:

Oct. 1957 Feb. 1958 July 1959
Approve
187,
8%
31%
Oppose
60
58
28
Don’t know
22
34
41

74.

George Packard III, on* cit., pp. 82-90.

75. The People’s Council for Preventing the Revision of the
Security Treaty was composed of the JSP, JCP (an observer), The
National Federation of Neutral labour Unions, Tofr/o Joint Struggle
Council for Safe-Guarding Peace and Democracy, and another 134
organisations throughout the country. (Protest in Tokvo, pp. 120-24.)
76. One of the most crucial splits in the Japan
Socialist
Party was that of the Kishio faction, the right-wing. The more than
30 members of the Nishio faction organized their ox;n party— The Democratic
Socialist Party, in January, 1960.
77. Shuzo Hayashi, "Nichi-Bei Anzen Hosho to 1970-nen," (The JapanU.S. Security Treaty and the Year 1970), 1970-nen Ilondai, ( Problems in
1970), Kokumin Kosa: Nihon no Anzen Hosho (ed.), Kara Shobo, Tokyo (1968).
78. Asahi Janaru, February 28, 1960, and June 5-29, 1960.
Both terms were considered very important in relation to Japan’s
involvement in American wars in the Southeast Asian and Far Eastern
regions, where the Vietnam War, the Korean tension and the U-2 Incident
were great controversial issues.
79. Ryoichi Ando, "Sono Yo no Kokkai o Mokugeki shite," (Witnessing
the Diet procedure that night), Ampo: 1960, Yoshimi Usui (ed.), Tsukuma
Shobo, Tokyo (1969), pp. 105-9.
80. Robert Scalapino and Junnosuke Nasuni, Parties and Politics in
Contemporary Japan, University of California Press, Berkley and Los
Angeles (1962), pp. 134-36.
The result of a poll taken shortly after the Hay 19 Incident by
Asahi Shimbun showed the Kishi cabinet as least popular in the postwar
period.
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Question:

Do you support the Cabinet?

.Answer:

Kishi
Hay 1960
Yes
12%
Ho
58
Don*t knot; or
indifference
30

Hatoyana
August 1956
29%
41

Yoshida
llay 1954
23%
48

30

Ashida
July 1948
16%
52

29

32

81. The Treaty had been approved by the House of Representatives
on May 19, I960* According to the Constitution of Japan, a treaty would
cone into effect automatically thirty days after ratification by the
lower house, if not approved before that tine by the House of Councillors*
Therefore, June 15 was only a few days before the automatic effectiveness
of the new Security Treaty*
82.

Yasukichi Yasuba, 0£. cit., p. 313.

83.

Ibid., Appendix 2-1.

84. The first Defence Programme (1958-1960)
Ground Self-Defence Force: 180,000 men, 20,000 reserves.
Maritime Self-Defence Force: 34,000 men, 124,000 tons, 200 airplanes.
Air Self-Defence Force: 41,586 men, 1,300 airplanes, 24 radar locations.
Estimated Expenditures: Approximately $1,260 million.
85.

U.S. Troops in Japan, 1955-60
in number oi men
Army
Navy
Air Force Total Ho.
--—
150,000
1955
—
—
117,000
1956
20,000
40,000
17,000
77,000
1957
10,000
18,000
65,000
37,000
1958
6,000
17,000
35,000
58,000
1959
5,000
1960
14,000
27,000
46,000
Source: Asahi Shimbun Sha, Jieitai,

p. 266.

86. The second Defence Programme (1962-1966)
Ground Self-Defence Force: 180,000. (The first Programme had the same
number, but altogether 28,500 men still had to be reci'uited to reach the
number 180,000.)
Maritime Self-Defence Force: 143,569 tons, 235 airplanes.
Air Self-Defence Force: 1,036 airplanes (priority placed on F-104 J fighters).
Estimated Expenditures: Approximately $3,611 million.
87.

Asahi Shimbun Sha, _on. cit., pp. 160-63.

88.

Ibid., pp. 156-59.
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Ranking o£ the Top Ten Defence Industries in Japan? 1962-66
in millions of yen
Name of Company
1963
1965
1966
1962
1964
ilitsubishi Nihon Heavy
1
Industry
(87.
Shin ilitsubishi Heavy
i
2
I
I
‘ 2r
(81.5) (55.0) (100.9) (203.8) (200.3)
Industry
3
5
3
i
6
Kawasaki Airplane
Industry
(56.3) (19.5) (19.4) (43.7) (67.0)
4
3
Ishikawajina-Karima
2
2
2
Heavy Industry
(36.3) (53.1) (37.9) (92.4) (70.2)
5
Ilitsubishi Shipping
Company
(30.6)
10
Komatsu Industry
6
7
(16.5) (21.5)
(26.6)
Nippon Steel
7
4
(25.9)
(24.2)
Ilitsubishi Electric
3
4
5
8
(22.5)
(25a) (23.4) (l8o7) (36.6)
10
10
Fuji Heavy Industry
9
8
(22.0)
_(17 *5) (22.9) _ (19.2)
10
10
Nippon Oil
(15.3) (14*4)
4
Kawasaki Heavy
6
Industry
(23«1)
(28.7)
itihon Hlectric
6
1
1
(16.6) (19.3) (24.8) (22.5)
Sumitomo Shoji
7
9
. (19.5)
05.4)
Mitsui Shipping Co.
9
(20.7)
Uraga Heavy
9
Industry
(14.8)
Nippon Aviatronics
1
(108.1)
Hitachi Limited
4
(37.5)
Nippon Kokan
5
(22.3)
Maisuru Heavy
9
Industry
(18.1)
Shin lieiwa
5
8
Electric
(36.3) (20.4)
1

89.

Note: Shin Mitsubishi Heavy Industry became Mitsubishi Heavy
Industry after it nerved with Ilitsubishi Nihon Heavy
Industry in June> 1962*
Source: Asahi Shimbun Sha> Jieitai; Appendix.
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90. The Agreement was concluded between Japan’s M r Marshall
Misoo Matsunae and U.S. Commander Robert U. Burns on September 2, 1959.
It regulated the operational management of the Japanese sky* in which
.Japan managed its own commanding authority completely independent and
separated from that of the U.S., in theory. In practice, however, ASDF
operated in close co-operation with the American system of command.
91.

Asahi Shimbun Sha, 0£. cit., pp. 24-7.

92. John Uamock, "Canada and the Alliance System," Canadian
Dimension, Uinnipeg, vol. 3, 1966, pp. 36-9.
93. The doctrine of "flexible response" originated in the state
ment of Christian Herter, the noninee for the U.S. Secretary of Defence.
He said, in April, 1959, "I cannot conceive of any President involving
us in all-out nuclear war unless the facts showed clearly that we are
in danger of all-out devastation ourselves." It meant that dependence
upon strategic and tactical nuclear weapons would be reduced, and that
the provision for conventional forces would be increasingly emphasized.
94.

John Gellner, _o p . cit., p. 77.

95. Lester Pearson, "A New Kind of Peace Force," Maclean*s,
May 2, 1964.
96. The French Government under General de Gaulle had been reducing
its military contribution to NATO ever since 1959, when .the doctrine of
"flexible response" was introduced by the U.S. On March 11, 1966, it
finally proposed to withdraw completely from the military organization
of NATO and, three weeks later, addressed the memorandum to the other
14 NATO countries, setting April 1, 1967, as the date when allied instal
lations had to be removed from French soil.
97. Harold von Reilchoff, "NATO: To Stay or Not to Stay," An Inde
pendent Forei.'m Policy for Canada?, Stephen Clarkson (ed.), McClelland
and Stewart Ltd., Toronto (1968), p. 167.
98. Statement of Prime Minister Lester Pearson, quoted from Canada
in NATO by John Gellner, p. 86 .
99. James Steele, "Canada’s Vietnam Policy: The Diplomacy of
Escalation," An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada?, p. 69.
100. John Holms, The Better Part of Valour: Essays on Canadian
Diplomacy, McClelland and Stewart Ltd., Toronto (1970), p. 169.
101. Lester Pearson, "Canada, the United States and Vietnam,"
Statements and Speeches, Information Division, Department of External
Affairs, No. 67/8
102.

Japan, Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Japanese
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Export Picture, 1967, Tokyo.
103.

The Christian Science Monitor, February 23, 1967.

104. Pierre Trudeau,"Canada and the World," Statements and Speeches,
No. 68/17.
105.

Ibid., .April 12, 1968.

106.

John Gellner, _on. cit., p. 100.

107.

Pierre Trudeau, Statements and Speeches, April 3, 1969.

108.

John Holmes, on. cit., p. 166.

109. Address by Dalton Camp, in the Progressive Conservative Party,
Report on the Montmorency Conference, August 7-19, 1967, Ot tax/a•
110. David Cox, "Canadian Defence Policy: The Dilemma of a Middle
Power," Behind the Headlines, November 1968, vol. XXVII, no.5.
111.

R. Barry Farrell, The Making of Canadian Foreign Policy, p. 76.

112.

John Holmes, _oji. cit., Chapter 5, part 1.

113.

Lester Pearson, op. cit.

114. Robert Reford, "Merchant of Death?”, Behind the Headlines,
vol. XXVII, October 1968, no. 4.- p. 18.
115. Walter Stewart, "Proudly We Stand the *Butcner*s Helper* in
Southeast Asia," Maclean*s, March 1970, p.13.
116. Canada, Department of National Defence, Canadian Defence
Commodities, The Queen*s Printer, Ottawa (1967).
117. Site I (Thule, Greenland) and Site II (Clear, Alaska) are under
the U.S. Air Force Air Division Command, 9th Aerospace Division, and
Site III (Fylingdale Moor, England) cones under the PvOyal Air Force
Fighter Command, xd.th a detachment of U3AF ADC*s71st Surveillance.
(Marian Talnadge and Iris Gilmore, NORAD, Dodd, Mead & Company, New York,
1967, pp. 36-8.)
118.

John Wamock, "Canada and the North American Defence," p. 67.

119.

Ibld.,

120.

The Windsor Star (Windsor, Ontario), January 6 , 1970.

121.

Time, March 2, 1970,

122.

Yomiuri Shimbun Sha, "Gaiko-Boci Seisaku ni taisuru Yoron,"

p.64.

n. 28.
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(Public Opinion on Foreign and Defence Policies), Kiroku: Kokkai Anno
Ronso, (Report: Debates on the Security Treaty in the House of Repre
sentatives), Tokyo (196S), vol. 2.
123. Statement of Prine Ilinister Sato, translated by the author,
Yoniuri Shinbun Sha, _op. cit., p. 71.
124. The Hawk, the Hike Hercules, the llace 3 missile and many other
manned bombers are reported all to be equipped with nuclear warheads.
125. Tadao Hisazuni, "Anzen Hosho Rongi ni okeru Okinawa Ilondai,"
(The Question of Okinawa in relation to the Security Treaty), Anzen
Hosho to Hichi-Bel Hankei, (The Security Question and the JapaneseAnerican Relations), Kokunin Koza: Nihon no Amzen Hosho Iinkai (ed.),
Hara Shobo, Tokyo (1968), pp. 167-200.
126. The American installations in Okinawa covers nearly one-fourth
of the entire land. There are more than 100 bases, including 23 main
ones. B-52 missions to Vietnam are staged from Kadeno airfield, one of
the biggest bases in Okinawa. (The New York Tines, November 22, 1969)
127. The three principles are: 1) not producing nuclear weapons;
2) not having nuclear weapons; 3) not acquiring nuclear weapons from
abroad.
128.

Yoniuri Shimbun Sha, 0£. cit., p. 56.

129.

The New York Times, November 20, 1069.

130.

Ibid., November 21, 1969.

131. Masao Hakiuchi, "ICaku Seito no Eoci Seisaku," (The Defence
Policy of Each Party), 1970-nen Ilondai, (Problems of the Year 1970),
Kokurain Koza: Nihon no Anzen Hosho Iinkai (ed.), Hara Shobo, Tokyo (196S),
pp. 85-101.
132. Policies of the opposition parties towards the Security Treaty
and the Okinawa problem are mainly referred to in : Tadao Hisazuni, op.
cit., and Masao Hakiuchi, op. cit.
133.

Asahi Shinbun Sha, Jieitai, p. 156.

134.

Ibid., p.77.

135. Mainichi Shimbun Sha, /repo to Jieitai, p. 76.
The total
estimates of $6,500 million for the third Defence Programme were divided
in these categories:
$2,925 million (45%)
Personnel expenses
$3,575 million (55%)
Non-personnel expenses.
O f the non-personnel expenses, taking $3,575 million as 100 per cent:
$1,339 million (SS?,)
Non-weapons expenses
$2,236 million (62%)
Defence weapons expenses.
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Of the defence weapons expenses* taking $2*236 million as 100 per cent:
$1,476 nillion (66")
Renovation of old weapons expenses
$ 760 million (34")
Net; weapons expenses.
136. Herbert p. 3ix, "The Security Treaty System and the Japanese
Military-Industrial Complex," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars,
January 1970, vol. 2, no. 2, p. 38.
137.

Ibid., p. 40.

138.

Ibid., p. 32.

139.

Mainichi Shinbun Sha, _ojo. cit., pp. 103-4.

140.

Ibid., p. 89.

141.

Ibid., p. 128.
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FOOTHOTEB
(Conclusion)

1. Janes Eayrs, "The Military Policies of Contemporary Canada:
Principles, Problens, Precepts, Prospects," Contemporary Canada, Diehard
II. Leach (ed.), Duke University Press, Durban, U.C. (1967), p. 242.
2. Canada, Department of National Defence, The Unite laner on
Defence, 1964, Otta*.'a.
According to the Paper, the equipment expenses wore to increase fron 13.3
per cent to 25 per cent in the years 1264 to 1974, by way of reducing the
nunber of men under ams.

4. In the ten years 1955-1964, the average increase of military
expenditures in Japan was 6.7 per cent annually. But the rate of increa
of the 1965 military'' expenditures was 19.9 per cent, compared to the 11.
per cent increase in 1964 expenditures.
5. Canada, House of Commons, Debates, Statement ofSecretary
for External Affairs Lester Pearson, 1949, vol. I, p. 239.

of Gtate

6 . Canada, Department of External Affairs, Foreign Policy for
Canadians— Europe, The Cueen’s Printer, Ottawa (1970), p* 15.

7. See the section on the Attitude of the Public towards the U.S.
in this paper.
8.

See footnote 49 in Part I of this paper.

S. The Gallup Report, the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion,
December 31, 1969.
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VITA AUCTORIS

KIBOUU ICATC was born in Japan on June 1, 1942, in
the city of Soka, just north of Tokyo.

One of four

sons of Hr. and Ilrs. Shoichi Kato of Soka, Japan,
he studied Lav? at Taseda University in Tokyo and
obtained his Bachelor of Arts depree there.
Follov?in3 his study of English at the
American Language Institute in San Francisco, he
entered the University of Toronto for a nake-up
year and, in 1969, v?as enrolled in the Faculty of
Graduate Studies at the University of Uindsor.
He married Carol Arikado, a Japanese Canadian,
in June 1970.
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